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Amy B. Murphy-Nugen 
FROM HOMEOWNERSHIP TO FORECLOSURE:  
EXPLORING THE MEANINGS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATE WITH THE LIVED  
EXPERIENCE OF FORECLOSURE 
This study is an interpretative phenomenological analysis that explored the 
meanings homeowners associated with their lived experience of foreclosure. In the wake 
of the 2006 housing crash and 2008 Great Recession, questions have been posed about 
the continued efficacy of homeownership as an asset-based strategy. In addition, the 
conversation has been dominated by traditional economic and business interests. 
Discussions about housing policy and foreclosure response have marginalized the voice 
of vulnerable populations. The literature on housing policy reflects a positivist 
perspective that privileges analysis of unit production, economic costs and benefits. 
Secondary attention is given to exploring housing and foreclosure from a critical and 
constructivist standpoint. Consequently, this study intentionally engaged people who 
have experienced foreclosure. Depth and meaning were uncovered through interpretative 
phenomenological analysis. A purposive sample of five homeowners who experienced 
foreclosure was identified. The five homeowners participated in semi-structured 
interview. Transcribed interviews were analyzed using the six-step process articulated for 
interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA). IPA combines three philosophical 
foundations—phenomenology, hermeneutics, and idiography—to approach qualitative 
and experiential research. The findings of this study discovered that foreclosure 
represents disconnection for the participants. Specifically, due to experiencing 
foreclosure, participants felt separated from their self-identity, from housing finance 
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literacy, from their relationship with their mortgage lender and servicers, from the 
benefits of homeownership and from self-sufficiency due to their social service-based, 
helping-based, and/or low-wage employment. Study findings both affirm and challenge 
relevant theoretical frameworks. In addition, this research underscores the need for social 
work education to address financial literacy. Further, social work practitioners should be 
prepared to either provide or refer consumers to home-buyer education and training. 
Social workers should also challenge exploitative consumer practices and offer 
empowering alternatives in their place. Lastly, this research offers strategies and practices 
to strengthen housing policy and foreclosure response for the benefit of consumers.  
 
                                                              
 Margaret E. Adamek, Ph.D., Chair 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
A white picket fence, a lush green yard, a welcoming front door, a family room 
where relatives and neighbors gather to share the mundane, celebrate milestones, and 
comfort one another in time of need. These images evoke the quintessential 
homeownership experience that culturally defines the American Dream. A broken fence, 
an overgrown or brittle brown yard, a bank notice on the door, boarded up windows 
barring recent homeowners but providing shelter for criminal activity. Conversely, a 
dichotomous image is painted when describing the nightmare experience of foreclosure. 
 Homeownership – one word that conveys many social, economic and political 
meanings in the United States. It is regularly cited as evidence of achieving a substantial 
part of the American Dream (Burchell & Listokin, 1995; Ronald, 2008), symbolically 
communicates information about one‘s social status and stability (Schwartz, 2010), and 
provides financial benefits in the form of tax breaks and other incentives (Johnson & 
Sherraden, 1992). Overwhelming and historically, the attributes associated with 
homeownership are positive; however, in light of the 2006 housing crash and subsequent 
2008 financial meltdown, scholars and lay people are reassessing the sacred position 
homeownership holds in U.S. culture and the market economy.  
Foreclosure Crisis 
 In 2006, the U.S. housing bubble burst placing ―millions of homeowners and 
thousands of communities‖ in a historic foreclosure and financial crisis (Corporation for 
Enterprise Development [CFED], 2008, p. 3). Homeownership rates peaked in the fourth 
quarter of 2004, reaching a high of 69.2% (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2012). 
Following the aftermath of the 2006 housing crash, the rate began to drop. In 2011, 
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homeownership rates sat at 66.1% (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2012). The crisis 
followed ten years of the largest expansion in homeownership since the period following 
World War II (CFED, 2008; Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2006b). Between 1995 and 
2005, 12.5 million individuals became new homeowners (CFED, 2008; Joint Center for 
Housing Studies, 2006b). Growth in homeownership occurred in an environment that 
offered low-interest rates, new loan products, and relaxed financial regulations (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD], 2009; Schwartz, 2010).  A 
growing body of research establishes a relationship between the relaxed financial 
regulatory environment and the housing crash that began in 2006 (CFED, 2008; HUD, 
2009; Schloemer, Li, Ernst, & Keest, 2006; Tetreault & Verrilli, 2008).  Evidence also 
indicates that the foreclosure crisis unearthed critical weaknesses of the financial sector in 
the U.S., which played a significant role in the U.S. economic recession that started in 
2007 and impacted economies around the globe (Friedman, 2010; Glaeser, 2010; Solow, 
2010; Stein, 2010; Temin, 2010; Treas, 2010).   
When the U.S. housing market crashed in 2006, it ushered in an economic crisis 
that would become known as the Great Recession, and economists and business 
professionals were consulted with to provide explanations and forecast the fallout 
(Friedman, 2010; Goodhart, 2010; Glaeser, 2010; McCarty, Poole, Romer, & Rosenthal, 
2010; Solow, 2010; Stein, 2010; Temin, 2010; Zingales, 2010). Although the crisis would 
touch every socio-economic demographic and a war, if solely metaphorical, was waged 
between Wall Street and Main Street, most of the discussion was centered in traditional 
finance-oriented domains of business and economics; however, the crisis 
disproportionately impacted vulnerable populations—populations that often fall out of 
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the purview of traditional financial and economic domains (Hinze, 2011; Waddan, 2010). 
Given the primary mission of the social work profession to ―enhance human well-being 
and help meet the basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs 
and empowerment of people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty,‖ it is 
important for social work scholars and practitioners to discuss and analyze the fallout 
from this crisis (National Association of Social Workers [NASW], 2008, para. 5).  
Structure of Analysis 
To begin this examination, it is helpful to revisit the past and establish the context 
for the current crisis. In 1929, the U.S. experienced its most devastating economic 
crisis—the Great Depression. Although factors leading to the 1929 crash were unique, 
some important similarities exist between the Great Depression and the Great Recession 
that provide for substantive analysis and comparison. In addition, following the Great 
Depression, legislation was implemented not only to intervene in the financial crisis but 
also to prevent future economic catastrophes from occurring. A historical analysis will 
document the slow erosion of these legislative and regulatory remedies over the decades 
between the 1930s and early 2000s, which some scholars have attributed to the creation 
of conditions precipitating the 2008 Great Recession. In tandem, relevant and landmark 
housing policy will also be explored.  
Following the historical analysis, an exploration of the epistemological stance 
dominating housing literature and empirical base concerning the impact of foreclosure on 
communities will be discussed. Specifically, this analysis will summarize theories that 
offer explanatory frameworks for understanding societal behaviors and dynamics related 
to the foreclosure crisis, current policies and programs intended to prevent or mitigate the 
4 
 
effects of foreclosure. This discussion provides the rationale for the research design, 
situated in interpretative phenomenological analysis, of exploring the meanings 
homeowners associate with the lived experience of foreclosure. Data were analyzed using 
the six-step IPA process formulated by Smith, Flowers, and Larkin (2012). Implications 
for theory, social work education, social work practice, housing policy and foreclosure 
response are discussed.  
Historical Context and Analysis: Housing Policy from the Great Depression to the 
Great Recession 
 U.S. housing policy represents a complex interaction of real estate, finance, 
construction, and low-income advocacy interests. Although piecemeal policies existed 
prior to the 1929 Great Depression, the first comprehensive housing policy is traced back 
to the New Deal where special interest groups jockeyed for acceptance of their competing 
agendas. The purpose of this historical review is to document and analyze housing and 
foreclosure-related policy from the Great Depression to the Great Recession. These two 
historical bookends represent periods of great economic and housing crises, which 
present natural beginning and end points for comparison and analysis; however, it is also 
critical to review what happened in the intervening years with affordable housing policy. 
Consequently, this analysis will deconstruct the major pieces of affordable housing policy 
not only following the Great Depression and Great Recession but also during the 
interceding years of the 1940s-1990s.   
 The historical roots of housing policy targeted to low- and moderate-income 
communities are similar to other social welfare responses in the United States—with 
emphasis being placed on providing, or maintaining, a subsistence level of shelter 
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(Johnson & Sherraden, 1992; Radford, 1996; Sherraden, 1991).  Also similar to other 
social welfare programs, people generally think most federal spending directed towards 
housing is provided to assist people of low- and moderate-incomes (Johnson & 
Sherraden, 1992). In actuality, the U.S. federal government directs most housing 
expenditures to the benefit of upper-income individuals in the form of mortgage interest 
deductions (Dreier & Atlas, 1992; Ridenour, Weld, & Elson, 2012). Households earning 
over $100,000 received a significant portion of the $171 billion in homeowner tax 
benefits that were realized in 2008—compared to direct federal housing assistance for 
primarily low-income individuals, which totaled less than $40.2 billion in the same fiscal 
year (Schwartz, 2010). This two-tiered pattern of assistance is documented throughout 
the relatively brief history of U.S. housing policy (Johnson & Sherraden, 1992; Radford, 
1996).  
 While other forms of social welfare have a longer history in the U.S., it was not 
until the period of the Great Depression that the federal government developed a 
coordinated policy response to housing.  Over the next five decades, additional federal 
policy was developed that introduced different strategies to address housing issues; 
however, the focus remained on maintaining a basic level of shelter for low-income 
individuals, providing economic and business opportunities for those engaged in the 
construction of housing, and protecting the value of homes owned by middle and upper 
income individuals (Radford, 1996; Sherraden, 1991; Schwartz, 2010).  
6 
 
Context and Crash 
Gilded Age. 
 Although the 1929 stock market crash may be commonly discussed as an isolated, 
singular catastrophic event, critics argue it was a culminating result of the economic 
policies and market activities of the Gilded Age (Giroux, 2010). Consequently, a brief 
examination of this time period is essential to not only understanding its connection to the 
economic conditions leading to the Great Depression but also for providing interesting 
context in understanding the time period preceding the Great Recession of 2008 (Giroux, 
2010).  
The Gilded Age, following the Civil War with scholars documenting the time 
period as early as 1865 and as late as 1925, was a time of significant market expansion 
(Orser, 2011). Substantial wealth was accumulated by industry leaders as they leveraged 
increased production in the areas of manufacturing, mining, transportation, 
communication, marketing, and finance (Bartel, 2007; Field, 2007; Orser, 2011). The 
Gilded Age was also a time characterized by great disparities of wealth. Critics of wealth 
inequality that characterized the Gilded Age cite corruption, deregulated financial and 
industrial sectors, structural racism and classism as causes of the economic disparities—
and, eventually, the Great Depression (Bartel, 2007; Giroux, 2010; Mashaw, 2010; 
White, 2003).  
 Preceding the Gilded Age, Social Darwinism found its footing as an influential 
ideology and was embraced by some social theorists throughout this time period and into 
the Progressive Era (Hofstadter, 1944; Specht & Courtney, 1994). In fact, strains of 
Social Darwinist thinking have reemerged in recent policy debates concerning social 
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welfare and the plight of individuals who are poor. Social Darwinism, a concept adapted 
from England, distorts the biological evolutionary theory developed by Charles Darwin 
and presented in The Origin of Species (Hofstadter, 1944). Herbert Spencer, who is 
correctly credited with developing the phrase ‗survival of the fittest,‘ imposed a social 
evolutionary framework onto Darwin‘s theory (Hofstadter, 1944). Essentially, Spencer 
equated the natural order of the biological world with that of the economic world where 
individuals deemed weak found themselves selected out of society (Hofstadter, 1944; 
Peel, 1972; Spencer, 1851). Spencer, in his own words, detachedly explains the harsh but, 
from his perspective, necessary elimination of weak individuals from society,  
It seems hard that widows and orphans should be left to struggle for life or 
death. Nevertheless, when regarded not separately, but in connection with 
the interests of universal humanity, these harsh fatalities are seen to be full 
of beneficence—the same beneficence which brings to early graves the 
children of diseased parents, and singles out the low-spirited, the 
intemperate and the debilitated as the victims of an epidemic. (Spencer, 
1851, p. 323)  
 
It is through this ideological lens that Spencer rejected government intervention into the 
private lives of individuals. Spencer argued against the efficacy of England‘s Poor Laws, 
citing social welfare policy as an affront against society‘s natural order (Peel, 1972).  
 Spencer‘s ideology was embraced by American William Sumner of Yale 
University, who was described as having one of the largest followings of students during 
this time (Hofstadter, 1944). Critics of Sumner contend that he espoused a religious-like 
approach in combining Calvinistic and natural economic tenants of Spencer‘s Social 
Darwinism (Hofstadter, 1944).  Central to Sumner‘s reconceptualization of Darwin‘s 
biological theory was the sociological construction that perpetuated the belief that people 
who found themselves at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder were subject to a 
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natural order that selected out the weak in favor of the strong (Sumner, 1883; Sumner, 
1914). This core concept of Sumner‘s interpretation of Social Darwinism is reflected in 
the following passage,  
Let it be understood that we cannot go outside of this alternative: liberty, 
inequality, survival of the fittest; not liberty, equality, survival of the 
unfittest. The former carries society forward and favors all its best 
members; the latter carries society downwards and favors all its worst 
members (Sumner, 1914, p. 25).  
 
This analysis has highlighted the core conceptual and ideological framework of Social 
Darwinism to demonstrate its influence on perpetuating the inequality of the Gilded Age. 
This dominant social ideology is credited by some scholars as providing a rationale for 
laissez-faire regulatory oversight of the markets, predatory behavior of ―robber barons‖ 
and legitimization of the oppressive treatment of people who found themselves at the 
economic bottom of U.S. society (Giroux, 2010; Hofstadter, 1944; Orser, 2011; Specht & 
Courtney, 1994). In its myopathy and oppressive ideological framework, Social 
Darwinism failed to acknowledge the significant sacrifices and strength of the laboring 
class—represented by many immigrants and children, on which the elites of society 
depended, and who endured dangerous working conditions that resulted in extraordinary 
wealth created by the ―weak‖ for the ―strong‖ (Joseph, 1989; Marx & Engels, 1848/2012; 
Orser, 2011; Wagner, 2008).  
Interestingly, the professionalization of social work practice also coincides with 
the Gilded Age. As the U.S. adapted the Elizabethan Poor Laws from the English in the 
1600s, U.S.-based Charity Organization Societies (COS) developed similarly to a British 
organization in the 1880s (Abel, 1998; Becker, 1963). Although concerned with the 
plight of people who were impoverished and having genesis during a period of extreme 
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wealth gaps, perhaps influenced by the ethos of Social Darwinist and Puritan ideology, 
COS generally viewed poverty as a personal defect rather than the result of structural 
inequality (Abel, 1998; Chambers & Hinding, 1968; Roberts, 2003; Vincent, 1984).  
Chambers and Hinding (1968) emphasize the level of contempt ―friendly visitors,‖ who 
provided ―scientific care‖ demonstrated to people in need during this period of extreme 
resource inequality,  
The sources of poverty lay in personal shortcomings—improvidence, 
imprudence, drunkenness and crime; the poor were extravagant, ignorant, 
slatternly, and shiftless. The granting of indiscriminate relief did nothing 
but pull the needy down into pauperism, from which slough of habitual 
dependency there could be no escape. (p. 97) 
 
The COS movement continued to grow throughout the late 19
th
 Century, with it, 
emphasizing ―scientific care,‖ which consisted of, primarily, middle-income white 
women visiting the homes of people in need, engaging in a thorough assessment of the 
client and presenting situation, and developing a comprehensive report to share with a 
district committee who would then determine whether an individual was ―worthy‖ of 
relief (Abel, 1998; Specht & Courtney, 1994).  
Contrasted with the rise of the COS movement, is the development of the 
Settlement House movement. The Settlement House movement, also a borrowed 
organizational concept from England, arose after COS but still in the late 19
th
 century 
(Abel, 1998). The approach of the Settlement House movement differed substantially 
from the COS. Settlement House workers lived among the people they served and their 
locus of change centered on social and economic injustice (Chambers & Hinding, 1968). 
Although approaches of each movement differed significantly, both areas of foundational 
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social work professional practice reflected conservative, moralistic, and religious 
influences (Specht & Courtney, 1994).  
The professionalization of social work is important to acknowledge as there still 
exists a gap between social work practice and an understanding of the financial structures 
and realities that often result in the oppression of the clients served by the profession. 
Further, there is a lack of a sustained effort on the behalf of the profession and its clients 
to challenge these oppressive and institutional structures (Birkenmaier & Curley, 2009; 
Glasby, 2001; Hairston, 1981; Sherraden, Laux, & Kaufman, 2007;). One of the most 
recognized critiques of this split in professional social work practice was articulated by 
Specht and Courtney (1994). They present an impassioned case that the social work 
profession, in its open embrace of psychotherapy and serving people of higher socio-
economic status, has ignored the conditions of people who are poor (Specht & Courtney, 
1994). Specht and Courtney (1994) trace the abandonment of social work‘s community 
service mission back to the Flexner Report, which was delivered in 1915. The Flexner 
Report, delivered by Abraham Flexner, an educational expert, explored whether social 
work possessed the requisite criteria for it to be considered a full profession—alongside 
areas of study such as medicine and law (Flexner, 1915). In comparing social work to 
these traditional and, consequentially, male-dominated professions, Flexner determined 
that social work was, indeed, not a full profession (Flexner, 1915). Specht and Courtney 
(1994) suggest the pronouncement by the influential Flexner resulted in a lingering 
professional self-confidence issue in which social workers began radically restricting the 
core mission of the profession to be accepted and validated. Their conclusion was that the 
profession had become dominated by practitioners providing therapeutic interventions at 
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the expense of pursuing widespread systems change.  Thus, the foundation of 
professional social work developed in a period of great inequality, where early practice 
was characterized by judgmental and moralistic assessments and sidetracked by esteem 
issues concerning professionalization. This historical and professional context is 
significant in understanding the existing social and economic order prior to the Great 
Depression.  
1929 Stock Market Crash & the Great Depression. 
 The boom and bust cycle preceding the Great Recession of 2008 shares 
similarities with the Great Depression of 1929. During the four years following the 1929 
crash, personal income decreased 44%, inflation-adjusted economic output declined 30%, 
and the unemployment rate reached 25% (Wheelock, 2008). Housing prices and 
household incomes declined dramatically following a period in which debt was 
increasingly used to finance housing purchases (Wheelock, 2008). Following an increase 
of housing prices, which peaked in 1926, residential real estate foreclosures doubled 
between 1926 and 1929 (Wheelock, 2008). The instability of housing increased 
dramatically following the 1929 market crash. Between 1929 and 1933, housing prices 
fell further, and foreclosures increased from 134,900 to 252,400 (Wheelock, 2008). The 
foreclosure rate increased from the first year data was available in 1926 from 3.6 per 
1,000 home mortgages to a high of 13.3 per 1,000 mortgages in 1933 (Schwartz, 2010; 
Wheelock, 2008). Moreover, in 1933, on average 1,000 home mortgages were foreclosed 
every day (Wheelock, 2008). Risk of foreclosure was high during this time. On January 
1, 1934, it was reported that nearly half of urban home mortgages were delinquent 
(Wheelock, 2008).  
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 According to Wheelock‘s (2008) analysis, ―The sharp increase in mortgage 
distress during the Great Depression was the result of precipitous declines in income and 
real estate values following a period of rapid growth in mortgage debt outstanding‖ (p. 3). 
Data support Wheelock‘s (2008) analysis. During the four years following the market 
crash, personal disposable income and nonfarm residential wealth fell 41.0% and 25.7%, 
respectively (Wheelock, 2008). Comparatively, over this same time period, the value of 
nonfarm residential debt fell only 6.8% (Wheelock, 2008).  These conflicting factors 
were further complicated by falling houses prices, which caused homeowners who were 
experiencing difficulty in paying their mortgage payments to encounter a likely scenario 
of owing more on their mortgages than what they could demand for in a selling price—or 
what is commonly referred to in today‘s market society as being underwater on one‘s 
mortgage (Schwartz, 2010; Wheelock, 2008).  
 Again, similar to loan products associated with the Great Recession, mortgage 
lending strayed from traditional underwriting standards, which were often exclusionary to 
many populations, to offer more risky, speculative loans (Wheelock, 2008). These loan 
products may have been beneficially constructed when refinancing was easily accessible 
during the 1920s, when homeowners experienced higher household incomes and rising 
property values—but access to refinancing products became essentially nonexistent 
during the Great Depression (Schwartz, 2010; Wheelock, 2008). Lenders, who had 
relaxed credit standards, tightened them in the aftermath of decreasing incomes following 
the 1929 market collapse. The result was a financial environment in which homeowners 
found it difficult to pay their mortgage on decreased wages and lenders were not open to 
refinancing outstanding loans (Wheelock, 2008). In his historical review, Bernanke 
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(1983) elaborated on the effects of the 1929 constrained financial market concluding that 
borrowers who were safe credit risks were not able to refinance due to the failure of 
several banks, which resulted in dissolving customer relationships and severely 
restricting access to credit. The result was a ―mix of falling household incomes and 
property values and short-term, non-amortizing loans resulted in soaring mortgage 
delinquency and foreclosure rates‖ (Wheelock, 2008, p. 4). Consequently, homeowners 
could afford less housing than before and lenders were reluctant to refinance home loans.   
Federal Response and Restrained Expansion 
1930’s Legislation. 
The Great Depression is credited with providing the impetus for a federal 
response to a widespread housing crisis (Radford, 1996; Schwartz, 2010).  The U.S. 
Housing Acts of 1934 and 1937 are commonly referenced as the first federal housing 
policies. Certainly, it is arguable that these landmark pieces of legislation represent the 
initial substantial attempts to address housing issues following the Great Depression; 
however, the U.S. Shipping Act of 1917 is the first documented federal housing policy 
(Martens, 2009; Radford, 1996). The U.S. Shipping Act of 1917, passed during the 
Woodrow administration and World War I, allocated $100 million to construct workforce 
housing (Martens, 2009). Although considerable attention is given to analyzing the 1934 
and 1937 Housing Acts, the U.S. Shipping Act of 1917 deserves closer scrutiny as it 
informs understanding about the foundational and recurring rationales for government 
intervention in housing development. As the U.S. entered World War I, a housing 
shortage arose as workers relocated to both coasts for employment in the ship building 
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industry (Martens, 2009). The U.S. Shipping Act of 1917 was responsible for, in less than 
two years, the construction of 16,000 workforce housing units (Martens, 2009).  
Martens (2009) contends that two dominant themes were behind the passage of 
the Shipping Act and the federal government‘s first foray into housing production: 1) an 
emphasis on designing homes that would result in an effective workforce for the ship 
building industry and 2) an incentive for workers to invest in their incomes into their own 
homes, which would create a disincentive for workers to leave or strike against their 
employers. From this perspective, the basic provision of shelter was not a driving 
consideration of the first federal housing policy.  Evidence supporting the claim that 
providing access to labor, and not basic access to shelter, was a primary consideration of 
the U.S. Shipping Act was arguably apparent at the end of the War. In 1918, with less 
than 75% of housing units developed, Congress stopped production under the 1917 Act—
a decision that would result in the government losing more than half of its initial 
investment (Martens, 2009).   Despite the market-driven competition concerns stemming 
from the federal government‘s first intervention into housing during World War I, the 
chaos following the Stock Market Crash of 1929 created an environment resulting in 
greater acceptance of a federal role in housing (Radford, 1996; Wheelock, 2008).  
 Federal Home Loan Bank and Reconstruction Finance Corporation.  
Preceding the Roosevelt administration and the New Deal, Hoover first attempted 
to ameliorate the housing and mortgage sectors by creating two legislative entities in 
1932: Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) and Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) 
(Radford, 1996; Schwartz, 2010; HUD, 2007). The Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
was established to provide loans to private corporations for the development of low-
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income rental housing and slum clearance (Radford, 1996). The FHLB, which is still in 
existence, established 12 regional banks that allowed member banks to access funds 
when the demand for mortgages surpassed the supply of deposits at individual member 
banks (HUD, 2007; Schwartz, 2010). In addition to increasing lenders‘ access to funds, 
the FHLB system benefitted borrowers, too, by extending loan terms and increasing loan-
to-value ratio (Immergluck, 2004; Schwartz, 2010).  
Although critics recognize the long-term benefit of the FHLB system, they also 
suggest that it provided virtually no relief during the crisis of the Great Depression 
(HUD, 2007; Radford, 1996; Schwartz, 2010). In the year the FHLB system was 
established, housing starts were one half of what was recorded in 1931 (Radford, 1996). 
When Roosevelt took office in 1933, housing starts had once again plummeted with half 
of $20 billion of all home mortgage debt in default (Radford, 1996).   
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation.  
Acknowledging the widespread impact of the 1929 Stock Market Crash and 
resulting foreclosures, as part of the New Deal Roosevelt established the Home Owners‘ 
Loan Corporation (HOLC) in 1933 to purchase and refinance delinquent home mortgages 
during the Great Depression (Harriss, 1951; Schwartz, 2010; Wheelock, 2008). Unlike 
the FHLB system, the HOLC specifically addressed the challenge of foreclosures. HOLC 
was responsible for purchasing and refinancing more than 1 million delinquent home 
loans—representing 10% of all owner-occupied homes (Radford, 1996; Schwartz, 2010; 
Wheelock, 2008). HOLC contained a number of provisions to mitigate foreclosures: 
extended term of mortgages, reduced monthly payments, provided low-interest loans to 
allow families to repurchase homes lost in foreclosure, and also provided funding to 
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assist with taxes and home repairs (Crossney & Barter, 2005; Harriss, 1951; Schwartz, 
2010). In addition to providing immediate relief to the foreclosure crisis stemming from 
the Great Depression, HOLC also introduced a new and enduring way of approaching 
mortgage financing. HOLC is responsible for introducing the concept of a fixed-rate, 
long-term, self-amortizing, low down-payment mortgage (Crossney & Barter, 2005; 
Harriss, 1951; Schwartz, 2010). Prior to the Great Depression, this type of loan product 
was essentially unavailable.  Although HOLC stopped lending in 1935 and completely 
ceased agency operations in 1951, the type of financing structure it introduced 
fundamentally altered future structuring of mortgage products (Harriss, 1951; Schwartz, 
2010).  
Glass-Steagall. 
 Prior to the 1929 market crash, a clear separation was indistinguishable between 
the deposit and investment sides of financial institutions. In fact, in the late 1920s, it was 
estimated that one-third of securities issued by U.S. corporations were financed by banks 
(Cargill, 1988). Following the market crash, the Banking Act of 1933 was passed that 
included a number of financial reforms intended to mitigate risky financial transactions 
and to protect consumers (Cargill, 1988; MacDonald, 2005). Glass-Steagall, a part of the 
Banking Act, established a wall between deposits and investment functions in an attempt 
to prevent banks from speculatively using customers‘ deposits to pursue risky 
investments (Cargill, 1988). Specifically, Glass-Steagall  
…prohibited any federally chartered or state chartered member of the 
Federal Reserve System from purchasing, dealing in, or underwriting 
nongovernment securities for their own account, or affiliating with any 
corporation principally engaged in these activities. Glass-Steagall also 
prohibited investment banks from accepting demand deposits. (Cargill, 
1988, p. 27) 
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In addition, the 1933 Act established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
to insure deposits at both thrifts and banks (MacDonald, 2005). The purpose of these 
provisions was to protect consumers from conflicts of interests arising from the 
intermingling of commercial and investment activities, to minimize speculation and risk, 
and to restore public confidence and trust in the U.S. financial system (Cargill, 1988; 
MacDonald, 2005).  
 Glass-Steagall was co-authored by Representative Henry Steagall, a conservative 
Democrat from Alabama and chair of the Committee on Banking and Currency, and 
Senator Carter Glass, Democratic chair of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee 
(Key, 1964; MacDonald, 2005).  Opposition of Glass-Steagall was minimized due to the 
findings of a Senate special investigating committee of 1933, which was led by the 
committee‘s special counsel, Ferdinand Pecora (Key, 1964). The committee determined 
that bankers were not disinterested but, ―had engaged in foolish, if not criminal, practices 
of rigging pools, artificially inflating bond prices and reaping illegitimate profits‖ (Key, 
1964, p. 205). These findings provided the rationale for the separation of commercial and 
investment banking, or created a protective wall, in the form of Glass-Steagall (Key, 
1964).  
National Recovery Act of 1933 and Public Works Administration. 
Following the 1929 Stock Market Crash and subsequent Great Depression, 
housing advocates attempted to introduce legislation addressing shelter for low- and 
moderate-income families. A social worker, New York settlement house worker, and 
leader of the National Public Housing Conference, Mary Simkhovich, advocated to 
Senator Robert Wagner to include $125 million in the Title II National Recovery Act of 
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1933 for slum clearance and housing (Leighninger, 2005; Radford, 1996).  The 1933 Act, 
sponsored by Senator Wagner and part of President Roosevelt‘s New Deal, laid the 
foundation for public housing by establishing the Public Works Administration (PWA) 
(Leighninger, 2005; Radford, 1996). Over four years, the PWA was responsible for 
constructing 25,000 housing units in 58 separate locations (Martens, 2009). The 
receptivity of the PWA programs was initially attributed to solid design and universal 
eligibility (Martens, 2009; Radford, 1996). Starting the shift into a two-tiered housing 
system, PWA implemented low-income eligibility guidelines, prompted by 
Congressional requirements, in 1936 (Martens, 2009).  
 National Housing Act of 1934.  
 To further address the economic conditions of the Great Depression, the National 
Housing Act of 1934, also part of the New Deal, was designed to reduce unemployment 
by stimulating the housing construction industry and to encourage opening up of credit 
by financial institutions for home repairs and construction (HUD, 2007; Schwartz, 2010). 
The entity through which the 1934 Act would achieve this goal was the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) (Gotham, 2000a; HUD, 2007; Radford, 1996).  The FHA provided 
federally-backed insurance to private lenders for home repair and construction (Radford, 
1996). Federal insurance, which reduced risk to private lenders, was available through 
two programs: 1) Section 203 mortgage insurance for single family homes, and 2) 
Section 207 for multi-family housing (HUD, 2007). To encourage more funds to be 
available for mortgage lending, the 1934 Act also established an entity through which 
mortgages could be sold to a secondary market (HUD, 2007; Schwartz, 2010). Created as 
a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Federal National Mortgage 
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Association, more commonly known as Fannie Mae, was established to meet this need 
(HUD, 2007; Schwartz, 2010; Wheelock, 2008).  
 The creation of the FHA is a landmark moment in housing finance policy 
(Schwartz, 2010). In exchange for protecting qualified mortgage lenders from default and 
thereby expanding homeownership opportunities to more Americans, the FHA 
established underwriting criteria for receipt of the insurance (Schwartz, 2010). Other 
tangible ways in which the FHA shaped housing finance policy include: extending loan 
terms to 30 years; decreasing monthly mortgage payments, increasing maximum loan-to-
value ratios, eliminating the need for many second mortgages, reducing down payments 
to less than 10%, establishing minimum standards for home construction that were 
widely adopted, decreasing mortgage interest rates, and ultimately decreasing the cost of 
homeownership (Gotham, 2002; Schwartz, 2010). FHA-insured mortgages were credited 
with reviving the anemic housing industry during the late 1930‘s and early 1940‘s. 
Jackson (1985) noted that 40% of all 1940-era mortgages were insured by the FHA. In 
addition, housing starts increased by 86% during the years 1937-1941 (Schwartz, 2010).  
 Yet, the economic benefits of the 1934 Act and the FHA were not equally visited 
upon all American households. Another enduring legacy of 1930s housing legislation, 
specifically of the FHA, are the bedrock policies that resulted in institutionalized racial 
segregation that still impact individuals, neighborhoods, and whole communities today 
(Bond & Williams, 2007; Gotham, 2000a; Radford, 1996). During the 1930s, federal 
agencies were influenced by interest groups like the National Association of Real Estate 
boards that wrote into its ethical standards the prohibition of selling homes to minorities 
in ―white neighborhoods‖ (Williams, Nesiba, & McConnell, 2005). This racist 
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prohibition was intended to protect predominantly white neighborhoods from perceived 
―adverse influences‖ that would be invited by minority neighbors, such as increased 
crime and lowered property values (Bond & Williams, 2007; Gotham, 2000a; Jimenez, 
2010). In its 1936 underwriting manual, the FHA clearly identified its racial bias in 
evaluating properties,  
The valuator should investigate areas surrounding the location to 
determine whether or not incompatible racial and ethnic groups are 
present, to the end that an intelligent prediction may be made regarding 
the possibility or probability of the location being invaded by such 
groups…The protection offered against adverse changes should be found 
adequate before a high rating is given [in] the future. (Section 23 of the 
1936 Underwriting Manual as quoted in Immergluck, 2004, p. 95)  
 
Racism was immediately and comprehensively institutionalized in early housing policy. 
For further illustration, the first two New Deal public housing developments were 
constructed in Atlanta, GA—Techwood Homes and University Apartments. Reflective of 
New Deal policy, Techwood Homes was segregated for whites only and University 
Apartments was developed for Atlanta‘s population that was demographically black and 
poor (Lapping, 1973).  By 1959, only two percent of FHA-insured loans were issued to 
people representing minority populations (Levin, 1976).  
United States Housing Act of 1937. 
In addition to Mary Simkhovich, another housing advocate who influenced 
Senator Wagner was Catherine Bauer (Bauer, 1934; Martens, 2009; Radford, 1996). 
Bauer, author of the classic book Modern Housing, was concerned about the acceptance 
of public housing, administered in a bureaucratic manner, solely for people who were 
low-income (Bauer, 1934; Martens, 2009; Radford, 1996). She advocated for multi-
family units, developed by not-for-profits and cooperatives, which would minimize any 
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distinctions in wealth (Bauer, 1934; Martens, 2009; Radford, 1996). Ultimately, Bauer‘s 
vision of public housing, as championed by Senator Wagner, would be thwarted by 
market interests. A compromised version of her ideals, yet reflective of the positions of 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Board of Realtors and the Bankers 
Association, would be passed in the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (Martens, 2009; Radford, 
1996). The Housing Act of 1937, also known as the Wagner-Steagall Act, contained the 
following objectives:  
provide financial assistance to the states and political subdivisions thereof 
for the elimination of unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions, for the 
eradication of slums, for the provision of decent, safe and sanitary 
dwellings for families of low income, and for the reduction of 
unemployment and the stimulation of business activity, to create a United 
States Housing Authority and for other purposes. (Karger & Stoesz, 2006, 
p. 418)  
 
The major point of contention between Bauer‘s and Wagner‘s position and private 
interest groups rested on whether the federal government would provide a unified, 
comprehensive national housing program or a two-tiered response that relegated 
government intervention to low-income families and private interests to the middle- and 
upper-income (Bauer, 1934; Martens, 2009; Radford, 1996). In addition to the special 
interests securing their position to limit government intervention into the provision of 
housing, these forces also won the following concessions: limiting public housing‘s 
development costs, and connecting the development of new housing units to the 
clearance of existing blighted properties (Martens, 2009). Critics argue that these 
concessions created a self-fulfilling prophesy for government‘s role in housing 
development—one of failure (Radford, 1996). The U.S. Housing Act of 1937 resulted in 
the creation of large-scale, isolated, underfunded housing projects (Hoffman, 1996).   
22 
 
As may be argued with the response to the current economic and housing crisis, 
the Housing Act of 1937 was created not to address economic hardships facing 
individuals, particularly individuals of color but was primarily designed to save the home 
building, real estate and financial industries that were struggling to survive during the 
Great Depression (Gotham, 2002; Kirp, Dwyer, & Rosenthal, 1995; Martens, 2009; 
Radford, 1996). This privileged position provided to real estate, building and financial 
interests, and members of the power elite (Mills, 1959) was the foundation on which 
national housing policy was constructed and provided the framework for the majority of 
legislation and programs that followed.  
1940’s Legislation. 
Following comparatively substantial expansion of housing policy during the 
1930s, no significant movement would occur on specific housing-related legislation for 
almost a decade. World War II had captured global attention and economic resources 
during the early 1940s—resulting in a halt to any non-defense housing construction 
(HUD, 2007). Yet, following WWII, one of the most significant expansions of 
homeownership in U.S. history occurred. By the end of the decade, 8.3 million people 
would become homeowners, representing an increase of 55% from 1940 to 1950 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, n.d.b) 
The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944. 
Preceding the end of World War II, anxiety surfaced among planners and 
economists regarding the return of service people. Worries existed as to whether the labor 
market would be able to absorb approximately 16 million servicemen and women, with 
their families representing a quarter of the U.S. population, and if the country could avoid 
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sliding into another depression following the post-war economic boom (Gordon, 2005; 
Severo & Milford, 1989). Reflecting this immediate concern, the U.S. Department of 
Labor referred to the weakened economy and return of millions of service people as a 
―recipe for disaster,‖ estimating 12 to 15 million unemployed workers (Fischer, 2004, 
para. 14; Severo & Milford, 1989). In addition, nearly 60% of the nation‘s military 
expected a significant economic depression following the war (Pedigo, 1994; Severo & 
Milford, 1989).  As noble and beneficial as the Servicemen‘s Readjustment Act proved to 
be—honoring service people for their hard work and sacrifice—its underlying goal was 
primarily one of pragmatism: incentivizing veterans to remain out of the labor market for 
as long as possible (Gordon, 2005). Once again, in housing policy, market forces were 
privileged over the provision of shelter.  
Signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Servicemen‘s 
Readjustment Act of 1944 is more commonly referred to as the G.I. Bill of Rights—or, 
shortened to G.I. Bill (Black & Hyson, 1944; Pedigo, 1994). The G.I. Bill initially 
provided six benefits to returning service people. Administration of three major 
provisions were overseen by the Veterans Administration (VA), including: education and 
training, loan guaranty for a home, farm or business, and a weekly $20 unemployment 
payment for up to one year (Colean, 1945; Pedigo, 1994; Severo & Milford, 1989). Other 
benefits included: employment placement assistance, military review of dishonorable 
discharges and highest priority for building materials purposed for constructing VA 
hospitals (Black & Hyson, 1944; Pedigo, 1994).  
Recognizing the leverage of providing a loan guaranty instead of a cash benefit, 
the nation successfully transitioned from a war to a peace economy through jobs created 
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in the housing construction industry and related businesses, increased taxes and asset 
wealth (Pedigo, 1994). Initially, the guaranty provided up to 50% of the loan to a 
maximum of $2,000 (Merryfield, 1945; Pedigo, 1994). The original G.I. Bill ended in 
July 1956 and provided 2.4 million service people with VA-backed home loans (Gordon, 
2005). The VA home loan guaranty is credited with expanding the middle class and home 
ownership (Bennett, 1996; Buckley, 2004; Severo & Milford, 1989). The average income 
of a worker in 1943 was $3,000, double the amount in 1939 (Severo & Milford, 1989). 
Wealth inequality contracted during the period following the war. In 1937, the wealthiest 
5% of Americans controlled 23.7% of the nation‘s wealth—following the war, the 
percentage of wealth among the top 5% decreased to 16.8% indicating contraction in 
wealth inequality (Severo & Milford, 1989). Asset-creation was no longer solely 
available to the wealthiest of individuals. The combination of increased wages and VA-
backed home loans provided many families with the opportunity to increase their wealth 
and move into the middle-class.  
Housing Act of 1949. 
 The goal of providing a ―decent home for every American‖ was considered of 
paramount importance in passing the Housing Act of 1949 (Gillette, 1983, p. 421). 
Achievement of this goal would be pursued through the following primary provisions: 1) 
slum clearance and community development, 2) low-rent public housing, 3) farm 
housing, and 4) housing research (Monthly Labor Review, 1949; Orlebeke, 2000).  
Considering the scope of the legislation‘s provisions, budget allocation and housing need, 
a critical challenge regarding the efficacy of the policy goal was apparent. For example, 
the Housing Act of 1949 provided federal assistance for the construction of 810,000 low-
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rent housing units over six years (Monthly Labor Review, 1949). According to the 1950 
Census, the U.S. population was 154.2 million people and 42.2 million households (U.S. 
Census Bureau, n.d.a, n.d.c). The poverty rate was 39.5%, indicating a realistic 
assumption that 60 million people may have benefitted from some level of housing 
assistance (Iceland, 2012). It is worth noting, given the aforementioned issues of racism 
in housing benefits, that the poverty rate in 1950 was significantly higher for African-
Americans at 76.7% (Iceland, 2012). Although this example is simplistic, it offers a crude 
illustration of the minimal response to fulfill the legislation‘s stated goal of providing a 
―decent home for every American‖ (Gillette, 1983, p. 421). 
 The Housing Act of 1949 followed the pattern of 1930s housing legislation: 1) 
privilege of economic/market concerns, 2) limited eligibility for housing assistance, and 
3) a modest commitment to providing affordable shelter (Gillette, 1983; Marcuse, 2001; 
Monthly Labor Review, 1949; Ransohoff, 1955). It is worth noting the housing research 
provision of the 1949 act focused on evaluating effective production and design 
standards—further reflecting economic considerations over shelter (Monthly Labor 
Review, 1949; Ransohoff, 1955).  
Retrenchment, Urban Renewal, and Race 
1950’s Legislation. 
 If legislation of the 1930s and 1940s represented a restrained federal expansion of 
housing policy, policy of the 1950s was primarily characterized by its retrenchment from 
developing public housing and embrace of ―urban renewal‖ (Flanagan, 1997; Hunt, 
2005). Overwhelming attention was devoted to the Housing Act of 1949 as it became the 
subject of scrutiny and backlash (Flanagan, 1997; Hunt, 2005). Real estate and financial 
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industry interests, critical of government involvement and competition in housing 
production, embarked on a divide and conquer propaganda campaign with the goal of 
undermining the 1949 goal of providing a decent home for every American (Flanagan, 
1997; Hirsch, 2000; Orlebeke, 2000). The National Association of Home Builders and 
the U.S. Savings and Loan League created a media strategy that encouraged their 
members to place ads in local newspapers with the divisive tagline, ―Can you afford to 
pay somebody else‘s rent?‖ (Hunt, 2005, p. 193). Such efforts were predicated on the 
enduring Social Darwinistic dichotomies of deserving vs. underserving, work ethic vs. 
laziness, provider vs. freeloader, which were easily manipulated with public housing 
programs that had selective rather than universal eligibility—people were encouraged to 
view the 1949 Act as a zero-sum proposition with someone gaining at their expense.  
 The lobbying and grassroots efforts of these business interests were rewarded 
with local referenda impeding new construction of public housing units in major cities—
including Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit and Philadelphia (Hunt, 2005). Divisive tactics 
to undermine public housing initiatives were not limited to economic class distinctions 
but also extended to racial bias (Hunt, 2005; Hirsch, 2000). The 1950s political climate 
could easily be categorized as hostile to federal housing policy, in general, and public 
housing, in particular.  
 Housing Act of 1954.  
 The Housing Act of 1954 essentially repealed and replaced the 1949 Act. Focus 
was placed on urban renewal and commercial development of areas described as 
―blighted‖ and ―slums‖ (Dobelstein, 2003; Flanagan, 1997). The racial undertones of this 
policy resulted in ―urban renewal‖ being commonly and derisively equated with ―black 
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removal‖ (Dobelstein, 2003; Hirsch, 2000; Jimenez, 2010). Due to areas being deemed 
inappropriate for new construction, inner city communities were instead targeted for 
commercial development as a way to guard against further loss of government funds 
(Dobelstein, 2003; Flanagan, 1997). This fundamental shift from providing a ―decent 
home for every American‖ to ―urban renewal‖ resulted in the removal of 243,000 
housing units from 1949 to 1963 (Karger & Stoesz, 2010). These units were replaced 
with 68,000 units, of which 20,000 were designated for low-income families, and fell 
significantly short of the 1949 goal of constructing 810,000 low-rent housing units over 
six years (Dobelstein, 2003; Karger & Stoesz, 2010; Monthly Labor Review, 1949).  
 Housing Act of 1959.  
 The Housing Act of 1959 also represents a significant change in national housing 
policy. The Act created Section 202, which is the oldest and largest elderly housing 
program (Schwartz, 2010). There are two main delivery features of the program: 1) not-
for-profit organizations may access development funds to cover construction, 
rehabilitation and/or acquisition of a property and, 2) rental assistance contracts in which 
subsidies are provided to a private landlord to cover the difference between 30% of a 
tenant‘s adjusted income and total costs of a rental unit (HUD, n.d.d; Schwartz, 2010).  
 The program has experienced mixed results. By 2009, it was credited with 
producing more than 300,000 affordable rental units for people who are elderly or 
nonelderly disabled yet the program only reaches about 11% of people who are eligible 
(Schwartz, 2010).  
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1960’s Legislation. 
 The 1960s represent a time of significant social and cultural change in the U.S.—
housing policy offers no exception. Housing policy was influenced by the Civil Rights 
movement and the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy 
and Martin Luther King, Jr. Not content to wait until the federal government responded to 
protracted inequality, a number of states passed fair housing legislation. Finally, there 
was movement at the federal level to address past racial injustice, remedy previous failed 
and misguided attempts at urban renewal, and stem increasing social unrest (Collins, 
2006; Ferguson & Dickens, 1999; Levin, 1976). 
 Department of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965. 
 In 1965, as part of President Lyndon Johnson‘s Great Society, the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development was established as a cabinet-level 
department to coordinate and oversee most of the nation‘s housing and urban community 
development programs (HUD, n.d.b). The creation of HUD resulted in the dismantling of 
the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA), which had coordinated federal housing 
agencies and programs following World War II (National Archives, n.d.). Two primary 
purposes of HUD were to support community development efforts and increase access to 
affordable housing (HUD, n.d.b). One of HUD‘s first initiatives expanded 
homeownership opportunities to low-income individuals through a leased-housing 
program of privately owned units (HUD, n.d.e).  
 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act (Model Cities) of 1966. 
 In response to increasing urban disinvestment, social unrest, and calls for equal 
access to economic opportunity, President Lyndon Johnson declared a War on Poverty in 
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1964 (Ferguson & Dickens, 1999; Green & Haines, 2008). The Demonstration Cities and 
Metropolitan Development Act, otherwise known as ―Model Cities,‖ was passed in 1966 
as a part of Johnson‘s anti-poverty and urban renewal efforts known as the Great Society 
(Daguerre, 2011; Ferguson & Dickens, 1999). Similar to past efforts, Model Cities hoped 
to provide economic stimulus for jobs and ameliorate debilitated housing and blighted 
neighborhoods (Ferguson & Dickens, 1999; Karger & Stoesz, 2010). A departure from 
past federal efforts, Model Cities embraced a geographically targeted and time intensive 
approach (Karger & Stoesz, 2010). In addition, it emphasized local planning and control 
and included supportive social services (Ferguson & Dickens, 1999; Green & Haines, 
2008). 
 Model Cities legislation underwent significant changes in the policymaking 
process. At time of implementation, the program was modified to serve twice the number 
of communities as recommended, receive 50% less funding than had been initially 
requested, and achieve its goals in one-third of its suggested timeframe (Ferguson & 
Dickens, 1999). Beyond potentially reducing people moving out of targeted 
neighborhoods, the long-term impact of the Model Cities initiative was minimal 
(Schechter, 2011).  
 Housing Act of 1968. 
 Although Model Cities was not designed to replace housing units removed during 
prior urban renewal efforts, the Housing Act of 1968 attempted to address the shortage of 
affordable units. The 1968 Act developed two programs that provided affordable 
mortgages (Section 235) and rent subsidies (Section 236) (HUD, n.d.b). Section 235 
provided a 1%, FHA-subsidized mortgage to eligible home buyers (Orlebeke, 2000). 
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Similarly, Section 236 encouraged below-market rents for low- and moderate-income 
renters through a 1%, FHA-subsidized mortgage to multi-family developers (Orlebeke, 
2000). The purpose of the 1968 Act was to incentivize lenders and landlords to provide 
housing to people with lower incomes than were traditionally served by the private 
market. More specifically, targeted populations for Section 235 and 236 programs were 
poor and inner city minorities—two groups who had historically been excluded from 
housing opportunities (Gotham, 2000b).  
The 1968 Act is a landmark piece of legislation for four primary reasons: 1) 
shifted emphasis away from providing public housing to incentivizing private sector 
development of affordable homeownership and rental units through government 
subsidies, 2) encouraged the FHA to amend its underwriting standards in order to issue 
mortgages to people with lower incomes, 3) established the Government National 
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) to provide government guaranteed mortgage 
securities to lower the risk to lenders and 4) converted Fannie Mae into a private, 
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) (Gotham, 2000b; HUD, n.d.a, n.d.b; Orlebeke, 
2000). Unlike its legislative predecessors, the 1968 Act was fully funded by Congress 
(Orlebeke, 2000).  
Taking a broad perspective on the effectiveness of Section 235, it appeared to be 
successful. Housing starts for subsidized units peaked at 197,000 units in 1969 and grew 
to 431,000 in 1970 with all indications for continued growth (Orlebeke, 2000; Schwartz, 
2010). Yet, one major intention of the 1968 Act was to remedy the racial inequality that 
had pervaded previous housing legislation. In this area, it is questionable whether the 
1968 Act was as effective as overall housing production numbers indicate. Some 
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evidence suggests the 1968 Act reinforced racial segregation by inadvertently 
encouraging ―white flight‖ of low-income whites to the suburbs and limiting the 
opportunity for African-Americans, who remained in the inner city, to accumulate wealth 
due to depreciating home values (Gotham, 2000b). These underlying conditions may be 
attributed to panic selling, foreclosures, and inner city abandonment occurring during this 
time period (Gotham, 2000b). 
 Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968.  
One week following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., the Federal Fair 
Housing Act of 1968 was passed as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act (HUD, n.d.a, n.d.b; 
Schwartz, 2010). The Fair Housing Act was an attempt to remedy the negative outcomes 
of housing segregation by prohibiting discrimination against minorities in 
homeownership and rentals and including enforcement provisions for HUD (HUD, n.d.b; 
Reed, 1991). Despite inadequate and poorly specified enforcement actions, the Fair 
Housing Act signaled a paradigm shift concerning the federal government‘s perspective 
on racial discrimination and segregation (Jimenez, 2010; Schwartz, 2010).  
After studies indicated widespread housing discrimination was still a frequent 
occurrence, the 1968 Act was strengthened in 1988 to enhance the federal government‘s 
enforcement role, broaden inclusion in protected classes, and increase penalties against 
violators (Galster & Godfrey, 2005; Jimenez, 2010; Reed, 1991; Schwartz, 2010). Even 
with this expanded authority and protections, housing discrimination continues to be 
pervasive (Galster & Godfrey, 2005). Annually, an estimated 2 to 10 million cases of 
housing discrimination occur in the U.S. (Feagin, 1999).   
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1970’s Legislation. 
In the early 1970s, concerns arose that housing programs were not reaching 
individuals most in need were not fairly distributed and were not cost effective (Welfeld, 
1977). Following the release of critical reports on federal housing programs, newly 
elected President Nixon imposed a moratorium on all subsidized programs in 1973 
(Orlebeke, 2000; Welfeld, 1977).  Congress and the Nixon administration responded by 
introducing vouchers and state block grants.  In addition to the policy direction pursued 
by Nixon, housing legislation in the late 1970s, once again, focused attention on issues of 
discrimination.  
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. 
 The comprehensive Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 
introduced the concept of devolution in the form of vouchers and block grants that would 
eventually characterize the role of federal housing involvement (Dobelstein, 2003; 
Orlebeke, 2000; Welfeld, 1977). Two major programs were established in the 1974 Act: 
1) Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) and 2) Section 8 (HUD, n.d.a, n.d.b).   
 CDBG encompasses many elements and programs of previous urban renewal and 
community development legislation. Flexibility was provided to states through a wide 
variety of eligible activities with the goal of providing ―decent housing and expanding 
economic opportunities for low-income persons‖ (Jimenez, 2010, p. 436). Eligible CDBG 
activities include urban renewal, neighborhood development, model cities, water and 
sewer projects, neighborhood and facility grants, public facilities, home rehabilitation 
(but not new construction), urban beautification and historic preservation (Karger & 
Stoesz, 2010). Federal agencies retained responsibility for setting spending priorities and 
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required local jurisdictions to develop a comprehensive plan based upon the needs of 
low-income residents (Karger & Stoesz, 2010).  
 Section 8 provides a voucher, issued by a local housing authority, to an income-
eligible individual (Jimenez, 2010). The voucher is used to subsidize the difference 
between the fair market rent a landlord can demand and the rent a low-income person is 
able to pay (Orlebeke, 2000). Vouchers are attractive as they rely on existing units rather 
than requiring investment in a large-scale public housing development, provide some 
level of choice for eligible individuals, and integrate people with low-incomes into 
society (Jimenez, 2010; Schwartz, 2010). Although these are positive features, significant 
limitations also exist with the Section 8 program. Individuals must be able to locate an 
eligible apartment and a landlord who is willing to accept the voucher. Simply holding a 
voucher does not ensure availability and access to Section 8 housing. In 2000, 
approximately 30% of eligible households were unable to utilize their voucher (Jimenez, 
2010).  
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1976 & Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.  
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was implemented in 1977 to curtail 
two financial lending practices impacting minority, low-moderate income (LMI), inner 
city, rural and older neighborhoods: 1) redlining and 2) capital export (Marisco, 2005).  
Redlining was a practice used by financial institutions where red lines were drawn on 
maps around neighborhoods perceived as being too risky for loans.  Capital export, on the 
other hand, was essentially an exploitative banking practice where financial institutions 
would ―export the deposits of one neighborhood‘s residents to other communities and 
make loans in those other communities despite local lending opportunities‖ (Marisco, 
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2005, p. 13).  Senator Proxmire, a major proponent of the CRA legislation, illustrated the 
extent of these two issues noting that banks located in Brooklyn invested 11% of their 
deposits in the city, banks located in Washington D.C. invested 10% of their deposits in 
the city, and banks in other major cities like Los Angeles, Chicago, Cleveland and St. 
Louis mirrored this deposit/lending ratio (Marisco, 2005).  The outcome of these 
practices resulted in lack of credit available to particular areas not determined by an 
individual‘s or business‘s ability to repay a loan but simply assessed on where individuals 
and businesses were located.  The result of such practices was the failure to meet ―local 
credit needs for housing, small businesses, and farms to the detriment of these 
communities‖ consistent with safe and sound financial practices (Marisco, 2005, p. 13).  
Urban and rural areas alike suffered from disinvestment, while the deposits made by their 
citizens were used to extend credit in the suburbs.  Prior to the passage of CRA, a study 
conducted by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs found that 
one bank located in Washington, D.C. developed a policy forbidding any home mortgage 
loans in the city in which it derived deposits for making such loans (Marisco, 2005).  
CRA aimed to stop these practices by using both prohibitive and affirmative 
features (Marisco, 2005). Credit allocation, which essentially consists of a lending quota 
system, was not included in the legislation (Marisco, 2005). Yet, the goal of CRA was 
explicit in prohibiting redlining.  Regulatory agencies were also given oversight authority 
to examine financial institutions, which affirmatively used measures of loan performance 
to decide bank expansion applications (Marisco, 2005).  In addition to CRA, a companion 
piece of legislation, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), was passed to require 
financial institutions covered by CRA to disclose the location of every loan (Schwartz, 
35 
 
2010).  The purpose of this legislation was to support CRA‘s intent for evaluators to 
assess a bank‘s lending performance.  
For the last 30 years, CRA has been both heralded as an effective tool to provide 
credit to economically marginalized communities and attacked as being an affront to free 
market principles (Barr, 2005; Belsky, Schill, & Yezer, 2001; Enterprise Foundation, 
1997; McKinley, 1994).  The Wall Street economic meltdown in 2008 provided an 
opportunity for critics to charge that CRA was one of, if not, the primary cause(s) of the 
significant increase in foreclosures.  The overwhelming evidence disputes that CRA, in 
any substantial way, caused the foreclosure crisis the US is currently facing (Goldstein, 
2004; HUD, 2009; Quercia, Stegman, & Davis, 2007; Schloemer et al., 2006).  
Devolution, Deregulation and Ownership Society 
 1980’s Legislation. 
For forty years following the Great Depression, the federal government engaged 
in a piecemeal response to housing. During that same time, financial regulations put in 
place to guard against another large-scale economic crisis remained largely untouched. 
The 1980s would continue the pattern with one of those trends and take a sharp turn with 
the other. The federal approach to housing followed the path of further devolution and 
retrenchment. Burchell and Listokin (1995) explain the consequences of this decision, 
―From 1980 to 1990, new budget authority for subsidized housing in the United States 
fell by 60%, from roughly $25 billion to $10 billion, and annual subsidized housing starts 
plummeted by almost 90%, from 175,000 to 20,000‖ (p. 559). Further, and perhaps more 
significantly, financial deregulation would begin in the 1980s that would arguably lay the 
groundwork for the Great Recession of 2008.  
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Elimination of Regulation Q, 1980 & Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). 
 In the wake of the Great Depression, the federal government established a system 
for thrifts, or savings and loans institutions which existed in a highly regulated market 
with few investment options and full insurance provided by the government (Gilbert, 
1986; Schwartz, 2010). Although much attention was directed to the FHA and its 
financing of mortgages following the Great Depression, thrifts issued the majority of 
mortgages between the late 1930s and 1970s (Schwartz, 2010). Between FHA and thrifts, 
the mortgage finance system remained stable.  
 Beginning in 1980, changes were introduced that fundamentally altered the thrift 
system and mortgage financing. The Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee 
(DIDC), established by the Monetary Control Act of 1980, was charged with dismantling 
Regulation Q over a period of six years (Gilbert, 1986; HUD, 2009).  Regulation Q 
imposed maximum interest rates that thrifts paid out on deposit accounts (Gilbert, 1986; 
Schwartz, 2010). Since thrifts were primarily in the business of issuing mortgage loans, 
customers‘ deposit accounts served as a source for this capital. The purposes of imposing 
interest-rate ceilings were to: 1) encourage thrifts to increase loans in local communities 
instead of investing in larger banks believed to use deposit funds for risky speculative 
investments, 2) limit competition for deposits with the goal of increasing thrift profits, 
and 3) provide a reliable pool of deposits to decrease likelihood of thrifts seeking higher 
profits in riskier investments (Gilbert, 1986). The DIDC found that Regulation Q was not 
able to fulfill its promise and determined interest rate ceilings ―created problems for 
depository institutions, discriminated against small savers, and did not increase the 
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supply of residential mortgage credit‖ (Gilbert, 1986, p. 35). Regulation Q was repealed 
in 1986, which opened up thrifts to offer market-rate interest products to depositors 
(Gilbert, 1986).  
 The repeal of Regulation Q and other changes were not enough to stabilize thrifts 
in a period of inflation. The federal government provided more than $157 billion to bail-
out the industry in 1989 in the form of the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC], 
2012; Schwartz, 2010). The enduring impact of FIRREA was a decreased role for thrifts 
and an increased one for the secondary mortgage market (Schwartz, 2010).  
 Low Income Housing Tax Credit of 1986. 
 The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) was passed as part of the Tax 
Reform of 1986 and surpasses the number of rental units provided through the financing 
of public housing (Buron, Nolden, Heintzi, & Stewart, 2000; HUD User, 2012). The 
LIHTC provided a mechanism for the government to incentivize private developers to 
create low-income housing without direct allocation of federal funds. Overseen at the 
federal level by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), LIHTC provides designated state and 
local agencies authorization to allocate tax credits to private not-for-profit and for-profit 
housing developers (Buron et al., 2000; HUD User, 2012). In turn, the developers then 
sell the credits to investors, who are attracted to invest in low-income rental housing 
development because the credit reduces the investors‘ federal tax liability by one dollar 
for every tax credit purchased (Orlebeke, 2000). The credit is available to investors for 10 
years and the LIHTC property must provide occupancy to low-income renters for a 15-
year minimum (Schwartz, 2010).  
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 Production numbers demonstrate a story of success. More than 1.6 million rental 
units, or about one-sixth of all multi-family units built through 2006, were constructed 
using LIHTC (Schwartz, 2010). During the years 1995 and 2010, an average of roughly 
1,400 projects, representing 107,000 rental units, were made available each year (HUD 
User, 2012). In addition, LIHTC leverages up to $6 billion of private investment annually 
(Karger & Stoesz, 2010).  
 Challenges are also evident in the LIHTC program. An enduring criticism of the 
program is its high transaction costs (Orlebeke, 2000). Given it is a tax-related credit and 
this requires multiple layers of complex financing and strict adherence to income and 
other requirements, developers frequently hire attorneys, accountants and other 
professional consultants to assist in ensuring compliance (Orlebeke, 2000). It is estimated 
that, at least in the early days of the program, nearly 20 to 30% of the allocation was not 
directed toward development but paid attorney, accountant, and consultant fees 
(Orlebeke, 2000).  
 More recently, the program has been challenged by the 2008 economic crash. Due 
to losing billions of dollars in the mortgage crisis, banks and GSEs—including both 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—stopped investing in tax credits (Schwartz, 2010).  With 
the primary investors gone, tax credit projects were in jeopardy. In 2007, tax credit equity 
investments attracted $9 billion dollars—in 2009, developers were expecting to award 
only $4 billion in credits (Schwartz, 2010).   
 McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987. 
 In response to increased homelessness during the 1980s, the first major federal 
legislation to focus on the problem was passed in 1987 in the form of the McKinney-
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Vento Homeless Assistance Act (HUD, n.d.a; Wright, 1989). The Act provides block 
grant funding for a wide range of programs related to homelessness, including: 
emergency shelter, transitional housing, job training, health care, mental health care, 
substance abuse, education and permanent housing (Jimenez, 2010). Although some 
research has demonstrated the effectiveness of the program in meeting permanent 
housing and other needs of people who are homeless (Anderson, Janger, & Panton, 1995; 
Cousineau, Wittenberg, & Pollatsek, 1995; Fuchs & McAllister, 1996), criticism also 
exists regarding the paucity of funds available to address the scope of the challenge 
(Jimenez, 2010; National Low-Income Housing Coalition [NLIHC], 2006). According to 
HUD‘s most recently released point-in-time count, which was conducted in 2013, there 
were 610,042 people who were documented as homeless (Henry, Cortes, & Morris, n.d.). 
Twenty-three percent of people documented as homeless consist of youth under the age 
of 18 (Henry et al., n.d.).   
 1990’s Legislation. 
 Housing policy in the 1990s followed previously established trends: 1) removing 
public housing at a faster pace than it was replaced, 2) providing publicly-backed 
incentives to encourage private development of low-income housing, and 3) funding 
housing programs at an inadequate level to meet the need. Housing legislation in the 
1990s also deviated from these trends in some noteworthy ways: 1) expanded 
opportunities for people of low- and moderate-incomes to become homeowners, 2) 
acknowledged housing and supportive service needs of people who were low-income and 
diagnosed with HIV/AIDs, and 3) placed emphasis on using housing policy to promote 
workfare (Daguerre, 2011; HUD, n.d.a, n.d.b; Jimenez, 2010; Schwartz, 2010). Further, 
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financial deregulation continued throughout the 1990s—ultimately resulting in the repeal 
of the Glass-Steagall Act (Carow, Kane, & Narayanan, 2011; MacDonald, 2005) and the 
introduction of complex and exotic mortgage financing that would be cited as a 
contributing factor in the subsequent housing and economic crises (HUD, 2009; 
Schwartz, 2010).  
 Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990.  
 The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 was 
comprehensive in scope and included the following programs: 1) HOME Investment 
Partnership Program (HOME), 2) Housing Opportunities for People with AIDS 
(HOPWA), 3) Shelter Plus Care Programs, 4) Section 811 Supportive Housing for 
Persons with Disabilities Program, and 5) the HOPE programs (HUD, n.d.a, n.d.b). 
Although the scope of the 1990 Act was comprehensive, budget allocations fell short of 
meeting the needs of people eligible for the programs (Schwartz, 2010).  
 Despite persistent challenges with provision of adequate federal funding, the 
passage of Cranston-Gonzales provided an opportunity for people of low- and moderate-
incomes to realize more benefits from housing than shelter alone.  Research has 
demonstrated that individuals who own their own homes not only personally benefit 
psychologically and economically, but also positively impact the communities in which 
they live (Miller-Adams, 2002; Schneider & Tufano, 2007; Sherraden, 1991). In addition, 
in a democratic capitalist political economy that privileges property ownership, tax laws 
and other incentives attached to homeownership were developed that primarily benefitted 
middle and upper income individuals. Sherraden (1991) first began articulating ideas of 
asset development and explained how middle class people are afforded substantial 
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opportunities to build wealth and assets—noting the federal subsidy provided through the 
home mortgage tax deduction exceeds other social welfare spending (Sherraden, 1991).  
The home mortgage tax deduction continues to provide one of the largest federal 
subsidies.  Homeownership, as offered through the 1990 Act, has the potential to benefit 
people with low-incomes in similar asset-building ways.  Yet, as the subsequent housing 
and economic crisis would demonstrate, homeownership is not without its limitations 
either.   
 Housing and Community Development Act of 1992.  
 The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 is most notable for the 
attention it gave to remediating risks associated with GSEs. Upon passage of the 
legislation, President Bush (1992) emphasized the importance he placed on providing a 
regulator within HUD to monitor capitalization and other financial activities pursued by 
the GSEs.   
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998.  
 The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 [QHWRA] may be 
considered a companion piece to the comprehensive overall of the public welfare system 
addressed in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 [PRWORA]. More directly, QHWRA may be considered the ―ending public 
housing as we know it‖ to PRWORA‘s ―ending welfare as we know it.‖  
QHWRA embraced devolution and workfare ideology woven into the legislative 
fabric of PRWORA. QHWRA shifted its responsibility for operating publicly assisted 
housing to each local Public Housing Authority (PHA) (Hunt, Schulhof, & Holmquist, 
1998). With resident input, local PHAs were now tasked with establishing rents, 
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admission guidelines and social service programs (Hunt et al., 1998). In addition, 
QHWRA directly attached work requirements to receipt of housing benefits (Hunt et al., 
1998).   
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. 
At the end of the 1990s, a substantial shift occurred in financial deregulation. In 
1999, President Clinton signed the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Carow 
et al., 2011; MacDonald, 2005). This Act, also referred to by the name of its authors—
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, repealed Glass-Steagall (MacDonald, 2005). Glass-Steagall had 
endured for 70 years following its passage after the Great Depression. With the repeal of 
Glass-Steagall, commercial banks were no longer restricted from engaging in investment 
activities with their customers‘ deposits. Grumet (2009) addresses the concerns of this 
disappearing consumer protection:  
Banks were able to take on risk because they were playing with house 
money—your money, in the form of your deposits in their institutions. If 
an investment gamble doesn‘t pan out, they don‘t have to cover the loss; 
your deposits are protected by the federal government. If they win big, 
they get to keep all the winnings—realizing profits that were made off 
your monies. You share some of the risk and none of the reward. (p. 7) 
 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley removed the 70-year consumer protection ―wall‖ that stood 
between the commercial and investment sides of financial institutions.  
The Act of 1999 was followed by another piece of financial deregulation the 
following year, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (Friedman & 
Friedman, 2010; Stout, 2011). The 2000 Act would make it permissible for ―over-the-
counter‖ investment derivatives, including credit default swaps, to be unregulated 
(Friedman & Friedman, 2010; Stout, 2011). These newly created unregulated investment 
vehicles were the genesis of the securitization of mortgages (residential mortgage backed 
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securities) and a contributing factor to the economic crash of 2008 (Friedman & 
Friedman, 2010; Schwartz, 2010; Stout, 2011).  
Summary 
The historical context of federal housing policy demonstrates a clear deference for 
the private market.  The real estate, construction, and financial industries shaped the 
foundation of national housing policies that was responsible for overseeing their 
behavior. This phenomenon is one explained by Lindblom‘s (1977) theory on the 
privileged position of business. Lindblom (1977) contends that because our government 
is dependent on the success of the economy, public actors turn over the role of 
governance to business.  Lindblom (1977)  further explains, ―Because public functions in 
the market system rest in the hands of businessmen, it follows that jobs, prices, 
production, growth, the standard of living, and the economic security of everyone all rest 
in their hands‖ (p. 172).  Government actors defer their knowledge and authority to that 
of the for-profit business sector.  The underlying issue here is that this pseudo-
government of business interests undermines the popular sovereignty of the public. hooks 
(1989) explains this behavior as ―politics of domination‖ that:  
…refers to the ideological ground that they share, which is a belief in 
domination, and a belief in the notions of superior and inferior, which are 
components of all of those systems.  For me it‘s like a house, they share 
the foundation, but the foundation is the ideological beliefs around which 
notions of domination are constructed. (p. 175)  
 
A powerful elite has replaced the representative government, and accountability to the 
voice and will of the people has been compromised (Lindblom, 1977; Mills, 1959).  
From the inception of housing policy, business interests have benefitted from this 
deference provided to market interests often to the detriment of vulnerable individuals.  
44 
 
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) directly challenged this privileged 
position of the financial industry.  In so doing, opponents of CRA felt that it ultimately 
confronted the political-economic system of democratic capitalism on which the U.S. 
government is based.  Supporters of CRA refuted this claim by explaining that the 
legislation was effectively an appropriate quid pro quo relationship. In exchange for a 
bank‘s charter, which was also a way for the government to protect banks from 
competition, CRA stipulated those financial institutions should be required to make loans 
in the areas in which they were granted the charter (Marisco, 2005).  In effect, CRA 
opponents were insisting that individuals be subject to a laissez-faire economy, while 
they were content with government regulation being used to reduce market competition.  
This hypocrisy underscores that these interests were less concerned about preserving the 
principles of a free market economy and more interested in expanding their own political 
power at the expense of individuals and neighborhoods of color and low-incomes.  In 
actuality what these interests are advocating is a ―market-centered ideology of privatism‖ 
characterized by an ―underlying commitment by the public sector to help private business 
grow and prosper‖ (Gotham, 2000a, p. 295).  Some might define this benefit as corporate 
social welfare.   
 Now that it is understood that CRA challenged, and still aims to, the status quo of 
powerful economic interests, a political-economic explanation starts to arise for why 
CRA was blamed for the foreclosure crisis. If the public sector exists to help private 
business grow and prosper as Gotham (2000a) suggests, and a greater factor on the 
foreclosure crisis is related to tremendous growth in the loosely regulated, high-risk, 
exploitative subprime market on which a good number of Wall Street executives and 
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investors made a tremendous amount of money, then one that benefitted from that system 
might want to protect it (Lord, 2005).  Subprime loans could be described as the freest of 
markets, the ‗Wild Wild West‘ of mortgage financing—one exotic subprime loan product 
was called NINJA, which stood for No Income, No Job, No Assets (Friedman & 
Friedman, 2010). Admitting that deregulation, enhanced by Wall Street‘s desire to 
maximize returns, may actually be the culprit in the foreclosure fiasco means that the 
current regulations governing the real estate market may need to be strengthened.  Elites 
with something to lose—money, power, status—chose to use false economic arguments 
to link the increase in foreclosures with a policy designed to increase economic justice.  
A red herring was used to throw the public off the trail of the real culprit, which was a 
large-scale, systemic economic crisis due to the deregulation of financial markets.  
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Chapter II. Literature Review 
Epistemological Stance: Homeownership Research  
Before a summary of the literature concerning foreclosure‘s impact on 
communities is presented, it is helpful to articulate how knowledge concerning effects 
and perceived benefits of homeownership have been primarily constructed over the 
relatively short history in which they have been studied. Harrington (2005) succinctly 
defines epistemology as ―the theory of knowledge, or the modes and methods by which 
knowledge is obtained‖ (p. 320). Epistemologies are influenced by one‘s paradigm—or, 
as explained by Kuhn (1970), ―the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and 
so on shared by members of a given community‖ (p. 2). Research on the effects of 
homeownership is characterized by two distinct epistemological and paradigmatic 
perspectives, dominantly by post-positivism and minimally by constructivism (Lincoln & 
Guba, 2000).  
Post-positivism is an extension of an earlier developed epistemology, positivism 
(Glesne, 2006; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). According to Guba (1990), the purpose of 
positivistic inquiry is to ―predict‖ and ―control‖ phenomena (p. 19). The epistemological 
stance of positivism privileges the scientific method, which seeks to verify an objective 
reality by testing hypotheses through carefully crafted and validated measures (Guba, 
1990; Harrington, 2005; Ritzer, 2008). Pure positivism posits an objective reality with 
irrefutable facts and laws, whereas, post-positivism acknowledges the influence of history 
and political contexts on knowledge construction and probable facts and laws (Glesne, 
2006; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Overwhelmingly, housing literature reflects a post-
positivist perspective. The most robust body of housing knowledge focuses on 
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quantifying outcomes, including unit production, economic costs, and benefits (Elliott, 
Fergus, & Friedline, 2012; Galster, 1983; Oliver & Shapiro, 1995; Rohe & Stewart, 1996; 
Shobe & Boyd, 2005) and normalized measures of individual and societal well-being 
(Blum & Kingston, 1984; Fogel, Smith, & Williamson, 2008; Green & White, 1997; 
Harkness & Newman, 2003; Hunter, 1975; Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Rohe & Stegman, 
1994a, 1994b; Steinberger, 1981). 
Conversely, Guba (1990) explains that a social constructivist perspective rejects 
the notion of an objective reality, ―Constructivism thus intends neither to predict and 
control the ‗real‘ world nor to transform it but to reconstruct the ‗world‘ at the only point 
in which it exists: in the minds of constructors‖ (p. 27). Therefore, researchers privileging 
a constructivists‘ lens engage in a process of hermeneutics and dialectics (Guba, 1990; 
Harrington, 2005; Ritzer, 2008). Hermeneutics describes the act of presenting an 
―individual‘s constructions as accurately as possible, while the dialectic aspect consists of 
comparing and contrasting these existing individual constructions (including the 
researchers‘) constructions so that each respondent must confront the constructions of the 
other and become comfortable with them‖ (Guba, 1990, p. 26). Where post-positivism is 
concerned with predicting and control knowledge, social constructionists seek to 
understand and reconstruct meaning (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). A less developed body of 
housing research adopts a constructivist perspective—focusing on the deep meaning and 
symbols people associate with the social construction of ―home‖ (Clapham, 2010; Doyle, 
1992; Dunn, 2006; Mest, 2008; Ronald, 2008) and the lived experiences associated with 
accessing appropriate shelter (Ben-Yoseph, 2011; Dumbleton, 2011; Dupuis & Thorns, 
1998; Jones, Newman, & Isay, 1997; Liebow, 1993).  
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Empirical Knowledge: Foreclosure’s Impact on Community 
Contextual Background. 
Foreclosures are the result of a borrower defaulting on a home mortgage loan, 
typically defined as being more than 90 days delinquent on their mortgage payment (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2008). Following the 2006 housing crash and subsequent economic 
recession, the foreclosure rate increased dramatically with particular states being hit hard 
(see Table 1). In fact, by the end of 2007, seven states accounted for more than half of the 
entire nation‘s foreclosed and seriously delinquent (90 days) loans (Pew Charitable 
Trusts, 2008). By 2008, 1.2 million homeowners faced foreclosure with projections of up 
to 8 million more to occur before the nation hit the bottom of the housing crash (Mallach, 
2009).  
Table 1 Ten states with highest foreclosure rates in 2007: Projected foreclosures and 
impacts 
State Est. # of 
foreclosures & 
% of all U.S. 
foreclosures, 
Dec. 2007 
Est. 
foreclosures 
from 
subprime 
loans, 2005-06 
# of neighboring 
homes 
experiencing 
devaluation 
Decrease in house 
value from 
foreclosure effect 
(millions) 
California 228,133 (14%) 355,682 7,505,584 $107,196 
Florida 186,093 (12%) 194,796 3,667,230 $35,856 
Michigan 91,081 (6%) 79,893 1,414,411 $3,798 
Ohio 91,188 (6%) 85,618 1,392,990 $2,850 
Texas 99,495 (6%) 149,661 2,283,390 $4,923 
New York 61,978 (5%) 124,601 3,552,642 $65,136 
Georgia 67,126 (4%) 83,686 630,218 $1,817 
Illinois 69,251 (4%) 87,918 2,536,938 $27,297 
Indiana 49,069 (3%) 48,034 544,991 $959 
Pennsylvania 52,069 (3%)  76,055 1,684,475 $6,582 
(Pew Charitable Trusts, 2008, pp. 10 & 12)  
Several factors have been cited for the housing meltdown and financial crisis, 
including subprime mortgages, securitization of high-risk loans, predatory lending 
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products, and a weakening economy (Goldstein, 2004; Quercia et al., 2007; Schloemer et 
al., 2006). As previously mentioned in the historical analysis, when the foreclosure crisis 
deepened, critics of financial regulation blamed the Community Reinvestment Act of 
1977 for the housing crash and Great Recession (HUD, 2009).  
The overwhelming evidence disputes that CRA, in any substantial way, was a 
contributing factor to the connected crises (Gupta, 2012; HUD, 2009; Ocaya, 2012). 
First, timing is an issue. CRA was enacted in 1977, yet, the proposition of CRA critics is 
the legislation planted a metaphorical financial bomb set to explode over 30 years later. 
CRA has no history of increasing foreclosures over its three decade existence (HUD, 
2009). Further, changes were made to CRA in the years preceding the economic crisis 
that eroded the scope of the legislation (Schwartz, 2010).  
Second, critics charge CRA forced banks to provide loans to individuals who 
were credit risks; however, part and parcel to CRA is the implicit notion that banks 
should use safe and sound underwriting (Barr, 2005). Further, lending to low-income 
borrowers or communities is similar in profitability and performance for CRA governed 
banks as their lending portfolios for non-CRA loans (Kroszner, 2008).  
Third, critics claim CRA lending activity makes up a considerable amount of 
units involved in the housing crash. The data is extremely compelling in disputing this 
point. Although foreclosures are typically clustered in neighborhoods with primarily 
minority populations, characterized by modest incomes, the defaults are often the result 
of subprime loans (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2008). Subprime loans are targeted to 
consumers that are considered ‗high-risk,‘ usually characterized by low-incomes or poor 
credit (Quercia et al., 2007).  In exchange for a lender loaning to an individual defined as 
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‗high risk,‘ subprime loans have higher interest rates and other fees as a way to recoup 
anticipated losses (Apgar & Duda, 2005). Housing advocates refer to some of these loan 
terms as predatory as they are seemingly designed to strip equity from a homeowner 
(Quercia et al., 2007). The subprime market became a major provider of home mortgage 
loans over the last two decades.  From 1993 to 2005, subprime originations increased 
from a market share of $20 billion to nearly $625 billion (Joint Center for Housing 
Studies, 2006b; Quercia et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2005).  The subprime market also 
became a significant originator of foreclosed loans.  One estimate indicates subprime 
loans may account for ten times the share of foreclosures as prime loans (Apgar & Duda, 
2005).  Because of the association of increased foreclosures with minority and low-
income neighborhoods, one may also erroneously assume that the result of subprime 
lending has a relationship with CRA.  In fact, only 6% of all subprime loans were 
originated by lenders regulated by CRA to lower-income individuals or communities in 
their CRA assessment areas (Kroszner, 2008).  The majority of subprime lenders simply 
fall outside of the current regulatory scope of the CRA.  
Yet, an increase in subprime activity in underserved communities, which are 
typically defined as low-income and minority, does not mean the loan activity was 
necessarily predatory since subprime lending may be used by individuals who do not 
meet mainstream credit standards of nonprime loans to finance purchase of a home, to 
improve an existing home, or to refinance their mortgage (Williams et al., 2005).  
Subprime lending becomes predatory when specific communities are targeted, 
irrespective of credit risk, resulting in discriminatory lending practices.  Unfortunately, 
the research indicates that residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods, at every 
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income and credit history level, are serviced more by subprime lenders than residents of 
majority white neighborhoods (Marsico, 2005; Williams et al., 2005).  It is estimated that 
between 30 and 50% of subprime borrowers could have qualified for a less expensive, 
more favorably termed prime loan (Mallach, 2008). This finding has significant 
implications for predominantly low-income and minority communities as the rate of 
foreclosures, mostly subprime and concentrated in particular geographies, continues to 
increase. One estimate is that 2.2 million subprime home loans made during the housing 
bubble have already failed or will end in foreclosure (Schloemer et al., 2006).   
 Despite the damage caused by predatory subprime loans, affluent populations did 
not escape foreclosure. Foreclosure for properties valued at $1 million dollars or more 
increased 50% from 2006 to 2007 (Marr, 2008). Further illustrating the universality of 
the foreclosure crisis, from 2006 to 2007, foreclosures increased 88% for homes values 
from $500,000 to $999,999 (Marr, 2008). Further, 60% of subprime loans were 
originated for middle and upper-income borrowers and communities (Kroszner, 2008).  
 Even though all socio-economic segments are experiencing historic foreclosure 
rates, the impact on low- and moderate-income households is most significant.  One 
analysis of the current housing market demonstrates the lop-sided effect in net worth, 
wealth inequality, homeownership, and home equity. Net worth, defined as wealth and 
representing the difference between assets and debt, grew for the top 60% of households 
by income but fell for the bottom 40% (CFED, 2008; Schneider & Tufano, 2007).  
 Home equity is a primary path for individuals of low- and moderate-incomes to 
develop net worth.  Net worth represents the market value of a home minus any 
outstanding mortgage obligations (CFED, 2008). Between 2004 and 2006, median home 
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equity increased overall by 20%, but households in the second income quintile 
experienced a 31% loss in home equity (CFED, 2008). Income quintiles divide the total 
number of households into five quintiles, which provides a comparative measure of 
economic well-being (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2010; see Table 2).   
Table 2 Mean household income of quintiles, Median household income of total 
households, GINI index of income inequality, 2004-2009 
Measure 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Mean Household income:  
1
st
 quintile 
11,552 11,612 11,949 12,077 11,707 11,633 
Mean household income:  
2
nd
 quintile 
29,257 29,405 30,457 30,614 30,057 29,765 
Mean household income:  
3
rd
 quintile 
49,534 49,942 51,691 51,301 50,871 50,431 
Mean household income:  
4
th
 quintile 
78,694 79,457 81,839 81,201 80,014 79,518 
Mean household income:  
5
th
 quintile  
170,844 170,408 173,763 178,904 175,335 171,965 
Median income:  
Total households 
49,777 50,112 51,965 51,278 50,899 50,343 
Gini index of income 
inequality 
.468 .466 .463 .470 .469 .466 
(DeNavas-Walt et al., 2010) 
 Since 2006 falling home values and rising foreclosures have eroded recent gains 
in home equity, with the biggest losses recorded for minority households (CFED, 2008).  
In addition, the racial wealth gap closed slightly, but wide disparities endure, and wealth 
inequality grew between the richest and poorest households (CFED, 2008, p. 4; 
DeNavas-Walt et al., 2010). These figures demonstrate the economic damage that low- 
and moderate- households and communities experience in the wake of a housing crisis. 
Homeownership has long been considered one way that groups of lower economic 
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standing can create wealth and increase assets. The foreclosure crisis has caused many to 
ask whether homeownership still provides this opportunity. 
Community Impacts of Foreclosure 
The impact to one homeowner facing foreclosure can result in a crisis situation.  
The homeowner is faced with securing new housing and the ramifications of a blemished 
credit history. The education of a child is disrupted as the family moves to a new area.  
Psychological stress may impact familial cohesion.  While these life stressors are no less 
significant to each individual homeowner, taken collectively, the impact on a low-income 
or predominant minority community may be catastrophic.   
In reviewing the literature, there is a general acknowledgement regarding the lack 
of depth of research on the community impacts of foreclosure (Apgar & Duda, 2005; 
Goldstein, 2004; Immergluck & Smith, 2006a).  The existing literature identifies three 
primary impacts on low-income and minority communities as a result of foreclosures: 1) 
increase in crime, particularly violent crime, 2) increase in housing instability, and 3) 
increase in financial costs (Apgar & Duda, 2005; Carsey Institute, 2006; CFED, 2008; 
Goldstein, 2004; Immergluck & Smith, 2006a, 2006b; Mallach, 2008; Pew Charitable 
Trusts, 2008; Tetreault & Verrilli, 2008; Vidmar, 2008).  The overall findings are that 
foreclosures pose a threat to neighborhood stability and community well-being and 
disproportionately impact low-income and predominantly minority communities.  
Increase in crime. 
 Three primary ways in which foreclosures impact crime in low-income and 
minority communities are: 1) providing opportunity for theft, 2) increasing demands on 
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law enforcement, and 3) attracting violent crime (Apgar & Duda, 2005; Immergluck & 
Smith, 2006b; Kingsley, Smith, & Price, 2009; Vidmar, 2008; see Figure 1).   
Figure 1: Foreclosures‘ impact on crime
 
 
(Apgar & Duda, 2005; Immergluck & Smith, 2006b; Vidmar, 2008)  
Provide opportunity for theft.  
Abandoned buildings invite theft.  Several empty, boarded, and dilapidated 
properties communicate to criminals an unlikeliness of being caught in a neighborhood 
that seemingly appears not to take responsibility for the maintenance of its homes 
(Immergluck & Smith, 2006b).  Although, in fact, neighbors may concerned about the 
foreclosed homes on their blocks, unoccupied buildings do make it more likely that 
property crimes will go unreported simply from a lack of awareness of what is happening 
behind secured doors and boarded windows. 
Increased theft: copper 
wire, air conditioning 
units, water heaters, 
refrigerators become 
valuable commodities  
Increased demand on law 
enforcement: Austin, TX 
officers responded to 3.2 
times as many drug calls, 1.8 
times as many theft calls, and 
twice the number of violent 
calls’ in block with unsecured 
buildings compared with 
those with secured buildings 
Increased violent crime: 
every one percentage 
point increase in 
foreclosures = 6.7 percent 
increase in violent crime 
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 Abandoned homes are rich with commodities that thieves may sell on the black 
market.  Common items that are taken from foreclosed homes include copper wire, air 
conditioning units, water heaters, refrigerators, and toilets (Vidmar, 2008).  In addition to 
being burglarized, foreclosed homes may also be vandalized.  Whether thievery or 
vandalism, or both, property destruction requires additional money to repair the homes.  
Sometimes theft and vandalism is so extensive that it costs more to fix the homes than 
they are worth (Vidmar, 2008).   
 In addition to crime occurring behind boarded windows, criminals also feel 
emboldened by the lack of investment and attention paid to low-income and minority 
communities.  A local director of the East Side Organizing Project of Cleveland reported 
that car thieves used an empty lot on one block for several months to ―store and strip 
parts from stolen cars‖ (Vidmar, 2008, p. 1).  Even more concerning, over a two-year 
period, seven dead bodies, including victims of crime, were discovered in Buffalo, New 
York either in or around vacant buildings (Vidmar, 2008).  
Increase demand on law enforcement.  
The lack of attention to preventative policing in some neighborhoods battling an 
increase in foreclosures may be impacted by the overall demands being placed on law 
enforcement.  While research in this area lacks meaningful depth, one study in Austin, 
Texas documents increased demand on law enforcement in proportion to a rise in 
foreclosures.  The evidence indicates that ―blocks with unsecured [vacant] buildings had 
3.2 times as many drug calls to police, 1.8 times as many theft calls, and twice the 
number of violent calls as blocks without vacant buildings‖ (Vidmar, 2008, p.1).   
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Increase in violent crime.  
One of the most significant findings regarding crime and foreclosure is the 
increase in violent crime.  For many of the same reasons as discussed for the rise in 
thefts, violent criminals also take advantage of the shelter provided by foreclosed homes.  
In the first study to systemically evaluate the impact of foreclosure on crime, it was found 
for every one percent increase in the foreclosure rate, violent crimes increased by 6.7% 
(Immergluck & Smith, 2006b). Immergluck and Smith (2006b) affirm the importance of 
their findings, ―An increase in violent crime is an important social cost, as well as an 
economic cost, that must be incorporated into policy making concerning real estate and 
mortgage lending policies and regulations‖ (p. 863).   
Increase in housing instability. 
 The most fundamental impact of foreclosures is increased housing instability.  
Three major ways such instability occurs has been documented in the literature: 1) a rise 
in homelessness, 2) an increase in demand for rental units, and 3) an increase in tent cities 
(HUD, 2009; Pettit, Hendey, Kingsley, Cunningham, Comey, Getsinger, & Grosz, 2009; 
Kingsley et al., 2009; Vidmar, 2008; see Figure 2)  
Rise in homelessness.  
Since the foreclosure crisis began, 61% of local and state homeless coalitions 
have reported a rise in homelessness (Vidmar, 2008).  Prior to the foreclosure crisis, 
shelters were already at capacity and regularly turned individuals away.  Homelessness 
rates are often difficult to estimate because people may be isolated or living with friends.  
For example, state and local homeless coalitions report that 76% of people experiencing 
foreclosure and homelessness stay with family and/or friends (NLIHC, 2008).   
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Figure 2 Foreclosures‘ impact on housing instability 
 
(Kingsley et al., 2009; Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2006a; Vidmar, 2008)  
Technically, the individuals represented in the report meet the standard definition 
yet they may not consider themselves homeless because they are sheltered by friends and 
family. Information from Michigan also underscores the impact of foreclosure on 
homelessness.  The number of homeless adults listing foreclosure as one of the top two 
reasons for their homelessness was 217% higher in the first quarter of 2008 than it was in 
the first quarter of 2006 (NLIHC, 2008).  
Increase in demand for rental units. 
The availability and pricing of rental units have been impacted in two ways by the 
increase in foreclosures. First, as homeowners are forced from their houses, they are 
looking for rental units.  This demand in rental units has led to an increase in monthly 
rents (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2006a; Vidmar, 2008).  
Nearly 61 percent of 
local and state 
homeless coalitions 
report a rise in 
homelessness since 
the foreclosure crisis 
begin in 2007. 
Due to the increased demand for 
rental units, rents have also 
increased.  A foreclosure history 
also makes it more difficult to 
qualify for rental housing because 
of the damage to credit scores. 
Tent cities are also on 
the rise, which lack 
basic amenities such 
as electricity, 
plumbing and 
drainage. 
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Second, many of the foreclosed properties are rental units. For example, New 
York City had 15,000 foreclosure filings in 2007, of which 60% were multi-unit 
buildings (NLIHC, 2008).  The impacts are not geographically exclusive. During the 
third quarter of 2007, 20% of all foreclosures were multi-family dwellings (NLIHC, 
2008).   
Increase in tent cities. 
In addition to people living with families/friends or in homeless shelters, some are 
finding refuge in tent cities constructed in urban communities across the United States. In 
the Los Angeles suburbs, more than 200 displaced residents have established a tent city 
(Vidmar, 2008).  Tent cities pose unique health risks due to the close proximity of people 
who are living without basic amenities such as electricity, plumbing, and drainage.   
Increase in financial costs.  
 Foreclosures pose a significant fiscal impact not only to units of government, but 
also to not-for-profit organizations and other public-private partners.  Three ways 
foreclosures led to increased financial costs are: 1) loss of property value, 2) loss of 
property tax base, and 3) care and maintenance of foreclosures (Apgar & Duda, 2005; 
Kingsley et al., 2009; Vidmar, 2008; see Figure 3). 
Loss of property value.  
One of the most immediate impacts of foreclosures is the declining value of the property. 
As with most impacts of foreclosure, there appears to be a negative multiplying effect on  
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Figure 3 Foreclosures‘ impact on financial costs 
 
(Apgar & Duda, 2005; Kingsley et al., 2009; Vidmar, 2008)  
the values of nearby properties.  One study examined the impact to property values in 
Philadelphia and found that a single abandoned house on a block has the potential to 
reduce the value of nearby properties by 15% (Mallach, 2008).  In Cleveland, where a 
community devastated by more than 9,000 foreclosure filings in 2007 alone, homes sold 
for an average of 29% of their market value (Mallach, 2008).  Cleveland‘s median home 
value dropped 48% between 2005 and 2007 (Mallach, 2008).  While rust belt cities like 
Cleveland and Philadelphia experienced some of the worst increases in the foreclosure 
rate and therefore the most devastating effects, other communities did not escape falling 
property values either.  
 An examination of 1997 and 1998 foreclosure data in Chicago determined a 
statistically significant ability of one foreclosure to impact the property value of a 
neighboring home.  A conservative estimate of the data revealed that for every 
Forty-two 
counties in the 
U.S. can expect 
to see their 
property tax 
base decrease 
by more than 
$1 billion 
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foreclosure within an eighth of a mile of a single-family home there is a 0.9% decrease in 
the value of the home (Immergluck & Smith, 2006a). Immergluck and Smith (2006a) 
elaborate on their findings: ―The impact was even higher in lower-income 
neighborhoods, where each foreclosure dropped home values by an average of 1.44%‖ 
(p. 24). The aggregate estimated loss of property value for the City of Chicago for the 
3,750 foreclosures in 1997 and 1998 was $598 million, or an average of $159,000 for 
each foreclosure (Immergluck & Smith, 2006a).  The analysis did not account for the 
effects on condominium, multifamily rental, and commercial building values.  This study 
also took place prior to the foreclosure boom that began in 2006, for which the effects 
would likely result in an even greater cumulative loss in property value.  
 The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) has analyzed the potential impacts of 
the foreclosure boom, particularly the effects of the subprime market, on property values. 
CRL focuses primarily on the subprime market because data indicate a relationship 
between such loans and the likelihood of foreclosure.  One analysis has quantified the 
differential impact of use and harm of subprime loans noting that subprime loans account 
for only 14% of all mortgage loans but result in more than 50% of all loans that are in 
foreclosure (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2008). Another report found that ―more than 1 out of 
every 20 subprime borrowers was in foreclosure and thus at risk of losing their home in 
the fourth quarter of 2003, compared with just 1 out of every 100 prime borrowers‖ 
(Quercia et al., 2007).  That likelihood has increased since the housing crisis began.  CRL 
now estimates that for loans originated in 2004 and 2005, one in five will end in 
foreclosure (Schloemer et al., 2006).  Based on that estimate, foreclosures are likely to 
cost homeowners approximately $164 billion, which will mostly occur in stripped home 
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equity (Schloemer et al., 2006).  A more recent analysis, which occurred after the housing 
crisis began, indicates deeper losses to communities.  This analysis suggests that up to 
40.6 million homeowners will lose value due to subprime foreclosures in their 
communities (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2008). In fact, they estimate properties next to 
foreclosures may lose up to $356 billion in home value (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2008). 
Yet, even more troubling and concerning is the geographical and sub-population impacts 
of the loss in home value. 
 At the end of 2007, seven states accounted for more than 50% of all the nation‘s 
loans that were in foreclosure or seriously delinquent: California, Florida, Michigan, 
Ohio, Texas, New York and Georgia (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2008).  Within those states, 
foreclosures were concentrated in low-income and minority communities that have been 
impacted the most by the targeting of subprime lenders (Center for Responsible Lending, 
2011a).  The unfortunate impact is the reduction in ―value of properties owned by lower-
income residents in already weakened housing markets‖ (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2008, p. 
11).  Homeownership, especially for low-income and minority communities, is one of the 
most efficient paths to building wealth in the U.S. (CFED, 2008).  The importance of 
homeownership is underscored by research that demonstrates home equity is the most 
significant component of net worth overall, accounting for approximately 50% of all 
wealth (CFED, 2008).  
Although fewer than 50% of low-income and minority households are 
homeowners, for those that manage to achieve homeownership, the devastating effect of 
losing equity is even more pronounced. ―Mean wealth is more concentrated in 
homeownership for minority households (60.6%) – particularly for Latino households 
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(66.0%) – than it is for white households (48.8%)‖ (CFED, 2008, pp. 6-7).  Essentially 
what this data underscores is that white households have other forms of assets and wealth 
than minority households that may cushion the blow of lost property value. The impact of 
lost property value is further highlighted by the following statistics:  
The bottom income quintile had 62.4% of its mean net worth in home equity, 
whereas the top income quintile had only 44.4%, representing an 18 percentage 
point difference. Households in the second income quintile – earning income 
between $20,000 and $37,000 a year in 2006 – saw median income equity fall 
more than 31% from $16,000 to $11,000.Minority homeowners experienced a 
greater loss in home equity (15%) than did white homeowners (11%).  (CFED, 
2008, pp. 7-9) 
 
The data on the loss of property values document some of the most discriminatory effects 
of subprime lending on low-income and minority communities.  
Loss of property tax base.  
One cannot address the loss of property value without discussing one of the 
primary outcomes of devaluation—loss of property tax base.  The loss of property tax 
revenue underscores the domino effect of foreclosures.  Research has documented how 
the foreclosure crisis is disproportionately impacting communities already suffering from 
neglect and disinvestment.  Low-income and minority communities are further victimized 
through increased crime invited by foreclosures and perpetuated by law enforcement 
systems that are either unengaged and/or under-resourced (Kingsley et al., 2009). 
Although empirical research is not available that documents why law enforcement is 
under-resourced in meeting the policing needs of communities heavily impacted by 
foreclosures, it is reasonable to assume that declining property tax revenue may be one 
cause. In addition, when homes are vandalized and stripped bare it makes it more difficult 
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to sell.  If a whole block of foreclosed homes are vandalized and stripped, it makes it 
extremely challenging to develop revitalization projects. 
Two estimates document the extent to which local and state governments are 
impacted by the foreclosure crisis.  In terms of local impact, forty-two U.S. counties 
alone are expected to see their property tax base decrease by more than $1 billion 
(Vidmar, 2008). Vallejo, California recently declared bankruptcy after the housing crisis 
destroyed their local economy. Before declaring bankruptcy, the once thriving town, ―cut 
87 jobs, funding for parks, a library, a senior citizens‘ center and other public services,‖ 
but the decreases in spending were not enough for the local government to avoid financial 
failure (Vidmar, 2008, p. 3).  
At the state level, ten states alone were expected to lose $6.6 billion in 2008 tax 
revenue as a result of the foreclosure crisis (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2008). Unfortunately, 
reduced revenue will most likely result in cuts to social service and public programs at 
the precise time when they are needed the most. Although each state allocates property 
taxes differently, the revenue is typically used to provide essential services including law 
enforcement, fire protection, road and bridge maintenance, schools, and county 
government operations.   
States and cities must provide a minimum of services to keep government 
functioning and maintain public order. In addition to cutting needed social service and 
public programs, states and localities may actually be forced to increase the property tax 
rate to maintain basic services.  Such increases may come at a time when low-income and 
minority communities can ill-afford them.  An increase in the tax rate, coinciding with a 
decrease in services and other community amenities, may result in the unintended 
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consequence of mass migration from particular cities.  Perhaps reflecting this scenario, 
Detroit and Cleveland have both experienced significant decreases in their populations 
(Vidmar, 2008).   
Care and maintenance of foreclosures.  
In addition to losing property tax revenue, cities must contend with the costs 
associated with the oversight and maintenance of foreclosed properties. The most 
comprehensive study conducted on the impact of foreclosures on city governments used 
Chicago as a case study (Apgar & Duda, 2005). It is worth noting that the study occurred 
before the housing crisis reached its current magnitude. The study documents the high 
social impacts of subprime lending and describes the practice as encouraging perverse 
market effects with lenders essentially racing to the bottom with inappropriate 
underwriting standards and loan products (Apgar & Duda, 2005). The conclusion drawn 
is that speculative investors benefit at the time of loan origination and leave local 
governments and other entities to pay the cumulative costs when many of the loans 
default (Apgar & Duda, 2005).  Apgar and Duda (2005) acknowledge the clustering of 
foreclosures in low-income and minority communities and conclude that the result is the 
concentration of outsider effects in the nation‘s most challenging areas.   
In examining the costs of foreclosures to the City of Chicago, Apgar and Duda 
(2005) documented that more than a dozen city and county agencies were involved. The 
case study evaluated five common foreclosure scenarios to document the economic costs 
to local government. Costs ranged across the five scenarios and may have included such 
items as filing fees, building inspections, boarding, police calls, demolition, and fire 
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protection. Depending on the scenario, foreclosures cost the city of Chicago anywhere 
from $430 to $35,000/unit for care and maintenance (Apgar & Duda, 2005).  
Figure 4 Social Impacts of Foreclosure 
 
(Apgar & Duda, 2005, p. 6) 
 In addition to the direct costs of caring for and maintaining foreclosed properties 
for which ownership has shifted to a city government, there are also indirect costs that 
state and city governments may bear.  The research in this area is not substantial but there 
is some evidence that indicates prior investment by public and private partners is eroded 
when communities become blighted by foreclosures.  Through revitalization grants, many 
cities and private partners made investments in distressed communities that created 
opportunities for these neighborhoods to transition into thriving areas.  One example of 
this type of investment is Reservoir Hill in Baltimore, Maryland that is now faltering 
Mortgage Failure 
Insider Effects 
Borrowers 
Originators 
Issuers 
Servicers 
Noteholders 
 
Outsider Effects 
Muncipalities 
Neighboring Owners 
Local Businesses 
Landlords 
Mortgage Investors 
 
Social Cost of Foreclosure 
66 
 
because of high foreclosure rates (Vidmar, 2008).  Convincing cities and private entities 
to invest in distressed communities the first time around may have been challenging 
enough. Now that their investment did not produce the desired return it may be nearly 
impossible to attract capital to revitalize distressed neighborhoods again.  
Current Policy Practice 
Federal Response. 
 Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003.  
 A few years prior to the mortgage meltdown and widespread economic collapse, 
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003 was passed to protect military personnel as 
they actively serve the country (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ], n.d.). The Act 
includes a number of protective provisions including ones that prevent mortgage interest 
rate changes and foreclosure (Kelley, Ropiequet, & Kempa, 2005; DOJ, n.d.). Despite 
these safeguards, during the foreclosure crisis, evidence exists of violations that loan 
servicers made against actively serving military personnel (Henriques, 2011; Matthews, 
2011; U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011). In a regulatory review of 
2,800 mortgage documents, GAO staff reportedly discovered 50 occurrences of loan 
servicers pursuing foreclosure against an active service member (GAO, 2011). 
 Not overtly focused on foreclosure and recently new, the literature regarding this 
Act is minimal. Given the possible protections the Act does provide against foreclosure, 
it is worth further study. In addition, deeper investigation is warranted to discover the 
extent and contributing factors that resulted in violations of the Act.   
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Hope Now.  
 Despite troubles in the housing sector arising in 2006 and further deterioration 
into 2007, the Bush administration did not offer any response until late 2007. Hope Now, 
a voluntary effort of housing counselors, mortgage lenders, investors and homeowners, 
was encouraged by the Bush administration in late 2007 (HOPE Now, n.d.). The effort 
resulted in minimal assistance for struggling homeowners. Intended to expedite loan 
modifications of subprime adjustable-rate mortgages, the program was voluntary on the 
part of lenders and investors, did not address the multiple and complex problems 
associated with mortgage default, and only 20% of the few loans that were modified 
actually resulted in a lowered mortgage note (HUD, 2009). 
 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.  
 In the aftermath of the 2008 economic crash, Congress passed and President 
George W. Bush signed into law the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 
2008. Including overhauling oversight and regulation of GSEs, HERA contained three 
key provisions: 1) Hope for Homeowners, which provided $300 billion in FHA 
guarantees to incentivize lenders to refinance delinquent home mortgages; 2) 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program, which is a part of the Community Development 
Block Grant (CDBG) and provided $3.92 billion in block grants for states to purchase 
foreclosed or abandoned homes for the purposes of community stabilization; and 3) 
National Housing Trust Fund, which was to be financed through contributions from 
GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to support the construction, maintenance and 
preservation of affordable rental housing for low and very-low income individuals (HUD, 
n.d.b, n.d.c; HUD, 2008; NLIHC, 2012; Wheelock, 2008). 
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The juxtaposition of size, scope and success between HERA and the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) is striking. TARP, also passed in 2008 as part of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, provided $700 billion to financial institutions to 
mitigate the losses experienced during the economic crash (Jimenez, 2010). HERA was, 
in theory, the homeowner equivalent of the large-scale bail-out offered to banks and other 
financial institutions through TARP; however, the homeowners were not considered too 
big to fail. HERA was intended to provide relief to 400,000 homeowners but by 
September 2009 only 94 loans had been refinanced (Congressional Oversight Panel, 
2009). With its voluntary structure, HERA had failed to provide proper incentives to 
encourage lenders to meaningfully participate. In addition to the minimal invention 
provided by Hope for Homeowners, the financing structure for the National Housing 
Trust Fund collapsed when the federal government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
into conservatorship (NLIHC, 2012).  
Making Home Affordable.  
Introduced by the Obama administration shortly after assuming office in 2009, 
Making Home Affordable is a part of a comprehensive strategy to mitigate foreclosures, 
stabilize the housing sector, and strengthen the economy (HUD, 2013).  There are four 
main components to the initiative: 1) Home Assistance Modification Program (HAMP), 
which allows homeowners to modify their loan into an affordable mortgage, 2) Home 
Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), which provides an alternative route to 
refinancing a loan if homeowners are unable to obtain a traditional refinance due to a 
decline in home value, 3) Home Affordable Unemployment Program (UP), which 
provides a temporary reduction or suspension of mortgage payments for a minimum of 
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12 months if the homeowner is unemployed, and 4) Home Affordable Foreclosure 
Alternatives (HAFA), which offers homeowners an opportunity to exit a current 
mortgage through short sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure into a more affordable housing 
situation (HUD, 2013).  
Although comprehensive in scope, Making Home Affordable programs continued 
the previous pattern of voluntary participation by lenders. In the early years of the 
program, following the TARP rescue, very few lenders seem inclined to provide loan 
modifications. At the end of 2009, out of 3.3 million homeowners eligible for HAMP, 
only 66,465 mortgages (2%) were permanently modified (U.S. Department of The 
Treasury, 2010). In 2012, addressing criticism of HAMP‘s ability to reach more 
homeowners, the Obama Administration implemented changes to the program (Making 
Home Affordable, 2012). By the end of May 2012, over one million homeowners had 
received permanent loan modifications and were averaging $500 in monthly mortgage 
payments—representing a cumulative savings of $13.3 billion in mortgage payments 
(U.S. Department of The Treasury, 2012).  
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  
 Housing programs would receive a boost when Congress allocated more than $13 
billion of the $788 billion of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (Schwartz, 2010). As 
part of the effort to stimulate jobs and create shovel-ready projects, the following HUD 
programs would benefit from this investment: Public Housing Capital Fund, Native 
American Housing Block Grants, Community Development Fund, Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program, HOME Investment Partnerships Program with support to Low-
70 
 
Income Housing Tax Credits, Assisted Housing Stability and Energy and Green Retrofit 
Investments (HUD, n.d.b).   
 Hardest Hit Fund. 
 Further responding to criticism that existing programs did not go far enough to 
address the needs and challenges of homeowners facing foreclosure, the Obama 
administration developed the Hardest Hit Fund in 2010 (HUD, 2010; U.S. Department of 
The Treasury, n.d.).  The initiative began with a $1.5 billion investment in five states and 
has grown to include 18 states with $7.6 billion in funding (U.S. Department of The 
Treasury, n.d.). Targeting states with higher than national unemployment rates and/or 
20% declines in home prices, the Hardest Hit Fund allows state housing finance agencies 
to develop local responses to prevent foreclosures (U.S. Department of The Treasury, 
n.d.).  
 States are encouraged to develop programs that respond to the particular 
challenges faced by their residents; however, there are some common goals: provide 
mortgage assistance to individuals who are unemployed or ―underwater‖ on their 
mortgage, offer principal reduction to move homeowners into more affordable payments, 
eliminate homeowners‘ second lien loans, and assist homeowners who are moving from 
unaffordable living arrangements into affordable ones (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
n.d.).  
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.  
 Two years following the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, 
Congress passed and President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act in 2010 (HUD, n.d.b). Dodd-Frank reverses the decades‘ long 
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path of deregulation and attempts to restore financial protections that were repealed or 
weakened in the intervening years between the Great Depression and the Great Recession 
(Cohen, 2012). The 2,300-page bill with 400 rules is comprehensive and complex, 
contending with weighty financial issues, including: establishing a Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau with oversight and enforcement functions; establishing a financial 
stability oversight council; regulating non-bank financial companies; breaking up large 
corporations; limiting taxpayer funded bailouts; reestablishing a wall between deposit and 
investment activities in financial institutions in the form of the Volcker Rule; reforming 
the federal reserve; creating transparency and accountability for derivatives; pursuing 
mortgage reform; developing new requirements for credit rating agencies; imposing 
accountability in executive compensation; and reducing risks associated with securities 
(Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, n.d.; Frank, n.d.; New York Times, 2011; 
Protess, 2012; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2012).  
 Strong opinions exist as to whether Dodd-Frank will prevent another economic 
crisis; however, the full impact of the legislation is unknown (Cohen, 2012; Ludwig, 
2009; Stiglitz, 2011). Although comprehensive in scope, Dodd-Frank provided few 
details on how the legislation should be implemented, leaving federal regulators to tackle 
that arduous task starting in 2010 (Protess, 2012). Gary Gensler, chairperson of the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which is the agency responsible for 
promulgating rules for Dodd-Frank, expected a full implementation of the law in 2013 
(Protess, 2012). Along the path to implementation, Mr. Gensler‘s agency has contended 
with Wall Street backlash. Morgan Stanley alone has dedicated 100 people to influence 
rulemaking (Protess, 2012). In addition, due to lobbying efforts that have slowed the rule-
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writing process, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission has only promulgated 
one-third of mandated Dodd-Frank regulations, another one-third remain in the 
proposalphase, and the final one-third have yet to be fully considered (Protess, 2012). 
Wall Street representatives are also challenging Dodd-Frank in court. As of December 
2012, five lawsuits were filed (Protess, 2012). At this point, the full implementation and 
protective outcomes of Dodd-Frank remain uncertain.   
 National Mortgage Settlement of 2012.  
 In February 2012, U.S. Attorney General Holder announced news of a $25 billion 
settlement between the federal government, joined by 49 states, and five of the nation‘s 
major mortgage servicers (DOJ, 2012). The settlement stemmed from ongoing 
investigations at the federal and state levels concerning alleged abuses of mortgage 
servicing, foreclosure, and bankruptcy (DOJ, 2012). The five financial institutions subject 
to the terms of the settlement include: Ally Financial, Inc., Bank of America, Citigroup, 
Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and Wells Fargo & Co. (National Mortgage Settlement, 
n.d.b).  
 Key settlement provisions include: financial relief to homeowners in the form of 
principal reduction ($10 billion), refinancing ($3 billion), and other housing-related 
assistance ($7 billion); payments to state and federal governments in the form of 
payments to wrongfully foreclosed upon homebuyers ($1.5 billion) and general payments 
to state and federal governments (18.5 billion) to provide foreclosure relief and housing 
programs; strengthened servicing standards; and benefits to servicemembers and veterans 
in the form of restitution for wrongful foreclosures (payment equal to lost equity, interest 
and an additional $116,785), refund any interest payments made in excess of 6%, 
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universal eligibility for cost reimbursement associated with permanent change in station 
(PCS), and veterans housing benefit program ($10 million) (Lehman, n.d.; National 
Mortgage Settlement, n.d.a, n.d.b). 
State Response. 
 Foreclosures impact states unevenly. Based on HMDA origination loan data from 
2004-2008, the percent of completed foreclosures ranged from a low of 1% in Vermont 
to a high of 14% in Nevada (Center for Responsible Lending, 2011b). Considering the 
breadth of foreclosure experience, which is influenced by multiple social and economic 
factors, it is reasonable to find a wide range of legislative and programmatic responses in 
the states. Even before the housing bubble burst, some states attempted to protect 
consumers and vulnerable residents. North Carolina enacted the first state anti-predatory 
lending legislation in 1999—serving as an early model for other states to modify and 
adopt (Pierce, 2009).  
 Even when accounting for local nuance, states have generally responded to 
foreclosures with a three-tiered approach: 1) prevention, 2) mitigation and 3) stabilization 
(Center for Responsible Lending, 2008; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2008; Pierce, 2009).   
Prevention strategies typically include a combination of laws to regulate the conduct of 
mortgage brokers and minimize predatory lending, increase transparency during the loan 
process, and provide financial education to residents (Center for Responsible Lending, 
2008; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2008; Pierce, 2009). Mitigation responses include outreach 
to borrowers, referring borrowers to counseling and legal services, attempting to secure 
loan modifications, streamlining foreclosure processes, and protecting borrowers from 
unscrupulous service providers (Center for Responsible Lending, 2008; Pew Charitable 
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Trusts, 2008; Pierce, 2009). Stabilization activities serve as the last resort—after efforts 
to prevent or mitigate a foreclosure is not successful. Stabilization responses are 
concerned with attracting homeowners to an area before abandoned and vacant properties 
have enough time to take hold and potentially devastate an already fractured community, 
which also requires sustained maintenance (Pierce, 2009). Land banks are also a 
stabilization effort allowing a governmental or not-for-profit entity to assemble and 
temporarily manage a large number of vacant properties (Pierce, 2009).  
 Prevention, mitigation and stabilization activities encompass broad areas of 
responses found throughout the states. One year after the 2008 economic recession began, 
a number of new state laws were passed to stem the tide of foreclosures. Cumulatively, 
99 foreclosure-related laws were passed in 2009—67 of which provided mitigation-level 
responses, 15 more concerned neighborhood stabilization strategies and 12 were 
preventative in nature (National Governor‘s Association, 2010). States continue to be 
challenged with foreclosures and refine their policy responses.  
Grassroots Response. 
 Influenced by the financial industry bail-out and lack of a similar scope of 
response for individual homeowners facing foreclosure, community groups in various 
cities began engaging in direct action campaigns. Occupy Our Homes arose as an 
offshoot of Occupy Wall Street (OWS), whose genesis occurred in 2011 as a response to 
Wall Street‘s role in the 2008 economic collapse and has loosely and broadly coalesced 
around issues of wealth inequality, militarization, and monetary influence in political and 
policy arenas (Dean, 2012). Occupy Our Homes provides a focused effort that some 
critics charge is lacking in the general OWS movement. As Dean elaborates, ―While 
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Occupiers‘ arguments about inequality and corporate greed may sometimes seem 
abstract, the foreclosure issue has allowed activists to make their complaints about the 
U.S. economy more concrete‖ (Dean, 2012, p. 25). The purpose of Occupy Our Homes is 
to partner with local community groups to advance anti-foreclosure and anti-eviction 
actions (Dean, 2012).  
 Direct action. 
 Direct action campaigns are distinct from protests, marches and rallies in that a 
specific target, either an individual or an organization, is identified and the target is 
presented with a list of demands (Alinsky, 1971; Bobo, Kendall, & Max, 2001; Shaw, 
1996). One of the most recognized and successful efforts of direct action involved a 
veteran, U.S. Marine Bobby Hull of Minneapolis, MN (Dean, 2012). Hull joined forces 
with a local group, Neighborhoods Organizing for Change (NOC), in a direct action that 
targeted Bank of America (BOA) (Dean, 2012). Hull, who become ill and fell behind on 
his mortgage payment, and his family were facing foreclosure after being long-term 
homeowners and active participants in their community (Dean, 2012). After BOA was 
the target of press conferences, petitions and newspaper headlines, the bank agreed to 
negotiate a loan modification (Dean, 2012). One representative of another local 
community-based organization engaged in anti-foreclosure and anti-eviction efforts 
explains the uniqueness and effectiveness of direct action approaches:  
What (housing) counselors won‘t do is engage in advocacy. We are in a 
position to generate a hundred phone calls or a hundred emails to a bank 
executive saying, ―This person is trying to stay in her home. We‘re calling 
on you to do a modification.‖ That‘s made a difference sometimes. We‘ve 
been able to get some postponements and some loan modifications. (Dean, 
2012, p. 25) 
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Foreclosure Prevention Zones. 
 Foreclosure Prevention Zones (FPZ) are designated areas in which activists and 
other anti-foreclosure advocates provide collective and intentional support to individuals 
facing foreclosure (Dean, 2012). One of the most robust and broadly supported 
Foreclosure Prevention Zone (FPZ) is found in California. Occupy Petaluma, Occupy 
Los Angeles and Occupy Santa Cruz have combined efforts to promote FPZs (Dean, 
2012). Some of the actions undertaken by this coalition of Occupy organizations include 
holding weekly vigils and raising awareness through newspaper and radio interviews 
(Dean, 2012). The Occupy coalition has used its collective power to apply pressure on the 
financial industry and policymakers to make the zone foreclosure-free and provide 
opportunities for homeowners to modify their mortgages (Dean, 2012). This collective 
approach has yielded positive results. Mayor David Glass, who represents Petaluma, 
describes the FPZ as ―a model of mutual respect and cooperation that has delivered 
mileage‖ (Dean, 2012, p. 26).  
 The Occupy coalition, along with other anti-foreclosure and housing activists, 
continue to push to extend the power behind FPZs. Currently, they are attempting to 
strengthen the protective and supportive aspects by adding legal muscle to the zones. An 
organizer with Occupy Petaluma describes how the coalition is approaching every county 
recorder and district attorney across the state to request an injunction against foreclosures 
(Dean, 2012). The movement is using this tactic based upon the knowledge that lenders 
sometimes are unable to prove they actually hold the appropriate mortgage documents 
demonstrating they legally own the mortgage.  
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Take Back the Land. 
 In another grassroots approach, a local organization has assisted families and 
individuals facing foreclosure to reclaim foreclosed and vacant properties by re-
inhabiting them. Take Back the Land, a local organization based in Miami, reclaims 
empty properties for use by individuals and families who are homeless. Proponents of an 
ownership society may refer to this grassroots tactic derisively as ―squatting;‖ however, 
Take Back the Land considers housing a human right and believes they are liberating the 
land (Dean, 2012).  
 Take Back the Land is actively advocating for democratic community control of 
abandoned and foreclosed properties for use as affordable housing (Dean, 2012). As their 
tactics and awareness of the movement broadens so does the growth of the organization. 
Take Back the Land now has a presence in Rochester, NY and Madison, WI (Dean, 
2012).  
Theoretical Critique and Analysis 
 At its core, theory attempts to explain or predict phenomena.  Several working 
definitions of theory exist, each seemingly focusing on one nuance or another.  Payne 
(2005) offers a broad definition explaining that theory ―is an organized statement of ideas 
about the world‖ (p. 5).  Turner (1996) articulates the challenge many social science 
scholars encounter when attempting to communicate their scientifically-tested, 
conceptually rigorous theories to a mainstream society that equates the term as describing 
something no more than a ―hunch‖ or ―personal opinion‖ (p. 4). Acknowledging that 
reality and meanings are socially constructed, Turner (1996) moves beyond the lay 
definition to identify essential theoretical components—concepts, facts, hypotheses, 
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principles—which provide a framework to ―understand what is, what is possible and how 
to achieve the possible‖ (p. 2). Harrington (2005) articulates the nuance of social theory 
as being explicitly concerned about the ―study of scientific ways of thinking about social 
life‖ (p. 1) He further distinguishes social theory from political theory noting the inherent 
connection between the two bodies of thought but describes the former as having a 
broader orientation than the latter (Harrington, 2005). Perhaps one of the most precise 
and comprehensive definitions is found in the following concise statement, ―a theory is a 
set of ideas that are cogently connected in operationally defined components that seek to 
clearly explain a specified phenomenon‖ (Daley, Peters, Taylor, Hanson, & Hill, 2006, p. 
2).  
 The most highly regarded theories are characterized as having a solid empirical 
base, and a well-developed conceptual framework that offers clear explanatory features 
and provides direction for practice interventions (Decker et al., 2007; Simon, 1994; 
Turner, 1996). Theories also have significant limitations. If a theory is an ordering of 
ideas to explain some or several aspects of human behavior and/or the social 
environment, it stands to reason ambiguity exists. Weick (1989) cautions that theory, 
which is sometimes helpful in making sense of images and ideas that confront society, 
must also be approached with discipline and confidence to contend with its provisional 
and imperfect nature. Although Weick (1989) was offering his advice broadly, nowhere 
else should this care be given more full consideration in theory application, development 
and progression than with issues of oppression and vulnerable populations. Theory has 
been used to oppress and marginalize vulnerable populations throughout history; 
however, it may also provide a path to empowerment (Fook, 2002).   
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 The purposes of the following analysis are to critique relevant explanatory 
theories, to identify possible areas of theory development and inclusion in a research 
agenda related to the intersection of homeownership, foreclosure and low- to moderate-
income communities. After reviewing a number of social and political theories that 
appeared to have explanatory features appropriate to an analysis on the stated subject, 
four theories were selected: 1) Asset Development, 2) Functional Theory of Federalism, 
3) Marxist Theory, and 4) Social Exchange Theory.  An overview of each theory‘s 
conceptual framework will be provided in advance of a critique on three separate factors: 
1) status of empirical base, 2) status of conceptual rigor, and 3) relevance to topic. In the 
ideal world, the most promising theories will have a strong empirical base, high 
conceptual rigor, and accommodate exploration of the intersection between the benefits 
of homeownership, the costs of foreclosure, and the impact of both of the former 
attributes on low- and moderate-income communities.  
Asset Development Theory 
 Overview of Theory. 
 Most services and programs provided to meet the needs of individuals with low- 
and moderate-incomes are focused on income and subsistence maintenance (Sherraden, 
1991). Income and subsistence maintenance programs include Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF), Social Security, Medicaid, SNAP (food stamps), and rental 
subsidies.  Influenced by an American ideology of rugged individualism and self-
reliance, most of these programs are designed to provide enough assistance to raise an 
individual or family to poverty level, but not enough to incentivize the receipt of these 
government benefits (Dobelstein, 2003; Miller-Adams, 2002; Shapiro, 2001).  In addition 
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to discouraging a welfare lifestyle, an income and subsistence maintenance approach 
does little to significantly increase the opportunities for individuals who are low-income 
to move into the ranks of the middle or upper economic demographic groups.  In essence, 
income and subsistence maintenance programs do as they imply—maintain poverty.  
 In 1991, a social work professor, Michael Sherraden, introduced the concept of 
―asset development‖ that advocated for wealth-creating social policies for people who are 
low-income. In this context, wealth is defined as savings, investments, and accumulation 
of assets and does not include income, spending, or consumption (Sherraden, 1991).  
Asset-based welfare fundamentally challenges basic assumptions about the dominant 
U.S. social welfare system. The theory posits that traditional welfare policy is primarily 
concerned with income and consumption but should be driven instead by those factors 
along with promoting asset accumulation and investment (Schneider & Tufano, 2007; 
Sherraden, 1991).  Sherraden (1991) argued that ―current welfare policy has sustained the 
weak, but it has not helped to make them strong‖ (p. 3).  
 Asset-based welfare theory enhances the positive attributes of welfare assistance 
with the addition of economic development.  Sherraden argues that welfare policy should 
move to an asset direction for two reasons: 1) the effects of assets are significant (see 
Figure 5) and 2) it fits the American ethos of capitalism and ownership.  The theory 
acknowledges the reluctant U.S. welfare state and how ideological concepts of 
individualism, wealth, and other aspects of capitalism impact social policy. Asset-based 
development theory attempts to bridge the gap between individual theories of behavior 
that place the burden of poverty on people‘s behavior and social theories that target 
institutions and structures as the mechanisms for systemic poverty.  In this way, the 
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theory embraces the unique characteristics of the American experience and attempts to 
embed them into social welfare policy.  Sherraden (1991) explains, ―America needs a 
different welfare idea, an idea more suited to capitalism, more oriented toward 
accumulation and economic independence…Accumulation of independent capital is the 
American dream; it has deep roots in our history. It is the fabric from which we should 
cut an American welfare policy‖ (pp. 12-13). 
Status of Empirical Base. 
 Asset-based welfare theory is grounded in research that demonstrated the positive 
impacts of asset accumulation by non-poor individuals.  Sherraden (1991) defines these 
government-supported programs and incentives that are provided to middle- and upper-
income demographics as ―non-poor welfare‖ (p. 64). For example, Sherraden (1991) 
discovered that not only did the federal government provide asset-based subsidies to the 
non-poor ($107 billion) that only fell slightly less than for the entire poor welfare state 
($124.6 billion), but also found that most benefits provided to the non-poor were 
designed to help non-poor people accumulate financial and real assets.  The two major 
forms of non-poor asset-based welfare are: 1) tax subsidies for employer-sponsored and 
personally held retirement pension accounts ($59.8 billion), and 2) tax subsidies for home 
equity accumulation ($47.2 billion) (Sherraden, 1991).  Since Sherraden first introduced 
this theoretical framework, other studies have documented the discrepancy of the asset- 
based welfare system for the non-poor and the subsistence welfare system for the poor 
(CFED, 2008; Miller-Adams, 2002; Woo & Buchholz, 2007).  In 2004, a study evaluated 
federal spending and tax policy to calculate the total resources allocated to U.S. asset-
building programs and who benefitted from them.  The study documented that $335 
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Figure 5 Effects of Assets  
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wealth of the bottom 80%‖ (Brooks & Tivol, 2008, p. 2).  In addition to providing a 
framework for understanding the disparity in who benefits from federal asset-building 
policies, research has also demonstrated a return on investment when such opportunities 
are provided to individuals who are poor (Bratt, 2007; CFED, 2008; Green & Haines, 
2008; Miller-Adams, 2002). Neighborhoods Inc. of Battle Creek Michigan, a not-for-
profit housing developer, began offering homes in its geographical area in 1992 (Miller-
Adams, 2002). At that time, the average selling price was $25,783, which doubled to 
$54,685 by 1999 (Miller-Adams, 2002). The increase in selling price represents an 
increase in equity, or assets, for the homeowners living in Battle Creek. The organization 
also provided down-payment assistance and homeownership education and counseling 
that resulted in individuals with low-incomes being able to both access and maintain 
homeownership.  Census data also shows that the homeownership rate in Battle Creek 
increased between 1999 and 2000, representing a demographic shift that was attributed in 
part to the organization‘s programs (Miller-Adams, 2002).  Based on the early research, it 
can be argued that asset-based welfare theory has a relatively strong empirical base; 
however, given the infancy of this theoretical approach, there is room for additional 
development and progression.    
 Status of Conceptual Rigor. 
 Asset-based welfare theory draws from ideas and concepts associated with 
sociological, political, behavioral, and economic theories (Sherraden, 1991). Definitions 
and discussions are provided for the key concepts on which the theory is based in 
Sherraden‘s seminal work, Assets for the Poor (1991). Four key concepts ground asset-
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based welfare theory: 1) stakeholding, 2) asset accumulation, 3) asset poverty, and 4) 
wealth (Sherraden, 1991). Table 3 provides explanatory definitions for each term.  
Table 3 Key Concepts of Asset Development Theory 
Key Term Definition 
Stakeholding People who are poor, to overcome their poverty, not only economically, 
but also socially and psychologically, must accumulate a stake in the 
system.  A stake in the system means, in one form or another, holding 
assets. 
Asset accumulation Outcome of stakeholding. 
Asset poverty Households that are below minimum levels of both assets and income. 
Wealth Savings, investments, and accumulation of assets, does not include 
income, spending or consumption.  
(Sherraden, 1991, pp. xv, 7, 198, 294).  
In addition to these key concepts, there are also eleven policy principles of the asset-
based welfare theory:  
1) complement income-based policy, 2) have universal availability, 3) 
provide greater incentives for the poor, 4) be based on voluntary 
participation, 5) not define individuals as ―on welfare‖ or ―off welfare‖, 6) 
promote shared responsibility, 7) have specific purposes,8) encourage 
gradual accumulation, 9) provide investment options, 10) promote 
economic information and training, and 11) foster personal development. 
(Sherraden, 1991, p. 199) 
 
Assets and the Poor (1991) provides a discussion on the specifics of these principles in 
the context of the theory.  Combined with the key concepts these principles provide high 
conceptual rigor for asset-based welfare theory.  
 Relevance to Topic. 
 Asset Development Theory provides an exceptional explanatory framework for 
analyzing the intersection of homeownership, foreclosure, and low-income communities.  
At its core, asset-based development theory articulates the importance of people who are 
low-income being offered opportunities to increase their assets with the goal of rising out 
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of poverty.  The theory also provides explanatory features about how assets may be 
protected, which could be helpful in mitigating the impact of foreclosure.   
Functional Theory of Federalism 
 Overview of Theory. 
 The functional theory of federalism is primarily concerned with the selection of 
the appropriate level of government for policy design and implementation. While not a 
formal theory at the time, our Founding Fathers grappled with the roles of national and 
state governments. James Madison articulated a delineation of these roles in the 
Federalist Papers. He believed that nationals powers should only include:  
1) Security against foreign danger; 2) Regulation of the intercourse with 
foreign nations; 3) Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among 
the States; 4) Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5) Restraint 
of the States from certain injurious acts; 6) Provisions for giving due 
efficacy to all these power. (Madison, 1788, p. 1) 
 
All other powers were considered to reside in the jurisdiction of states.  This shared 
authority and delineation of policy making provides the underpinning of the federalist 
system.   
The enduring challenge of federalism is how to grant states sovereignty to 
internally govern while connecting them to the national system in a unified manner. De 
Tocqueville (1835-40) understood the complexity, yet simplicity, of this dual system. He 
also recognized the genius of the Constitutional framers as they crafted this federalist 
system.  De Tocqueville (1835-1840) noted:  
…the prerogatives of the federal government were carefully defined, and 
it was stipulated that any prerogative not comprised within that definition 
was to be retained by the states.  Thus state governments remained the 
rule; the federal government was the exception. (p. 129)   
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This decentralized form of government has ebbed and flowed throughout U.S. history 
depending on political actors and changing environments.   
Modern-day functional theory of federalism concerns itself with two primary 
areas of domestic policy: 1) developmental and 2) redistributive (Peterson, 1995).  
Developmental policy is concerned with ―physical and social infrastructure necessary to 
facilitate economic growth,‖ while redistributive policy focuses on transferring 
―economic resources from those who have gained the most from economic development 
to those who have gained the least‖ (see Figure 6) (Peterson, 1995, p. 17).  According to 
functional theory, the national government is best situated to address redistributive policy 
and local and state officials are the most appropriate policy actors to work on 
developmental policy (Peterson, 1995).   
Figure 6 Functional Theory of Federalism Framework: Redistributive and Developmental 
Policy  
 
(Adapted from Peterson, 1995, p. 17)   
 
 
 
Redistributive Policy 
• Typical Level of Government Intervention:  
Federal 
• Type of Policy: economic resources from 
those who have gained the most from 
economic development to those who 
have gained the least 
Developmental Policy 
• Typical Level of Government Intervention:  
State 
• Type of Policy: physical and social 
infrastructure necessary to facilitate 
economic growth 
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 Status of Empirical Base. 
 Functional theory of federalism has received mixed reviews for its empirical 
soundness.  On the one hand, it has been used to explain the redistributive policies carried 
out at the federal level more often than developmental policies administered by the states 
(Peterson, 1995).  Critics also charge that the theory falls short of outlining the political 
process in which policy is created (Peterson, 1995).  Despite this criticism, political 
science literature is rich with studies that empirically evaluate levels of intervention by 
the federal and state governments (Anton, 1989; Berry, Fording, & Hanson, 2003; 
Burchell & Listokin, 1995; Koonz, 1997; McFarland & Meier, 1998; Peterson, 1995; 
Rodden, 2004; Tetreault & Verrilli, 2008; Wood, 1991).  Based on a review of literature, 
it can be asserted that functional theory of federalism has a strong empirical base. Yet, 
there are significant and critical opportunities to explore federal and state public policy in 
the context of homeownership, foreclosure, and low-income communities.  
 Status of Conceptual Rigor. 
 In and of itself, functional theory of federalism offers a clear conceptual 
framework. It is primarily concerned with redistributive and developmental policies and 
whether they are situated as federal or state policy.  The conceptual framework becomes 
somewhat ambiguous depending on what policy is being evaluated.  For example, prior 
to welfare reform in the mid-1990‘s, welfare policy was viewed as primarily a federal 
policy due to its redistributive function.  Under Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), states had to adhere to national guidelines, but they were allowed to establish 
monthly benefit levels (Peterson, 1995).  Welfare reform ushered in a new era of benefit 
distribution and administration.  AFDC became Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
88 
 
(TANF) and as its name implies, was time-limited.  In addition, states were given much 
more discretion to administer the program.  TANF remained a redistributive policy, but 
there were also developmental aspects tied to the new welfare program.  Work 
requirements were introduced and incentives were provided to employers who hired 
TANF recipients.   
 This example demonstrates issues with the conceptual framework of functional 
theory of federalism.  Depending on the particular policy, the concepts may become 
muddled and confusing. It is imperative that the researcher, depending on their specific 
topic, operationalize particular concepts related to the policy they are analyzing; 
however, the conceptual framework still provides a solid understanding for analysis.   
 Relevance to Topic. 
One of the fundamental principles of federalism, as explained by functional 
theory, is that states (and/or local governments) are better equipped to respond to 
development policy. Part of this principle is predicated on the assumption that the closer 
a unit of government is to the public, the more responsive it will be to their needs as 
decisions are based on local market and political factors (Krislov, 2001; Peterson, 1995). 
Given these assumptions, housing policy and a response to the foreclosure issue may be 
best developed at the state level. Housing is heavily influenced by local characteristics, 
including property taxes, zoning, and the supply and demand of the market.  In addition, 
other contributory factors point to the need to explore how states can respond to this 
issue. One study documented that,  
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About 50% of subprime loans in 2005 were originated by federally 
supervised banks and thrifts and their affiliates, but the other 50% were 
made by independent mortgage companies that are chartered by individual 
states and are not subject to federal supervision or required to comply with 
federal consumer protection laws. (CFED, 2008, p. 11)  
 
This example illuminates the complexity of housing and financial regulations that would 
benefit from further exploration.   
The available literature on federalism and state response does not appear to test 
this theory in relationship to the foreclosure boom that many states are currently 
experiencing.  One study provides a substantial account of states‘ responses, but it does 
not attempt to measure whether the state‘s legislative response matches the needs of its 
citizens (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2008).  The study indirectly addresses federalism in that 
it recommends roles for both a national and state response to foreclosure. Yet, there is no 
theoretical explanation for how these roles were determined and if the delineation of 
legislative responsibilities is effective.  Based on these findings, there is an identified gap 
in the literature explaining how individual states are responding to the particular 
foreclosure needs facing their citizens.   
Marxist Theory 
 Overview of Theory. 
 Marxist theory is concerned about the unequal status of classes intrinsic to a 
capitalist system.  In particular, it focuses on the relationship between the proletariat 
(working class) and the bourgeois (ruling class) (Marx, 1964; Robbins, Chatterjee, & 
Canda, 2006).  From Marx‘s perspective, this relationship was exploitative because 
property/ownership was held by the few bourgeois while the many in the working class 
created this wealth for those at the top through their ‗wage-slave‘ production (Joseph, 
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2006; Marx, 1964).  Because the ruling class controlled the mechanisms of production, 
they also controlled the value associated with the outcomes of production.  Marx argued 
that this unequal relationship led to wealth on behalf of the ruling class and to poverty for 
the working class.  Marxist theory explains this economic imbalance is the result of 
―surplus value,‖ which is defined as ―the difference between the selling price of the item 
and the cost of the labor to produce it‖ (Robbins et al., 2006, p. 67). Marxist theory posits 
that exploitation occurs when the products made by the working class are then sold back 
to them by the ruling class at inflated costs. To illustrate his point, Marx explains, 
―Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time the accumulation of 
misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite 
pole‖ (Robbins et al., 2006, p. 67; see Figure 7).   
 The exploitation of the working class not only alienates producers economically, 
but also politically and socially. In Marxist theory, alienation is described as a ―process 
by which people became estranged, demeaned, and depersonalized‖ (Robbins et al., 
2006, p. 67).  Economic alienation is used to further marginalize the working class from 
other social institutions, including the political arena.  The ruling class becomes aware of 
the need to fortify their position in the struggle of classes and works to consolidate their 
influence through political institutions (Joseph, 2006; Marx, 1964; Robbins et al., 2006).  
Marxist theory posits that the only way to end this exploitative relationship is for the 
working class to unite in a revolutionary manner to overthrow the ruling class.  Marxist 
theory suggests this exploitative relationship is harmful to both classes and there is a need 
for universal emancipation from the oppressive forces of capitalism (Joseph, 2006).   
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Figure 7 Marxist Theory: Relationship between Working and Ruling Classes 
  
(Adapted from Robbins et al., 2006, p. 67) 
Status of Empirical Base. 
 Marxist theory is often criticized as lacking a strong empirical base (Joseph, 2006; 
Jessop, 2008; Robbins et al., 2006). This lack of a strong empirical base may be the result 
of the underlying nature of Marxist theory that is admittedly biased towards social change 
and action.  Underscoring his orientation to praxis, Marx stated, ―The philosophers have 
only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it‖ (as 
quoted in Ritzer, 2008, p. 27). Perhaps, as Marx advocated, people are actively using his 
ideas to advance progressive social change rather than passively evaluating its theoretical 
and empirical attributes.  Regardless of the reasons why the theory lacks a strong 
empirical base, there is ample opportunity for theory development and progression.  
Status of Conceptual Rigor. 
 In light of its emphasis on conflict, the differing perspectives on the conceptual 
rigor of Marxist theory seem appropriate.  Or, perhaps because of its emphasis on 
complex human and social dynamics, the conceptual ambiguity is merely reflecting the 
nuanced subject of its attention (Joseph, 2006). Marxist theory provides a robust 
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Table 4 Key Concepts of Marxist Theory 
Key Concepts 
 Impact of transition from a feudal to capitalist society 
 Importance of value, exchange value, and commodities 
 Relationship between labor, exploitation, and commodities 
 Impact of capitalist expansion and self-destruction 
 Role of the state, civil society, and religion 
 Intersection between property, reform, and revolution 
(Palumbo & Scott, 2005, p. 44).   
explanatory framework of class exploitation and oppression (see Table 4). With its 
emphasis on revolution, it falls short in offering realistic solutions to empower the 
working class to overcome exploitative conditions.  
Relevance to Topic. 
 Marxist theory provides a framework for critically evaluating the intersection 
between homeownership, foreclosure, and low-income communities.  Foreclosure may be 
the outcome of an exploitative financial system that benefits large corporations at the 
expense of low-income communities.  One cannot minimize the key component of  
Marxism is revolution incited by the working class with the goal of emancipation from 
the capitalist system. The ultimate goal of Marxist theory is to introduce a communist 
system in place of capitalism.  In this significant regard, the theory seems only 
appropriate to provide an explanatory framework to analyze the presenting topic—
another theory will likely need to provide the basis for intervention and change of the 
housing and financial sectors.  
Social Exchange Theory 
 Overview of Theory. 
 Social exchange theory, or exchange theory, was adapted from B.F. Skinner‘s 
psychological behaviorism by George Homans (Ritzer, 2008).  According to Longres 
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(1995), it is a ―framework for understanding social interactions based on the proposition 
that individuals, as well as groups and organizations, seek to maximize their profit and 
minimize their cost in transactions with others‖ (p. 546).  Blau created a calculation to 
represent the interaction and behaviors behind the theory: ―Interpersonal profit = 
Rewards to be obtained – Costs to be incurred‖ (Longres, 1995, p. 359).  
 This equation may lead some to suggest that social exchange theory is a conflict 
theory in that individuals interact in selfish ways to the detriment of others; however, the 
theory is predicated on the concepts of ―norm of reciprocity‖ and the ―principle of 
distributive justice‖ (Longres, 1995, p. 363).  Norms of reciprocity assert that human 
beings usually treat others as they would want to be treated. The principle of distributive 
justice is concerned with ensuring that people involved in an interaction ―receive 
according to what they have given‖ (Longres, 1995, p. 363).  The theory contends 
reciprocity and justice exist in exchange because of people‘s desires to receive approval 
of others and the reliance on formal rules to mitigate conflict when it does arise (Longres, 
1995).  
 Status of Empirical Base. 
 Social exchange theory has received its fair share of criticism when it comes to 
the establishment of a strong empirical base.  Both Homan and Blau have been accused 
of lacking a well-developed methodology that grounds their conceptual framework 
(Robbins et al., 2006). Based on a theoretical review and analysis, the theory was 
considered to have a medium quantitative and qualitative empirical base (Robbins et al., 
2006).   
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 Status of Conceptual Rigor. 
 Robbins et al. (2006) also evaluated the conceptual rigor of social exchange 
theory as medium; however, in ascertaining this rating they provide a list of twelve 
theoretical principles that were developed by Homans, Blau, Gouldner, Emerson and 
other social exchange theorists (see Table 5) (Ritzer, 2008). 
 There is some conceptual ambiguity involving the application of these concepts at 
the micro, mezzo, and macro levels.  Social exchange theorists maintain that the theory 
has explanatory features applicable at all levels of practice, but there are gaps in 
understanding how this implementation may occur.  Interestingly, the theory is evaluated 
as being most appropriate for micro systems and placing low emphasis on diversity and 
empowerment (Robbins et al., 2006).   
Relevance to Topic. 
 Social exchange theory offers some applicability to exploring the intersection 
among homeownership, foreclosure, and low-income communities.  For example, an 
evaluation of what incentives motivated mortgage originators to approve loans with 
predatory terms could be explored.  The theory has some significant limitations for this 
exploration, too.  As mentioned previously, social exchange has a longer and richer 
history with explaining micro-level issues than macro.  In addition, it also offers a weak 
conceptual framework for exploring issues of diversity, power, and empowerment.  Most 
concerning to the application of this research area, ―exchange theories make no 
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Table 5 Social Exchange Theory Conceptual Framework  
Key Concepts 
 Individuals choose those alternatives from which they expect the most profit.  
 Costs being equal, they choose alternatives from which they anticipate the greatest rewards. 
 Rewards being equal, they choose alternatives from which they anticipate the fewest costs 
 Immediate outcomes being equal, they choose those alternatives that promise better long-term 
outcomes. 
 Long-term outcomes being perceived as equal, they choose alternative providing better 
immediate outcomes. 
 Costs and other rewards being equal, individuals choose the alternatives that supply or can be 
expected to supply the most social approval. 
 Costs and other rewards being equal, individuals choose statuses and relationships that provide 
the most autonomy. 
 Other rewards and costs equal, individuals choose alternatives characterized by the least 
ambiguity in terms of expected future events and outcomes. 
 Other costs and rewards equal, they choose alternatives that offer the most security for them. 
 Other rewards and costs equally, they choose to associate with, marry, and form other 
relationships with those whose values and opinions generally are in agreement with their own 
and reject or avoid those with whom they chronically disagree. 
 Other rewards and costs equal, they are more likely to associate with, marry, and form other 
relationships with their equals, than those above or below them. 
 In industrial societies, other costs and rewards equal, individuals choose alternatives that 
promise the greatest financial gains for the least financial expenditures. 
(Robbins et al., 2006, p. 366)   
presumptions about the individual‘s moral character but view actions based on exchange 
as reasonable and expectable responses to the need to survive and accommodate the 
surrounding environment‖ (Robbins et al., 2006, p. 381). This limitation is significant 
because of the high costs some homeowners had to pay for the illegal and/or unethical 
actions of some financial institutions that resulted in foreclosure.  Social exchange theory 
admittedly provides no context to evaluate that type of scenario. This conceptual gap, 
however, presents an opportunity for theory development and progression.  
Summary 
 Based on the preceding analysis, functional theory of federalism and asset-based 
welfare theory both demonstrate the most promise in providing an explanatory 
framework for exploring the intersection of homeownership, foreclosure, and low-income 
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communities.  Yet, there are meaningful opportunities for theory development and 
progression with social exchange and Marxist theory, too. Pieced together, these theories 
provide a critical and useful framework for exploring issues related to the intersection of 
homeownership and foreclosure.  
Organizing Thoughts 
 Since the 1937 Housing Act, there has been a dual system of federal subsidies 
provided in this country.  One system heavily subsidizes middle and upper income groups 
in ways that increase their wealth and led to greater asset accumulation.  The other 
system provides a subsistence level of assistance to low-income groups that are 
admittedly designed to maintain a poverty-level existence.  Research has demonstrated 
that low-income groups may also benefit from an asset-based welfare system (Brooks & 
Tivol, 2008; Sherraden, 1991). Homeownership is one such asset. 
 Yet, homeownership is not a panacea for every social, economic, or political 
challenge. Like middle and upper income groups, low-income communities can also 
suffer when inadequate regulatory or other public policy is not implemented to protect 
assets; however, unlike middle and upper income groups, low-income communities are 
hit harder when asset-stripping circumstances occur like the 2006 housing crash and 
subsequent Great Recession.  In these circumstances, asset-based welfare theory and 
functional theory of federalism provide explanatory frameworks that may help 
researchers evaluate these complex interactions and identify strategies to preserve and 
develop future asset accumulation.   
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Gaps in Literature 
The literature is beginning to document the impacts that low-income and minority 
communities experience in the wake of a housing crisis.  However, research into this area 
is still emerging and there are significant gaps to be explored. Housing literature, and by 
extension, foreclosure research, has overwhelmingly focused on quantifying outcomes, 
including unit production, economic costs, and benefits (Elliott et al., 2012; Galster, 
1983; Oliver & Shapiro, 1995; Rohe & Stewart, 1996; Shobe & Boyd, 2005) and 
normalized measures of individual and societal well-being (Blum & Kingston, 1984; 
Fogel et al., 2008; Green & White, 1997; Harkness & Newman, 2003; Hunter, 1975; 
Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Rohe & Stegman, 1994a, 1994b; Steinberger, 1981). A less 
developed body of housing research focuses on the deep meaning and symbols people 
associate with the social construction of ―home‖ (Clapham, 2010; Doyle, 1992; Dunn, 
2006; Mest, 2008; Ronald, 2008) and the lived experiences associated with accessing 
appropriate shelter (Ben-Yoseph, 2011; Dumbleton, 2011; Dupuis & Thorns, 1998; Jones 
et al., 1997; Liebow, 1993). Given the sacred and symbolic position homeownership 
holds in the United States, the privileged position of ownership in housing policy and the 
relatively unexplored experiences associated with foreclosure, an opportunity exists to 
develop knowledge in this critical area of scholarship.  
Statement of Study Purpose 
Homeownership, often described as part of achieving the American Dream, has 
increasingly been used as a tool to lift individuals and families out of poverty and into the 
economic mainstream. This asset-building strategy departs from welfare maintenance 
approaches that have typically defined service delivery to individuals and families 
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experiencing poverty (Sherraden, 1991).  The goal of the asset-building strategy is to 
create wealth for individuals and families living in poverty through the mechanism of 
homeownership, rather than providing social welfare services that arguably maintain their 
low socio-economic status.  As an asset development tool, homeownership has been 
demonstrated to increase political participation/civic involvement, psychological well-
being, stability in relationships, wealth, and intergenerational transfers (Miller-Adams, 
2002).  In addition, a home may be leveraged to start a business or further one‘s 
education. 
The 2006 housing crash and resulting economic recession that began in 2008 
exposed concerns with the homeownership-as-asset strategy. Foreclosures rose to an 
all-time high, disproportionately affecting low- and moderate-income individuals, 
families, and communities.  Foreclosure is the symbolic nightmare of the failed 
American dream of homeownership. It not only strips the asset-leveraging opportunities 
from a home but may also leave an individual, family or community in crisis. In the 
U.S., there is no guarantee to shelter. Housing is not considered a right but a market 
commodity. These economic conditions highlight the need for additional research on 
the impacts of homeownership and foreclosure in low-income and predominantly 
minority communities.   
Given its relatively brief history and almost non-existent attention to the 
experience of low- and moderate-income homeowners, housing research could benefit 
from further development and progression. The purpose of this study is to address this 
significant gap in the literature in an attempt to explore how homeowners make sense 
and meaning of losing their home in foreclosure.  
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Therefore, the primary research question is: What are the meanings that 
homeowners associate with the lived experience of foreclosure? A secondary research 
question is posed to begin exploring the homeownership-as-asset theory: To what extent 
can accounts of homeowners’ meaning-making process inform homeownership-as-asset 
theory?  
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Chapter III.  Research Method 
 Driven by the research question‘s proposition to explore the meanings 
homeowners associate with the experience of foreclosure, a qualitative method was 
required to allow for deep and thick descriptions to be collected and analyzed (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000). Specifically, interpretative phenomenological analysis was the chosen 
research approach used to guide this exploration (Smith et al., 2012). This section 
provides detailed information on the research methods, data collection and analysis 
strategies, evaluation criteria, and ethical issues.  
Research Design and Rationale 
 Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) combines three philosophical 
foundations—phenomenology, hermeneutics and idiography—to approach qualitative 
and experiential research (Smith et al., 2012). Phenomenology provides a philosophical 
approach to study experience, hermeneutics is a philosophy concerned with 
interpretation, and idiography encapsulates a philosophical stance of the particular (Smith 
et al., 2012). This three-legged philosophical stool provided the foundation to explore and 
interpret the particular experience of homeowners who live through losing their home in 
foreclosure.   
 Phenomenology.  
 Although Edmund Husserl, a German mathematician and philosopher, is 
commonly identified as the father of phenomenology, records document that the term 
was first used as early as 1765 (Kockelmans, 1967). Further, Hegel was the first 
philosopher who developed a definition of phenomenology (Kockelmans, 1967). 
Inspiring Husserl, Hegel, in his book Phenomenology of the Mind, equated knowledge 
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with consciousness (Kockelmans, 1967). Husserl was also influenced by Immanuel 
Kant‘s thoughts on transcendental idealism (Drummond, 2008). Kant viewed 
transcendental idealism as being concerned with identifying the necessary conditions for 
experience (Drummond, 2008). Husserl ultimately rejected many specific details of 
Kant‘s perspective, but the two philosophers were in agreement about the transcendental 
subject (Drummond, 2008). Kant and Husserl considered a transcendental subject as 
being, ―active in the disclosure of the world as experienced by empirical subjects in the 
world‖ (Drummond, 2008, p. 118). The implication of a transcendental subject is that 
meaning is made from interpreting and making sense of one‘s world at the same time one 
is experiencing living in one‘s world.   
Strains of the transcendental subject are apparent in Husserl‘s identifying slogan 
of ―zu den Sachen selbst,‖ or ―to the things themselves‖ (Drummond, 2008, p. 1). To 
uncover the things themselves, Husserl suggested the eidos must be analyzed, which are 
the essential structures of intentionality that characterizes the experience and objects of 
those intentional experiences (Drummond, 2008; Laverty, 2003). Intentionality is 
understood as a feature of conscious experience (Drummond, 2008; Laverty, 2003). 
Experience is some phenomenon or situation that is lived through or encountered in some 
manner that is intentionally or consciously captured (Drummond, 2008). Husserl 
identified three levels of consciousness:  
 ―Unified interweaving of psychic experiences in a unified stream of experience 
 Inner awareness of one‘s own psychic experiences  
 Mental or psychic acts for intentional experiences of all sorts‖ (Drummond, 2008, 
p. 54).  
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Yet, conscious experiences do not occur in isolation. When exploring the lived 
experience, situations and conditions must also be explored (Laverty, 2003; Padgett, 
2008).  This awareness and exploration is required for both researcher and participant. 
Husserl cautioned that those studying phenomena must ―bracket,‖ or suspend, the ideas 
that represent thinking of the natural perspective rather than the transcendental, also 
known as epoche (Drummond, 2008; Van Manen, 1990; Wertz, 2005). Eidetic variation 
encourages, ―imaginative and systematic variation to discover what features belong 
necessarily to any possible object‖ (Drummond, 2008, p. 67). Further, Husserl contends 
that researchers should use reduction techniques in an attempt to focus on the individual 
having the experience (Drummond, 2008).  Only through this structured process does 
Husserl suggest that one can arrive at the thing itself.   
 Following World War I, Husserl began mentoring Martin Heidegger (Moran, 
2005). During this teacher-student relationship, it became apparent the two philosophers 
viewed phenomenology differently. Husserl remained committed to transcendentalism, 
while Heidegger became more interested in the meanings people associate with their 
everyday lifeworld (Smith et al., 2012; Van Manen, 1990). Where Husserl saw 
phenomenology as the process of peeling back layers or structures until the thing itself is 
revealed, Heidegger contended the meaning-making process was inherently a subjective 
process in which one simultaneously interprets one‘s world and one‘s experience in it 
(Laverty, 2003; Smith et al., 2012). In Heidegger‘s phenomenology, history, context and 
culture cannot be separated from a person‘s experience and the meanings they associate 
with it (Laverty, 2003). Heidegger‘s conception of Dasein, or ―there-being,‖ reflects this 
experience of ―always already thrown into this pre-existing world of people and objects, 
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language and culture, and cannot be meaningfully detached from it‖ (Smith et al., 2012, 
p. 17). Heideggerian phenomenology still reflects some Husserlian roots—including the 
foundational focus on lived experience and attention to intentionality—but the divergence 
from the thing itself to there-being is a critical shift and one that influenced this research 
study.  The lived experience of foreclosure was explored from a there-being perspective, 
in which research participants are encouraged to share the meanings they have 
constructed in the context of their world and the people, objects, language, culture and 
history within it.  
 Hermeneutics.   
 When a lived experience is studied, there needs to be a mechanism to interpret 
and make sense of the accounts shared by research participants. The philosophical 
tradition of hermeneutics, or the art, theory and science of interpreting texts, is combined 
with phenomenology for this critical connection (Schwandt, 2007). Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, who was inspired by the work of Husserl and Heidegger, viewed hermeneutics 
as a way to extend Heidegger‘s practical philosophy (Laverty, 2003). Gadamer (1989) 
contended that, ―Language is the universal medium in which understanding occurs. 
Understanding occurs in interpreting‖ (p. 389). In particular, the hermeneutic circle offers 
an analytical process in which research participants‘ words may be interpreted into 
meaning. The metaphor of a circle is used to communicate an iterative process in which 
the researcher moves back and forth from a ―part‖—a single word, phrase, interview, 
episode—to the ―whole‖—sentence, complete text, research project, complete life in an 
attempt to extract deep understanding of one‘s lived experience (Laverty, 2003, p. 39; 
Smith et al., 2012, p. 28).  
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Table 6 Parts and Whole of Hermeneutic Circle 
The part The whole 
 The single word  The sentence in which the word is embedded 
 The single extract  The complete text 
 The particular text  The complete oeuvre 
 The interview  The research project 
 The single episode  The complete life 
(Smith et al., 2012, p. 28) 
 One of Heidegger‘s prominent contributions to hermeneutic philosophy is the 
concept of fore-structure (Smith et al., 2012). Fore-structure, or the researcher‘s previous 
knowledge and experience of the phenomenon, consists of three parts: fore-having, fore-
sight and fore-conception (Benner, 1994; Ginev, 2013; Smith et al., 2012). Fore-having, 
or pre-understanding, recognizes that an individual interprets a phenomenon through past 
experiences and knowledge (Ginev, 2013). Fore-sight describes the existence of a pre-
existing lens, or perspective, in which any particular individual views a phenomenon 
(Benner, 1994).  Fore-conception acknowledges that an individual holds preconceptions 
about how the phenomenon will unfold (Benner, 1994). To attempt to mitigate the 
interference of the ever-present fore-structure, Heideggerian philosophy suggests 
researchers be transparent about their pre-understandings of the phenomenon of study 
(Smith et al., 2012,). In another departure from Husserlian philosophy, Heidegger 
rejected the idea of bracketing due to his belief that it is impossible to divorce oneself 
from one‘s experience (Laverty, 2003).  For the purposes of this research study and in 
keeping with IPA methods, the researcher‘s pre-understandings of foreclosure are 
discussed in the following sub-section, researcher‘s pre-understanding of the 
phenomenon of foreclosure.  
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Researcher’s pre-understandings of the phenomenon of foreclosure.  
 For several years, I worked for a statewide association and citywide coalition that 
provided policy advocacy, training, and other capacity-building services to community-
based organizations.  Most of the organizations who were members of both the statewide 
association and citywide coalition developed or provided affordable housing.  In addition, 
some also provided preventive and intervention services to protect low- and moderate-
income and minority homeowners from losing their homes, often their largest asset, in 
foreclosure. Preventive services often included homeownership education and credit 
counseling courses prior to the individual becoming a homeowner.  Intervention services 
may have included foreclosure mitigation or other negotiation strategies that situate the 
borrower in a less harmful outcome than being forced into homelessness due to mortgage 
default. Long before the housing bubble burst in 2006, affordable housing advocates were 
concerned about the conditions they believed were resulting in the increase in 
foreclosures.  I have been interested in seeing an effective policy response to foreclosure 
for nearly fourteen years.  
 Through the experience of working with community development corporations 
(CDCs), the communities they serve, and my research into this area, I embrace the idea of 
‗corrective capitalism.‘  Essentially the term describes the process in which community 
development corporations work alongside their neighbors to revitalize markets and social 
aspects in blighted neighborhoods (Pierce & Steinbach, 1987).  In accepting this strategy, 
I also embrace the idea that the social welfare and development system is most effective 
in the U.S. context when it reflects its capitalist ethos.  I think capitalism also is most 
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effective when it recognizes the need for appropriate and protective regulations.  This 
aspect of a capitalist system is crucial, because it is my contention that the lax financial 
regulations and enforcement of the subprime lending market were economically 
oppressive and played a significant role in the foreclosure crisis. 
 In keeping with this ethos, I also believe that federal subsidies should incentivize 
and provide assets for individuals with low-incomes as they do for middle and upper 
income groups.  I think this strategy should be embraced because an income and 
subsistence maintenance-welfare system only serves to keep people in poverty. 
Affordable homeownership is one of many asset development tools that may be 
leveraged to lift people with low-incomes out of poverty.  However, I also recognize the 
continuum of human wants and needs and, in so doing, acknowledge that homeownership 
has limitations as an asset development strategy. 
 Idiography.  
 The final piece of the IPA philosophical triad is idiography. Idiography, or a focus 
on the particular, manifests in two ways in IPA: 1) commitment to the particular in 
significant detail and depth of analysis and 2) commitment to exploring particular 
phenomena through understanding the particular perspective of particular individuals in 
particular contexts (Smith et al., 2012, p. 29). In the context of this research design, the 
commitment was to explore foreclosure, in significant detail and depth, as each research 
participant experienced and made meaning from it.  
Data Collection Procedures 
In keeping with the attempt of IPA to invite research participants to extensively 
describe the lived experience of homeownership to foreclosure from their own 
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perspective and build initial rapport, semi-structured interviews began with the following 
question: Can you tell me how you came to be a homeowner? Additional broad, open-
ended questions followed. The full interview schedule is found in Appendix A, which 
reflects recommended questions posed by Smith et al. (2012) representing descriptions, 
narratives, structural, contrast, evaluative, circular and comparative. In addition, where 
necessary to illicit deeper and richer meanings, appropriate prompts and probes were 
used—for example, can you tell me more about that (experience, situation, etc.), what do 
you mean by (specific word, phrase, etc.), why, how, tell me what you were thinking 
when (experience, situation, etc.), tell me what you were feeling when (experience, 
situation, etc.) (Van Manen, 1990). The researcher digitally recorded each interview, 
which lasted anywhere from approximately 68 to 91 minutes each. It was the goal of the 
researcher to conduct each interview as a ―conversation with a purpose‖ (Smith et al., 
2012, p. 57).  
In an additional attempt to respect and empower participants, I encouraged them 
to identify interview locations in which they would be most comfortable but 
confidentiality would still be maintained. I offered suggestions such as private meeting 
rooms at the local public library, private meeting room at a local community center, local 
coffeehouse or restaurant. One participant chose to meet at a local library in a private 
meeting room. Two participants identified local restaurants in which they felt most 
comfortable. Two other participants felt most comfortable in sharing their experiences at 
local coffeehouses.  
Interviews were transcribed by a qualified transcriptionist hired by Landmark 
Associates, which is a provider of transcription services for academic researchers. The 
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transcriptionist signed a confidentiality agreement and adhered to stated confidentiality 
and security standards. The data handling process ensured confidentiality of the research 
participant and integrity of the data. The researcher electronically uploaded each digital 
audio file to a password protected account with Landmark Associates. Then, a 
transcriptionist accessed each secure file, provided a pseudonym and de-identified the 
data, completed the transcription, and then sent the researcher an email notification that 
the interview was available in the researcher‘s password-protected account. The 
researcher then accessed the secure file and verified the accuracy of the transcription 
against the original audio file. All electronic documents are maintained on a secure server 
and password-protected laptop. Printed documents are secured in a locked file cabinet.   
Another source of data is the researcher‘s field notes and reflexive journal. The purpose 
of the field note and reflexive journal is to document the researcher‘s observations, 
impressions, and interactions prior to, immediately following and throughout the research 
process (Smith et al., 2012).  
Data Analysis Strategy 
 Data was analyzed using the six-step model of Smith et al. (2012). Each of the six 
steps are outlined in the following sub-sections and reflect the conceptual framework of 
the hermeneutic circle—where a researcher moves back and forth from interpreting a 
―part‖—a single word, phrase, interview, episode—to the ―whole‖—sentence, complete 
text, research project, complete life in an attempt to extract deep understanding of one‘s 
lived experience (Laverty, 2003, p. 39; Smith et al., 2012, p. 28). 
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 Reading and re-reading. 
 The intention of step one is for the researcher to immerse herself in the 
participant‘s lifeworld. Smith et al. (2012) recommend listening to the audio recording 
along with the researcher‘s first review of the written transcript. I followed this guidance 
for each interview. Not only did it reconnect me with the participants‘ experience, 
emotions, tone and meaning but it also served a more pragmatic purpose. In a couple of 
instances, I identified where my original recording was not fully uploaded to the 
transcription service. If I had not engaged in this activity, it is possible I would have 
missed key experiences highlighted by the participants.  
Further, reading and re-reading the participant‘s account of the lived experience 
required a ―slowing down (of) our habitual propensity for ‗quick and dirty‘ reduction‖ 
and placed the focus of analysis on the participant (Smith et al., 2012).  This step 
reflected the idiographic nature of IPA Idiography, or a focus on the particular in 
considering significant detail of experience and exploration of the particular phenomena 
of foreclosure through understanding the particular perspective of particular individuals 
in particular contexts (Smith et al., 2012).  
 Initial noting.  
 Smith et al. (2012) consider steps one and two to be the most intense and involved 
as the researcher carefully and deeply reviews the transcript. Initial noting included three-
levels of analysis: descriptive, linguistic and conceptual (Smith et al., 2012). When 
engaging in descriptive analysis, the researcher focused on the subject of the participant‘s 
narrative. The descriptive analysis was a ―face-value‖ review of the participant‘s 
―descriptions, assumptions, sound bites, acronyms, idiosyncratic figures of speech and 
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emotional responses‖ (Smith et al., 2012, p. 84).  The linguistic analysis focused on the 
words and symbols used by the participant. In particular, the researcher examined, 
―pronoun use, pauses, laughter, functional aspects of language, repetition, tone, degree of 
fluency and use of metaphors‖ (Smith et al., 2012 p. 88). The last level of annotated 
analysis, conceptual, required the researcher to move more into an abstract-level of 
interrogation and interpretation (Smith et al., 2012). As the researcher asked questions to 
deeply explore the transcript, it was important to document and explore the researcher‘s 
pre-understandings and possible subjective interpretation of the data. Smith et al. (2012) 
encourage researchers to engage in a ―Gadamerian dialogue,‖ in which the researcher 
brings awareness to one‘s pre-understandings and the emerging understandings of the 
participant‘s experience (p. 89). The researcher documented her Gadamerian dialogue in 
her field notes and reflexive journal.  
 Following guidelines prescribed by Smith et al. (2012), the researcher followed 
the outlined process when making initial notes:  
 Initially, reviewed a section of the transcription and made descriptive notes in a 
right-hand column. Designated descriptive analysis by using normal text (Times 
New Roman, 12-point font with no bold, highlighting or underlining).  
 Next, reviewed the same section of the transcription and made linguistic notes in 
the same right-hand column. Designated linguistic analysis by using italicized 
text. 
 Then, reviewed the same section of the transcription and made conceptual 
notes/questions in the same right-hand column. Designated conceptual analysis by 
using underlined text.  
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 Moved onto the next section of transcription and followed the steps outlined 
above until all text had been descriptively, linguistically and conceptually 
analyzed. 
Developing emergent themes. 
The third step in this six step analytical process required a balance between 
reducing the transcript volume while still maintaining depth of data (Smith et al., 2012). 
The researcher accomplished this goal by identifying emergent themes, or a ―concise and 
pithy statement,‖ from the descriptive, linguistic and conceptual annotations that captured 
the complexity of ―interrelationships, connections and patterns between exploratory 
notes‖ (Smith et al., 2012, p. 91). Themes are both descriptive and interpretative, 
reflecting an essential essence of a participant‘s experience (Smith et al., 2012).  At this 
step, the focus remained on the individual experience of each participant.  
Searching for connections across emergent themes.  
Working with data from the same research participant, the researcher then looked 
for connections across the emergent themes identified in step three of the analytic 
process. In looking for connections, the researcher considered the research question and 
the relevance of emergent themes. Smith et al. (2012) recommend typing all the emergent 
themes in a chronological list, reviewing the list, and moving themes around to form 
clusters of related or connected themes. The researcher placed relevant themes together 
while also reserving a place for themes that reflect opposite concepts and experiences 
(Smith et al., 2012).  
Smith et al. (2012) identify several techniques to further identify connections 
between emergent themes: abstraction, which consists of grouping like themes together 
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into a super-ordinate theme; subsumption, where an emergent theme develops a super-
ordinate status that allows for a grouping of related themes; polarization, which 
encourages the researcher to consider thematic differences; contextualization, which 
encourages a researcher to examine connections between temporal, cultural and narrative 
themes; numeration, which considers the frequency with which emergent themes appear; 
and function, which considers the distinct manner and meanings of emergent themes. 
When appropriate, these techniques were utilized by the researcher.  
Moving to the next transcript. 
In the fifth step, the researcher repeated the first four steps of the analytic process 
with the next participant transcript. In keeping with the idiographic underpinnings of IPA, 
it was important for the researcher to explore the particular experience of the next 
transcript. Examining the particular experience of each participant required the researcher 
to reflect on her fore-structure and newly acquired pre-understandings with the attempt to 
look anew.  
Looking for patterns across cases.   
In the final step of the analytic process, the researcher identified patterns across 
the participants‘ lived experience of foreclosure. In considering patterns, the researcher 
analyzed connections across participants‘ experiences, how themes in one case explained 
experiences in another case and themes that were most relevant to the research question 
(Smith et al., 2012). The analytic process ended when common themes were established 
and the essential essence of the lived experience of foreclosure had been articulated 
(Smith et al., 2012).  
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Participants 
 There are three common ways a purposive sample is identified in qualitative 
studies: 1) referrals, 2) network contacts, and 3) snowballing (Smith et al., 2012). In an 
attempt to maximize opportunities to identify potential research participants, all three 
purposive sampling techniques were utilized. A deeper discussion of the challenges and 
limitations concerning the identification of participants is covered in the limitations 
sections; although, details about the strategy are covered here. The researcher worked 
through a number of intermediary and service delivery organizations to identify possible 
participants:  
 Community Action of Greater Indianapolis (CAGI): Largest not-for-profit, 
direct service provider of foreclosure prevention and intervention services in 
Indiana‘s largest urban county, Marion.  
 Indiana Association of Community Economic Development (IACED): 
Statewide, non-profit association of nearly 200 community-based, not-for-profit 
direct service providers, many of which provide foreclosure prevention and 
intervention and affordable housing programs. 
 Indiana Association of Community Action Associations (IACT): Statewide, 
non-profit association of Community Action organizations, not-for-profit direct 
service providers, many of which provide foreclosure prevention and intervention 
and affordable housing programs. 
 Indiana Housing and Community Development Authority (IHCDA): State 
agency that provides funding to organizations that provide affordable housing, 
foreclosure prevention and intervention programs across the State of Indiana.  
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 Mental Health America of Vigo County: A locally-based, not-for-profit 
organization in Vigo County, Indiana that provides supportive housing services to 
individuals with mental health diagnoses.  
 Neighborhood Christian Legal Clinic: Marion County-based, not-for-profit 
legal service provider that provides consumer advocacy services related to 
housing and foreclosure issues.  
 United Way of Bartholomew County: Bartholomew County-based, 
intermediary organization that funds human service organizations.  
 United Way of Central Indiana (UWCI): Intermediary organization serving 
counties in Indianapolis metropolitan statistical area; provides funding for human 
service organizations. 
 Visiting Nurse Association (VNA) and Hospice of the Wabash Valley: Direct 
service organization located in Vigo County, Indiana; provides palliative care 
services. 
Out of this extensive outreach effort, only one of five research participants was 
identified. Interestingly, the organization that connected the researcher with one of the 
participants was the VNA and Hospice of the Wabash Valley, which is a palliative care 
organization and does not provide any direct services concerning housing or foreclosure 
issues. The remaining participants were identified through referrals from individuals who 
were aware of my research and shared the research invitation and study information sheet 
with friends, family members, and colleagues.  
 Due to its qualitative approach, IPA privileges quality, and not quantity of, 
interviews (Smith et al., 2012). A homogeneous sample is not intended for 
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generalizability but for deep exploration of a shared phenomenon (Smith et al., 2012). 
Homogeneity of the sample was achieved by ensuring that all research participants had 
experienced foreclosure. To incentivize participation and acknowledge the time and 
effort of participants, a monetary incentive in the form of a $20 gift card was provided to 
participants.   
Evaluation Criteria 
 Yardley (2000) identifies four sets of criteria reflective of sound qualitative 
research, which the proposed study strived to uphold: sensitivity to context; commitment 
and rigor; transparency and coherence; and impact and importance.  
 Sensitivity to context.  
 Yardley (2000) provides some examples of how a researcher may demonstrate 
sensitivity to context, including familiarity with relevant theoretical and practice 
literature, empirical data, sociocultural setting, participants‘ perspectives, and ethical 
issues. Not only was the researcher familiar with the theoretical and practice literature 
that focuses on housing and foreclosure but also on phenomenology and hermeneutics. In 
addition, by nature of her professional and practice background, the researcher is deeply 
acquainted with relevant empirical data on housing and foreclosure. Further, the 
researcher is intimately connected with the sociocultural context and anecdotal 
participant perspectives related to housing and foreclosure. The researcher adhered to the 
highest ethical conduct throughout the research process. In addition to fulfilling 
requirements of human subjects review, the researcher regularly engaged her committee 
in discussions regarding ethical issues. She was also sensitive to power differentials 
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between researcher and participant and incorporated empowering and emancipatory 
language and behavior into the participant-researcher relationship.  
Commitment and rigor. 
 Yardley‘s (2000) second set of criteria include commitment and rigor which are 
manifested through the researcher‘s ―in-depth engagement with the topic; methodological 
competence/skill; thorough data collection; depth/breadth of analysis‖ (p. 219). By its 
very nature, IPA is concerned with deep exploration of a particular phenomenon. Further, 
IPA provides a sound methodological framework to illicit thorough data and a prolonged 
immersion in data analysis. Smith et al. (2012) acknowledge the difficulty in providing a 
general estimate but conjecture the analysis stage for six cases to last a minimum of six 
months based on a full-time schedule.   
 On the issue of methodological competence and skill, it should be noted that the 
researcher, as a Ph.D. candidate, is a novice. The researcher has engaged in one other 
phenomenological study and other qualitative research. She also attended the Institute for 
Heideggerian Hermeneutical Methodologies hosted by the Indiana University School of 
Nursing. To further build methodological competence and skill, the researcher continued 
to immerse herself in the phenomenological and hermeneutic literature and also consult 
with her committee when necessary.  
Transparency and coherence.  
 To demonstrate transparency and coherence, the researcher was clear in her final 
narrative, transparent in her methods and data presentation, and established a fit between 
theory and method and addressed reflexivity (Yardley, 2000). The researcher maintained 
field notes and a reflexive journal to not only clearly illustrate the research process but 
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also to provide transparency of the author‘s subjectivity and bias. In addition, the 
researcher included extensive excerpts of transcribed text in tandem with her 
interpretations in order for the audience to clearly follow the meaning-making process of 
the lived experience of foreclosure.  
 Impact and importance.  
 Yardley‘s (2000) last set of criteria answers the all-important ―so what‖ question. 
Ethical research should have some level of theoretical relevance and practical application. 
Specifically, this criterion was demonstrated through the research‘s ability to enrich 
theoretical understanding, socio-cultural and practical impact (Yardley, 2000). Smith et 
al. (2012) explain the appropriateness of having a secondary research question concerned 
with informing—not testing—theory. This research included a secondary question that 
explored how homeowners‘ experience with foreclosure may help to explain and inform 
the homeownership-as-asset theory. In addition, this research added to the theoretical 
development and progression of IPA. The explicit purpose of this study was to explore 
the experience of homeowners who experience foreclosure. The findings and analysis 
inform housing policy and practice.  
Ethical Considerations 
In addition to university Institutional Review Boards (IRB) and other governing 
bodies, social work researchers are also guided by their professional Code of Ethics 
(NASW, 2008). All social work conduct, including scholarly research, should stem from 
the six core values as articulated in the Code (NASW, 2008): provide service to people in 
need and address social problems; challenge social injustice; respective the inherent 
dignity and worth of every person; value the importance of human relationships; 
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demonstrate integrity by behaving in a trustworthy manner and practice in their area of 
competency (para. 7). In specific regard to this research study, other critical ethical 
considerations included providing informed consent, engaging in a culturally competent 
manner, ensuring the privacy and confidentiality of research participants and informants, 
and inviting review of research records when appropriate and with confidentiality 
standards (NASW, 2008). Relevant sections and of the Code of Ethics (NASW, 2008) 
and their implications for this proposed study are discussed in the following sub-sections: 
Self-determination.  
Research participants were able to participate or end their involvement in the 
study at any point.  As part of the informed consent process, the researcher clearly 
explained the right of self-determination prior to beginning all interviews.  
Informed consent. 
The researcher clearly informed participants about the research, its purpose and 
the risks associated with their participation in the study.  The primary risk to participants 
was minimal; however, it was explained that participants may experience emotional 
discomfort when discussing their experiences. The researcher prepared a list of relevant 
service providers to distribute to participants following interviews. Since a monetary 
incentive was provided to participants, the researcher thoroughly explained that no 
additional services or participation was required. In addition, it was explained that the 
participant may end their involvement with the study at any time.  
Cultural competence. 
The researcher acted in a culturally competent manner and respected the inherent 
dignity and worth of each participant.  
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Privacy and confidentiality. 
 The researcher took reasonable steps to ensure the confidentiality of all 
participants and of the data. Each participant was assigned a pseudonym and all data was 
de-identified. The researcher used password-protected files and computer for electronic 
documents and data. All hard copy data is maintained in a locked file cabinet in a secure 
location.  
Access to records. 
The researcher will continue to provide reasonable access to data associated with 
each participant.  
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Chapter IV.  Findings 
 Prior to introducing the essential theme, themes and sub-themes, it is helpful to 
understand the ―parts of the sum‖ context of the research participants. Accordingly, a 
brief contextual profile is provided for each participant in the order they were 
interviewed. To protect confidentiality, all individuals are identified by a pseudonym. In 
addition, where identities may be discerned, geographic locations, employers and other 
information was modified.  Consideration was also given to maintaining the authenticity 
and integrity of the lived experiences; therefore, de-identification modifications were 
only made in the most judicious and ethical circumstances.  
 Although each contextual profile is unique, two underlying patterns are shared by 
each participant: 1) pivotal life moment, and 2) confounding life challenges. A pivotal 
life moment may be described as the critical event in a person‘s life that results in 
financial decline into foreclosure.  Connected to pivotal life moments are confounding 
challenges. Confounding life challenges are significant events or barriers that appear one 
after the other, making it extremely difficult for the research participants to regain their 
financial footing. I use the term confounding to illustrate bewilderment or confusion.  
Sometimes it would appear, a participant might be on the cusp of righting their financial 
ship, and then another confounding life challenge would surface, knocking the rudder out 
of the participant‘s hands. Frequency, scope, and duration of confounding life challenges 
vary with each participant; however, with each confounding life challenge, it appeared 
participants would lose their financial direction a little more until at some point the wave 
of barriers seemed too insurmountable to overcome.  
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Contextual Profiles 
 Linda.  
 Linda is a White, 67-year-old female who has been employed in professional 
positions most of her working life. She was 53 years-old when she purchased the home 
that was foreclosed. The home was purchased in 2000 and went into foreclosure eight 
years later in 2008, when Linda was 61 years-old. The $1,500 monthly mortgage 
payment remained consistent throughout her time in the home. At the time of foreclosure, 
the mortgage servicer was J.P. Morgan Chase. Linda was not a first-time homebuyer. She 
held mortgages on at least two other homes prior to the one that was foreclosed. Linda is 
married and lives in Central Indiana, which is also the location of the foreclosed home.  
 Linda‘s pivotal life moment occurred when she received a terminal cancer 
diagnosis. The diagnosis set off a series of confounding life challenges for Linda. After 
receiving the cancer diagnosis, Linda knew she would not be able to continue in her 
demanding position as director of a community development corporation and she 
resigned. Further, between the cancer diagnosis and loss of income, Linda was not able to 
physically and financially maintain her home. Understanding real estate and housing 
finance, Linda worked quickly to line up a buyer for a short sale:  
…I was diagnosed with cancer. Because of the extreme chemo and 
radiation that I had to take, I was no longer able to work. That is what 
caused me to get into trouble because of the responsibility for the 
mortgage. The mortgage was in my name. My husband was living out 
west because he was doing contract work. We were maintaining two 
homes—and all sorts of things like that. I found a buyer for the home 
because I realized I wasn‘t going to be able to maintain it. I really—I 
physically couldn‘t maintain because it‘s almost 6,000 square feet. 
Physically, with the health issues, I couldn‘t do that.  
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Considering the weak housing market at the time and improvements the buyer had 
planned to make, his proposal was less than the mortgage pay-off. Linda explains:  
I found a guy that was going to flip the house, who was going to do some 
remodeling that I planned to do, and then, flip it. In order to do that, he offered a 
price that was about $2,000 below what the mortgage pay-off would have been. 
 
Linda presented the proposal to J.P. Morgan Chase who declined the offer. After several 
attempts to negotiate a short sale with J.P. Morgan Chase and three months into her six-
month terminal prognosis, Linda‘s health began to decline dramatically, ―I got down to 
80 pounds. I couldn‘t get myself outta bed, and so I couldn‘t even cook for myself.‖ 
Needing to focus on her health and experiencing no willingness on Chase‘s part to 
negotiate a work-out, Linda prioritized her health, reluctantly accepted foreclosure, and 
filed for bankruptcy.  When describing what it was like for Linda to care for her health 
and maintain the mortgage while also dealing with the loss of income and professional 
identity, she responded that, ―it was another, just another bomb." Despite Linda‘s 
terminal prognosis and estimated six months of life after diagnosis, seven years later, 
with an indomitable spirit and resilient character, she is still very much alive.  
 Helen.  
 Like Linda, Helen was 53-years-old when she purchased her Southern Illinois 
home in 2002. Helen, a White female, was 60-years-old when her home was foreclosed. 
She is now 65- years-old. Helen financed her mortgage through a local bank, Regents, in 
southern Indiana. She was also employed in southern Indiana, where she remains 
employed and now lives. Helen lived in her home for seven years before it went into 
foreclosure in 2009. Helen was married when she purchased her home but divorced by 
the time of the foreclosure. Helen endured years of domestic abuse:  
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It was a long---not so maybe physically abusive as mentally abusive 
relationship, where it just drains you physically.  
 
…part of my situation was my husband, who became my ex-husband after 
25 years, and he wouldn‘t allow me to have the relationship that I wanted 
with my family. He was a very controlling type person. From the very 
beginning, he wouldn‘t let me go see my family hardly ever. They didn‘t 
come up a whole lot either, because feeling so uncomfortable while they 
were here.  
 
Helen‘s divorce appears to be the pivotal life event that precipitated the loss of her home. 
These two significant life disruptions are among many that Helen has endured. Her 
marriage was characterized by domestic abuse often resulting in mental distress and 
isolation. A critical juncture in Helen‘s marriage occurred when her husband, Henry, 
presented an ultimatum. His demand was for her to either chose remaining in the 
marriage or having a relationship with her adult children. In addition to isolating Helen 
from extended family, he began to separate her from her children once they were adults:  
I guess it was the ultimatum, ―You‘re not going to see them anymore.‖ 
They (her children) were coming—sneaking in to see me at work. They 
would bring them in to work so I could see my kids. I guess you just kinda 
get tired of it. My daughter was married and had a baby. You‘re not being 
able to be around anybody.  
 
Without communicating her decision to Henry, Helen went to work the next day never to 
return home to Henry. After 25 years of marriage, Helen made the decision to divorce 
Henry. 
 Although Helen was the primary breadwinner with Henry only contributing 
sporadically and minimally to the family income, the tighter financial margin following 
the divorced proved too much for Helen to bridge:  
He didn‘t work much the whole 25 years probably. He never held down a job for 
a whole year, probably, any of that period of time at one time.  
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Shortly after the divorce was final in 2006, it became clear she could not carry the 
household expenses alone. When she purchased the home, the original mortgage was 
$450/month. Over the course of seven years, the mortgage increased to $550/month. 
Although by most considerations, a modest mortgage, it was beyond the means of 
Helen‘s income. Helen attributes having to file taxes as a single person rather than as 
married as a confounding life challenge from which she was unable to recover:  
We went through the divorce. Then that was in—it was final in 2006. 
Then in 2007, then I started the proceedings toward bankruptcy, because I 
just couldn‘t keep up with the house payment and everything. I mean I 
don‘t know, I don‘t know what actually changed so much. The income 
probably hadn‘t changed a whole lot.  
 
I mean you don‘t get to count him as a tax deduction, because you don‘t 
have that husband, which doesn‘t make sense, but you still lose—you lose 
money at tax time.  
 
 Dorothy. 
 Dorothy, a Black female, was 47-years-old when she purchased her northern 
Indiana home that eventually was foreclosured. Like Linda and Helen, Dorothy was not a 
first-time homebuyer, yet, this time would be the first occasion Dorothy would buy her 
home as a single person. Dorothy was ecstatic to move into her home:  
I loved the thought of bein‘ a homeowner. I love the house.  
Dorothy was one of the millions of people who purchased a home in the relaxed financial 
environment of the late 1990s and early 2000s. She moved into her home in 1999. Five 
years later, in 2004 and at age 52, her house went into foreclosure. Dorothy is now 62-
years-old.  
Dorothy‘s pivotal life moment was the approval of her unaffordable and 
unsustainable mortgage loan. Dorothy‘s initial mortgage payment was $600/month. Due 
125 
 
to a 2-1 buy-down financing structure and a loan process with some likely predatory 
features, by the time she went into her foreclosure, her monthly mortgage increased to 
$1,000/month:  
Well, like I said, my house payment went from $600/month to 
$1,000/month. The first year that it went up I struggled. 
 
Dorothy was approved for a $103,000 mortgage on a $25,000 annual wage. When her 
mortgage increased in the second year, Dorothy was paying almost 50% of her income 
towards housing expenses. This confounding life challenge made it impossible for 
Dorothy to sustain her mortgage. In order for housing to be considered affordable, a 
person should not pay more than 30% of their income for housing. Ten years after her 
foreclosure, Dorothy continues to share her story because she is committed to saving 
other people from the devastating situation she went through:  
These are actual people whose lives you‘re affecting.  We may not be the 
best credit wise, but you‘re still a hard working person who‘s trying to do 
better.  Unscrupulous people are taking advantage of the situation because 
they knew.  When they were writing these loans, they targeted single 
women, apartment complexes, and for a long time, even after I bought my 
home, up until we started organizing and doin‘ interviews and everything.  
 
Dorothy was actually turned down for a mortgage prior to its eventual approval. 
At the time of her mortgage rejection, she requested to be reimbursed for the money she 
had put down for the home. The lender did not return the money. Instead of standing 
behind the outcome of the original underwriting, the lender reversed their decision and 
approved Dorothy‘s loan:  
I told Irwin (lender) in the meeting, the representatives, that I was told by 
their loan officer that I could not afford that mortgage. I‘m like, ―If I 
couldn‘t afford it, why did you approve it? Because that was the 
conversation we had before they gave me a closing date. Because I called 
them. I‘m like, ―Okay. This has been goin‘ on for four months now. If I 
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can‘t afford the house now, I couldn‘t afford the house when we started. If 
I can‘t afford the house, then just say that.‖   
 
There appear to be two, at best, questionable, at worst, predatory reasons the loan 
was able to pass through underwriting. The lender had previously told Dorothy if she did 
not have a car payment, it would be easier to approve her for the loan. After Dorothy was 
in an accident and the car totaled, the lender revisited her debt-to-income ratio. Although 
most reasonable people understand the absence of a car payment was temporary, the 
lender took advantage of the situation. Further, Dorothy later learned, based on a review 
conducted by a HUD field office, it appeared the lender counted her retirement savings as 
income. Even though Dorothy was only 47 years-old when she purchased the home and 
had no immediate plans for retirement, the lender counted the savings as if Dorothy had 
immediate access. It was under these unethical underwriting practices that Dorothy‘s loan 
was approved. The originating lender, Irwin Mortgage, a local, Indiana-based company, 
went out of business in 2013. At the time of the foreclosure, the mortgage servicer was 
J.P. Morgan Chase.  
 Heather.  
 Heather, a White female, was 40-years-old when her home went into foreclosure 
in 2012. She was 27 years-old when she and her husband, Mike, purchased their first 
home in Central Indiana. The Horton‘s purchased their modest home in 1999, paying an 
initial mortgage payment of $350/month:  
We had lived in an apartment probably, I think it was two years into our 
marriage.  My husband‘s parents just kept pushing us, that homeownership 
was the way to go.  That‘s the American Dream, is to own your home.  
We didn‘t have the greatest of credit, so they did cosign the loan for us.  It 
was a small but cute house.  Nothing of my dreams, but we got the loan 
approved with their help. 
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In 2006, Heather and Mike decided to refinance their mortgage to consolidate an 
unexpected tax bill, credit card debt, and other expenses. The refinance served as the 
pivotal life moment for the Horton‘s. The refinance was based on a bogus, lender-
supported appraisal:  
That‘s kinda when things started.  We decided we have a little bit of debt, 
so let‘s go ahead and re-mortgage the house.  We did, and we had 
someone come through and inspect it.  They appraised it for I think it was 
$85,000.00, which was ridiculous [laughter].  When, really, the home‘s 
value was probably more like 40, 45,000.   
 
Heather and Mike tried to right-side-up their upside-down situation; however, they were 
unable to rebound after the mortgage refinance. They declared bankruptcy and their home 
went into foreclosure in 2012. Of all the research participants, Heather lived in her home 
the longest, 13 years. Among the participants, she also appears to have most 
fundamentally shifted her perspective of homeownership and rental living.  
 Due to the age of their home, approximated to be constructed in the 1940s, 
Heather and Mike‘s situation was confounded by a number of home repair expenses. 
Twice, their roof was damaged by broken tree limbs due to heavy storms. Several times, 
they covered plumbing expenses. Heather estimated a total of six to eight plumbing calls, 
which cost $200/call resulting in expenses of $1,200 to $1,400:  
Yes, the fact that we never knew how much something was gonna cost.  
Would we have enough money?  We were trying to build up savings, but 
it felt like, every time we had built up savings, something would happen to 
the home that we would have to fix.  Yeah, that was just not knowing.  
Just not knowing how to do it, also.  Just not having a clue.  We had a 
father-in-law that would help—thank goodness for him—but yeah, that 
was the stressful part.  Money stress is a stressful thing, anyway, but to not 
know. 
 
After the Horton‘s refinanced their home, additional unexpected expenses arose that 
made it more challenging to cover the doubled mortgage payment:  
128 
 
It wasn‘t immediately.  We noticed things getting a little tighter.  Then, 
one of our vehicles just completely gave out and we got a new vehicle.  
We had some medical issues.  My husband went into the hospital.  That 
was a significant—even with having insurance that was a significant bill.  
Then, we continued to have the credit card debt, so that, also.  Even 
paying the minimum on those was starting to hurt.   
 
Although Heather and Mike were diligent about trying to make ends meet, being upside-
down in their home was a confounding life challenge they could not overcome; they left 
their home and initiated bankruptcy proceedings.  
 Jessica.  
 At 28-years-old, Jessica is the youngest participant. A White female, she was 
employed as a manager of a fast-food restaurant when she and her husband, Jason, 
purchased their home in 2011. They moved into their first home, located in Central 
Indiana. At the time of purchase, Jessica was 26 years-old and Jason was 21 years-old. 
M/I Homes served as both the developer and financer of the home. Once the home was 
constructed, the Jones family made two payments to M/I homes before the mortgage 
company sold the loan to US Bank.  The initial mortgage payment was the same as the 
final one, $830/month. The Jones family lived in the home for approximately 2.5 years 
before vacating the home when foreclosure proceedings were imminent.  
 Although Jessica and Jason were only in the home for two years, substantial and 
confounding life events occurred over this short period of time. The Jones family grew to 
include three children. In addition, Jason‘s parents moved in with the young family in 
2012, a year after they built and moved into the home. Much to Jessica‘s surprise, her in-
laws brought some uninvited guests with them—bedbugs:  
…his parents had hit a rough patch and move-in with us for a while. When 
they did, they brought all of their stuff and didn‘t tell us that they were 
having issues with bugs. When they brought all their stuff, I started seeing 
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little bugs on the wall. I was like, ―What are those bugs?‖ I had an 
exterminator come out, and it was a bedbug. 
  
The combination of Jason‘s parents moving in along with the extermination cost 
of addressing the bedbug infestation represents a pivotal life moment for this young 
family:    
They infested the house. Then I had to—for them to fix it, it was gonna 
cost us like $2,000. I had to pay $2,000 for them to do the treatment to get 
rid of the bedbugs. It was rough. That was right when I stopped working at 
a fast food restaurant. I was babysitting one kid at the time, so I didn‘t 
really have an income. That was supposed to be—we used our tax refund 
money, and that money was supposed to go to catching up the mortgage. 
Instead, I had to pay an exterminator.  
 
Now, instead of being a couple of months behind on the mortgage, the Joneses were a 
couple more months behind. Confounding this situation, Jessica had become reliant on 
seasonal and sporadic employment as she attempted to balance work schedules and 
raising her children. When Jessica became pregnant with her third child, the families she 
babysat for grew concerned about her ability to continue taking care of their children. 
Almost at once, they all ended their arrangement with Jessica. Although, at one point, 
Jessica worked to get caught up on the mortgage, the family was now behind again.  
In addition to the financial challenges, interpersonal tension began to grow 
between Jessica and Jason. Rooted in division created by Jason‘s parents residing in the 
Jones‘ home and the financial burdens associated with their stay, the couple began to 
fight:  
I filled out the paperwork, and the reason, the big reason why we decided 
to just leave—and on top of this with all the issues with his parents and all 
that. He‘s very attached to his family so because they caused that issue, it 
was causing tension between us. 
  
There was times where he would move in and out and move in and out. 
Then I‘m sitting here like, I can‘t afford this by myself. He was just in and 
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out all the time because he—the fights would escalate, and it was always 
about his family. We would never fight unless it was about his family 
because he‘s very defensive when it comes to them.  
 
Seeing no way to make-up the mortgage payments again and dealing with increasing 
marital conflict, Jessica‘s family moved out of the house and she filed for bankruptcy.  
Contextual Summary. 
As noted in the contextual profiles, each of the participants experienced a pivotal 
life moment, which often pinpoints the moment when life‘s challenges become 
insurmountable and the individual slides into foreclosure. For Linda, her pivotal life 
moment was the cancer diagnosis and terminal prognosis. Helen‘s divorce was a 
triumphant moment of liberation but also served as the precipitating life event that 
pushed her into foreclosure. Dorothy‘s pivotal life moment occurred before she even 
stepped one foot into her house. The predatory features of her loan set her up for failed 
homeownership. Although challenged by persistent home repair issues, Heather‘s family 
could still easily manage their modest mortgage of $350/month. An inflated appraisal that 
doubled the Horton‘s mortgage overnight turned their financial situation ―upside-down,‖ 
where they had more home debt than home value, and were never able to financially 
recover. Their refinanced mortgage represents their pivotal life moment. Lastly, Jessica‘s 
young family became emotionally and financially overburdened by her in-laws moving 
into their home. The unexpected $2,000 extermination expense diverted funds the Jones 
family planned to use to catch up on their mortgage payment. Not only did the 
extermination expense put the family further into a financial hole but it introduced an 
interpersonal drama triangle among Jessica, Jason, and his parents. The extermination 
expense was a clear pivotal life moment for this young family.  
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 Without exception to the pattern, each participant‘s pivotal life moment was either 
preceded by or followed by a wave of confounding life challenges. Although the life 
challenges were unique to each participant, a shared pattern of having a challenge arise, 
meeting the challenge, and, yet, experiencing another arising challenge—over and over 
until the participant was so rolled over by the wave of challenges, they were no longer 
able to come up for air. This shared pattern of pivotal life moments and confounding 
challenges is interwoven into the essential experience of foreclosure among these 
participants: disconnection.  
Table 7 Participant Demographic and Personal Characteristics 
Participant Age at 
Home 
Purchase 
Age at 
Foreclosure 
Age at 
interview 
Marital 
Status at 
Foreclosure 
Race Employer at 
Home 
Purchase 
Pivotal Life 
Event 
Linda 53 61 67 Married W Not-for-profit 
community 
development 
organization 
Cancer 
diagnosis 
Helen 53 60 65 Divorced W State agency Divorce 
Dorothy 47 52 62 Divorced B University, 
professional 
school 
Predatory 
loan 
 
Heather 27 40 42 Married W Correctional 
facility 
Refinance 
based on 
inflated 
appraisal 
Jessica 26 28 28 Married W Fast food 
restaurant 
In-laws 
move in; 
associated 
bug 
infestation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
Table 8 Participant Housing Characteristics 
Participant 
Location of 
Home 
First-time 
homebuyer 
Purchase 
Year Foreclosure Year 
Years in 
Home 
Linda Central IN  No 2000 2008 8 
Helen Southern IL No 2002 2009 7 
Dorothy Northern IN No 1999 2004 5 
Heather Central IN Yes 1999 2012 13 
Jessica Central IN Yes 2011 2013 2.5 
 
Table 9 Participant Mortgage Information  
Participant Mortgage at 
Purchase ($) 
Mortgage at 
Foreclosure ($) 
Lender at Purchase Servicer at 
Foreclosure 
Linda 1500 1500 J.P. Morgan Chase J.P. Morgan Chase 
Helen 450 550 Regents Everhome Mortgage 
Dorothy 600 1000 Irwin Mortgage J.P. Morgan Chase 
Heather 350 700 Capital One Unknown 
Jessica 830 830 M/I Financial US Bank 
Essential Pattern of Experiencing Foreclosure: Disconnection 
 In its most fundamental and reductionist sense, a foreclosure represents the 
physical disconnection of a homebuyer from the material possession of a house. Yet, 
when one deeply interprets the common, unifying pattern of foreclosure among the 
participants in this study, it is discovered that this lived experience represents much more 
than any simple disconnection from a physical structure. The unifying theme at the 
foundation of each participant‘s meaning-making experience of foreclosure was a 
profound sense of disconnection. More than being physically displaced from one‘s home, 
foreclosure represents disconnection on many levels—micro, mezzo and macro.  
 One of the most fundamental disconnections participants experienced was a 
separation from self. This shared experience is articulated as Theme 1, Foreclosure 
creates a disconnection from self. Participants began questioning their identity. The 
experience of foreclosure challenged the essence of who the participants thought they 
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were. Foreclosure represented a disconnection from an idealized self, which was 
intimately connected with the identity of ―homeowner.‖ Foreclosure also represented a 
disconnection between a homebuyer and their knowledge of housing finance. This shared 
experience is represented in Theme 2: Foreclosure represents a disconnection between a 
homebuyer and housing finance literacy. Most participants simply did not understand the 
technically and, sometimes, highly-complex nuances of the home buying process or of 
housing finance. This lack of knowledge put many of the homebuyers at risk of being 
exploited. This theme connects to the next one, Theme 3, Foreclosure reflects a 
disconnection in the relationship between a lending institution and a borrower. Five sub-
themes were discovered within this theme, including: a) geographical distance between 
lender and borrower, b) service disruption when flipping loans, c) ethical violation in 
underwriting standards, d) relationship break from lender as trusted advisor, and e)  lack 
of accountability of shared responsibilities between lender and borrower. When a 
relationship was broken between a lender and borrower, it was discovered that home 
buyers were not able to fully experience the perceived benefits of homeownership. This 
experience is reflected in Theme 4, Foreclosure represents a disconnection between a 
homebuyer and the benefits of homeownership. Participants articulated this experience in 
specific ways, which make-up sub-themes of this finding: a) disconnection from shelter; 
b) disconnection from gathering place; c) disconnection from freedom and ownership; 
and d) disconnection from asset creation. Lastly, in some variation, all participants were 
employed in social service-based, helping-based, or low-wage positions. Although 
experienced uniquely, each participant was impacted by a disconnection emanating from 
their employment and the experience of foreclosure. Consequently, the core of Theme 5 
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is Foreclosure is a consequence of a disconnection between participants’ social service-
based, helping-based and/or low-wage employment and self-sufficiency. The essential 
pattern, themes and sub-themes of experiencing foreclosure are illustrated in Figure 8. 
The analysis of themes and sub-themes are presented in the following five thematic 
findings. Analyses is based on my interpretation of participant text and tone and 
supported by exemplars from interview transcripts.  
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Figure 8 Essential Pattern, Foreclosure as Disconnection 
  
 
Essential Pattern: Foreclosure is Disconnection 
Theme 1. Foreclosure creates a disconnection from self. 
Theme 2. Foreclosure represents a disconnection between a homebuyer 
and housing finance literacy.  
Theme 3. Foreclosure reflects a disconnection in the relationshp between 
a lending institution and a borrower.  
•Sub-theme a) geographical distance between a lender and a borrower 
•Sub-theme b) service disruption when flipping loans 
•Sub-theme c) ethical violation in underwriting standards 
•Sub-theme d) relationship break from lender as trusted advisor 
•Sub-theme e) lack of accountability for shared responsibilities between a lender and a 
borrower 
Theme 4. Foreclosure represents a disconnection between a homebuyer 
and the benefits of homeownership.  
•Sub-theme a) disconnection from shelter 
•Sub-theme b) disconnection from gathering place 
•Sub-theme c) disconnection from freedom and ownership 
•Sub-theme d) disconnection from asset creation  
Theme 5.  Foreclosure is a consequence of a disconnection between 
participants’ social service-based, helping-based and/or low-wage 
employment and self-sufficiency.  
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Theme 1: Foreclosure creates a disconnection from self.  
 Participants consistently used language that equated self with house and the loss 
of it. Participants spoke of losing their identity when they lost their house. They began 
questioning the essence of self and the extent of their own worth. In particular, Linda 
appeared to more fully articulate the connection between self and house and equating the 
loss of the physical structure of the home with the loss of personal identity. Perhaps this 
profound sense of disconnection was emphasized given her terminal diagnosis, which 
served as Linda‘s pivotal life moment. Linda consistently used the word ―diminished‖ to 
explain how facing foreclosure and the related financial challenges made her feel. Linda 
explained why this process made her feel ―diminished‖ and what that meant for her:  
You lose your whole perspective of who you are. I mean, one day you‘re a 
successful person. You have family. You have friends. You have a good 
job. You don‘t worry about money. You are the one that is the caregiver, 
the nurturer—and then all of a sudden, you don‘t have the job, the 
profession. That‘s your identity. You don‘t have the home. You don‘t have 
the security. You‘re being told you‘re less than what you oughta be. 
 
Linda elaborates on how deeply she felt her sense of self challenged.  Despite her 
terminal illness and numerous attempts to negotiate a short sale, she internalized the 
foreclosure and financial challenges as a personal failing:  
You‘ve done something wrong, and it shatters what you had always 
perceived yourself as being of, like I say, a confident, competent 
individual.   
 
It is striking that, at least at one time, Linda internalized this issue so deeply it shattered 
her identity:  
It can almost take me down, it can take anyone down, but it did. It was 
tough. There were times when I said, ―Why am I fighting this? Yeah, I 
don‘t even know who I am anymore.‖  
  
The person I was no longer existed. It‘s tough.  
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This woman is the same person who not only lived past her terminal prognosis but has 
also done so for seven years now. Further, her defiant and indomitable spirit is the same 
one that evoked this exchange with her treating physician:  
The doctor, when the lung cancer …. said, ―There‘s no medical reasons 
why you should be alive. It‘s because you‘re so damn stubborn.‖ Linda 
laughing, says, ―Well, it‘s the truth.‖  
 
Even with her notable resilience and defiance in the face of life‘s most significant 
challenges, Linda‘s strong sense of self was diminished by the experience of foreclosure.  
 Helen, like Linda, reflected a strong sense of personal responsibility. When she 
faced foreclosure, this central core of her character was challenged. She questioned her 
personal identity. Prior to the foreclosure, Helen demonstrated independence and 
responsibility, ―My first home I purchased before I was married…because I didn‘t get 
married until I was 30.‖ Maintaining steady employment, Helen has acted as the primary 
breadwinner for herself and family, ―I have 20 years with the state, because I started in 
‘93 with the juvenile detention center.‖ Helen‘s identity was heavily rooted in her sense 
of responsibility. When she began struggling financially, this core sense of self was 
challenged:  
Because I‘d always paid my bills before. Before I got—with me…getting 
married later, I‘d always been pretty well self-sufficient. I had a good job, 
I had a car, I had a home.  
 
Then you get—you get all switched around, and you always go from 
payday to payday, and still can‘t make it go. I don‘t know, you just feel 
like you‘ve lost something. 
 
I think you lose your self-esteem. You feel like you‘re not worth as much 
as you were before, because now having to rely on the system to help you 
out. I wasn‘t brought up that way. 
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The experience of foreclosure disconnected Helen from the person she perceived herself 
to be. She lost her self-esteem and felt like her worth was diminished. Further, the 
foreclosure so separated Helen from the responsible person she fully identified with that 
she took on the feelings of being homeless, ―You do feel homeless, kind of. It‘s just not 
the same. There‘s just no security there.‖ 
 In addition to challenging her sense of self and personal security, the foreclosure 
caused Helen to disconnect from the plans she had for her future:  
I think it all goes back, again, to the security thing. Getting older, and not 
having to worry about a home. A home is the biggest part, probably, of a 
person‘s life. It may not be much, but at least it‘s a place to sleep, a place 
to eat, and your family‘s there with you, whatever. If you don‘t have that, 
you really don‘t have anything.  
 
From Helen‘s perspective a home represents a fundamental aspect of a person‘s life. She 
goes as far as to say, ―If you don‘t have that, you really don‘t have anything.‖ It is hard to 
imagine a more definitive statement on the tremendous loss to self that Helen felt in 
losing her home.  
Similar to Helen, Jessica always considered herself to be a responsible person and 
took pride in her work ethic.  When she and Jason were first married, she was employed 
as a restaurant manager. Due to her heightened sense of personal responsibility, Jessica 
internalized shame through the foreclosure and bankruptcy process: 
…it‘s almost a little embarrassing cause people that know I lived there, they drove 
by it, and there‘s this big foreclosure notice. It makes me feel like a failure. I 
mean, just not being able to take care of my responsibilities. I don‘t wanna not 
pay my bills. 
 
 Despite numerous attempts to negotiate a work-out with her lender, Jessica began feeling 
that others saw her differently than the responsible identity she had embraced:  
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I think people that know me—I don‘t know. I just feel, I don‘t know, I 
guess I have the perception that someone who‘s in foreclosure is just—
people judge you. That‘s what I feel, not necessarily that‘s what they‘re 
thinking but that‘s just how I—I feel like people will look at that and 
think…that it‘s my fault. I shouldn‘t have bought a house I couldn‘t 
afford. 
 
The experience of foreclosure disconnected Jessica from positive behaviors she held 
dear:  
…I feel like the credit report makes me look like I‘m very irresponsible 
when it‘s like their take—they look at this snapshot, the most, this little 
snapshot of this bad time of my life when I was trying, but it looks like I 
just didn‘t pay any of the bills. They ignore the first 25 years of my life 
when they can see that I‘ve not paid late; I‘ve always paid my bills on 
time.  
 
Foreclosure minimized Jessica‘s life, her being, into a ―bad time.‖ The whole of her 
identity was reduced to arguably one of the worst experiences of her life.  
 Like the other participants, Dorothy also thought of herself as a responsible, 
independent person. One of the aspects of homeownership she valued the most was, ―Just 
feeling that I was able to accomplish something on my own. As a single person. On my 
income.‖ Dorothy equated this responsibility as a sign of her independence. Although 
Dorothy now fully realizes and accepts she was not able to afford the home she was 
approved for on her own, the experience of foreclosure was devastating for her. Dorothy 
explained, ―For me, it was devastating. It was [pause] the worst thing that could have 
possibly ever happened to me.‖ This statement is significant when one becomes aware of 
all the confounding life challenges facing Dorothy at this time. In 2000, Dorothy‘s 
nephew, who she raised as her son, died. Two years later, in 2002, her father passed 
away. Two years later, in 2014, Dorothy‘s home went into foreclosure. Dorothy explains 
how she began disconnecting from her life:  
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When I lost the home, it was like…For a very long time, I was very, very 
depressed about it and didn‘t even realize I was depressed.  
 
Some people are able to move on, but it‘s also a very—for me, it was 
very—I felt very beaten.  
 
The resignation in Dorothy‘s account is apparent. Dorothy, who once took pride in her 
independence and who tenaciously fought to save her home, now felt beaten by the 
impending foreclosure. She retreated from self into a deep depression:  
I was really very hurt when I realized the depth of my depression that no 
one that I worked with seemed to be able to say, ―Hey, you need help.‖ 
It‘s a really, a very, very long time (until Dorothy worked through the 
depression by herself). Probably up until maybe four years ago or so. I 
began to realize, ―Hey, this is not right. This is not,‖—I really began to 
realize that I had just been existing not living.  
 
Just getting‘ up. Puttin‘ one foot in front of the other and keep movin‘ 
until you lay down. Then you get up and you do the same thing over 
again. Then it‘s like you real—I feel as though I really wasted that time of 
my life. 
 
Dorothy‘s disconnection from her identity and life was so deep that she feels she did not 
return to living until four years ago in 2010, or six years after her home went into 
foreclosure.  Dorothy demonstrates significant resilience and fight. Even ten years after 
her foreclosure, she is defiant and wants people to understand the profound impact the 
experience of foreclosure can have on one‘s identity and life:  
It would be different had I just been one of these people who—I don‘t care 
about this. So what? They about to foreclose. I just go get me some place. 
No. This was an investment for me. This was my life.  
 
Dorothy equated the house with her life. When she lost her house in foreclosure, through 
a deep depression, she also lost her fundamental sense of self.  
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 Of all the research participants, Heather appeared to hold the most stigma and 
shame associated with the foreclosure and financial challenges. For Heather, the 
meanings she attached to homeownership were closely associated with responsibility: 
I think it goes back to you‘re an adult. You‘re growing up. You‘re maturing. 
You‘re responsible. Responsibility equals having a house, keeping a job, having 
bills. 
 
Conversely, when the Horton‘s were struggling to make ends meet, Heather‘s self-
perception began shifting, ―I was feeling like I wasn‘t responsible. I wasn‘t a responsible 
adult.‖ As Heather‘s family fell further into debt, her normative identity and behaviors 
continued to shift:  
Because not only did we have all this debt, our house is deteriorating. We 
have raccoons in our roof that we‘re trying to get rid of. We have water. 
We now need a new roof. Now, the house that I was once loved is also—
I‘m starting to be shameful of it. I‘m inviting less—because we can‘t 
remodel because we can‘t remortgage.  
 
Heather‘s feelings of shame intensified. The house she associated with demonstrating 
how responsible she was is now physically deteriorating. In essence, Heather viewed this 
deterioration symbolically—as a physical deterioration of her identity. People could 
visibly see the breaking down of her home. From Heather‘s place of shame, she 
internalized that people must also see she was not the responsible, mature person she had 
portrayed to them.  
 In addition to the attributes of responsibility Heather attached to homeownership, 
she also connected personal characteristics to their home.  She anthropomorphized the 
home:  
When you came home from work, even the smell—everybody has a 
certain smell. The smell of the house, it would just be like this is home, no 
matter what. It would be either a candle that I lit, or my [laughter]—a 
perfume that my daughter wears, or a cologne that my husband wore. You 
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could smell that. The smell of my dog being in the room, or whatever. It 
would just—you just walked in. Those were the smells. That‘s my family 
[laughter].  
 
For Heather, the home had not only taken on human-like qualities, but also the scents and 
fragrances of her family. Heather could not separate the physical structure of the home 
from the identity of her family. When the foreclosure happened, it also represented a 
deeply personal disconnection from her family—or, at least, the space she associated with 
her family:  
I felt like I was giving that up…and to know that it would be empty…My 
husband, he works over there every once in a while. He‘ll drive by it and 
just see all the curtains are still up. He‘ll tell me. There‘s just something. 
It‘s just too emotional for me. Because I know, now it doesn‘t have those 
smells. It has a musty smell to it…It‘s just too emotional to even—maybe 
later on I could do it, but not now.  
 
It is. It is (a real sense of loss). I never thought I would feel like that, but 
yeah, it is definitely---but it‘s still there. It‘s almost like I would imagine 
people going through a divorce. It is almost like a death. That person‘s 
still living and breathing. The house is still there.  
 
The comparison here cannot be understated. In one statement, Heather is connecting her 
family, actually embodying its human characteristics within the home. In another 
statement, Heather says, ―I felt like I was giving that up‖ and equating the separation 
from the home as divorce or death. In some emotional sense, the foreclosure 
disconnected Heather from her family—or, at least, its identity. When asked how Heather 
would feel if she chose to go by the home, again, she again personifies the home, ―I 
would feel like I would have to apologize, or to—I would feel so remorseful. I know I 
would just bawl, just because it‘s almost like I gave up.‖  Heather‘s extremely emotional 
and raw response underscores the deep sorrow she feels being disconnected from the 
home.  
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 Heather‘s profound sense of loss, shame, and questioning of identity also appear 
during the bankruptcy hearing. In some ways, she was comforted to see other families 
who had endured financial challenges, too. It lessened her sense of shame but it also 
unearthed the negative self-perception she had accepted after the foreclosure:  
…just to know other people had to make that same decision as we did, and 
some people—the two ahead of us were in way worse condition than us. 
Medical bills and the husband—one of ‗em had a heart attack, $200,000 in 
medical bills. She was on disability. He was a truck driver. She was a 
nurse, at one time. When she went on disability, there was no way that 
they could make it. It was just like, ―Okay, you‘re not a bad person. There 
are other people.‖ 
 
Yet, despite what appears to be a rejection of the negative identity Heather had embraced, 
she easily falls back into a deleterious self-perception:  
You have to say to people, your friends and family, ―Hey, I don‘t know 
how to deal with money. Therefore, you may think I‘m not responsible.‖ 
...bankruptcy is very much looked down upon. You‘re supposed to take 
care of your debts. You accrued all of this. You‘re the one who‘s supposed 
to take care of it. Biblically, too, it says in the Bible you‘re supposed to 
have no debt, zero balance, whatever. We had to confess that we don‘t. I 
had a very hard time accepting that I wasn‘t responsible for my money, 
that I wasn‘t responsible for how I dealt with money. 
 
From Heather‘s perspective, her foreclosure manifested her sinful nature. Guilt, shame, 
and stigma were interwoven deeply in Heather‘s personal experience of foreclosure. The 
meaning she attached to the experience was that it affirmed she was a bad, sinful person 
who had to confess her immoral behavior to family and friends—and, publicly, in court. 
Heather discusses how she felt like she was on trial, invoking language of committing a 
crime, during the bankruptcy hearing:  
…it was so set up like a courtroom that that‘s how it made me feel. There 
was a wooden panel between where the people they were talking with was 
sitting, and their lawyer. Then, the judge was in the middle, the 
bankruptcy judge. Then, almost like his courtroom person, whatever 
they‘re called. That‘s how it was set up. It almost made you feel like—
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you‘re in the federal courthouse. That, in and of itself, is—that‘s where 
not great things happen. You‘re in a courtroom, so it did make you feel 
like you had committed a crime, in a way. You had to confess: yes, these 
are all my debts. I‘m showing you everything.  
 
Heather‘s meaning-making process associated with the experience of foreclosure and 
bankruptcy had caused her to integrate the identity of a criminal and sinner. Clearly, her 
personal vulnerability was also heightened—feeling that she exposed all parts of herself 
in a public court. Heather no longer viewed herself as the responsible, mature adult who, 
for 13 years, managed to meet financial challenges and major home repairs to maintain a 
household. Through the foreclosure and bankruptcy process, Heather came to see herself 
as an irresponsible, ―loser‖ sinner who had to confess her sins and financial crimes in 
front of family, friends and officers of the court.    
 Theme 2: Foreclosure represents a disconnection between a homebuyer and 
housing finance literacy.  
Buying a home is most likely the largest purchase any of the participants will ever 
make. Unfortunately, most participants did not feel like they were connected to basic 
knowledge concerning the home buying process, refinancing, or general housing finance. 
Helen admitted she was disconnected from fully understanding financing the purchase of 
a house, ―…a lot of paperwork to sign. A lot of it you don‘t even understand what you‘re 
signing, but you go ahead and sign it.‖ Helen was focused on the reason why she wanted 
the home more than fully considering whether she would be able to financially sustain the 
mortgage:  
I don‘t think you do. I guess it‘s because you want it so bad, you think you 
can. I think in my mind, I knew all along that I didn‘t really think I could 
(afford it), but I went ahead and did it anyway.   
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Helen was driven by recapturing hours from her day. She had a long commute, was tired 
and wanted to buy a home that would give her some control over her daily schedule. 
Even though she had reservations about her ability to make her mortgage payment, her 
desire to be closer to work overrode any of those considerations:  
I think it‘s always there in the back of your mind, you‘re wondering how 
you‘re gonna keep up with it….Down in your heart you‘re not sure you 
can actually make it, but you want it so bad that you‘re willing to try it. I 
think that‘s how a lot of people lose their home.  
 
Helen led a difficult life. From her perspective, homeownership would lessen the burdens 
she intently felt. In pursuit of the freedom homeownership represented, Helen 
disconnected from the reality of the tight financial margin she and her family 
experienced.  
 Unlike Helen who did not recognize the narrow financial margin on which her 
family existed, Dorothy was aware of the limitations of her income. What Helen and 
Dorothy had in common was their dream of homeownership. Dorothy readily admits that 
she very much wanted to be a homeowner and how that desire probably caused her to 
disconnect from the financial reality of her ability to carry a mortgage on her income:  
Being excited about bein‘ able to buy a home and the whole process, I 
think it clouds the judgment, and, even though [pause] you‘re looking at it 
and your—no one told me—when I started buying the home, the whole 
reason I went through Crossman was because they had went around and 
put fliers in the apartment complex where I was living, ―If you‘re paying 
$500.00 a month in rent, then you can be in a home payin‘ the same 
thing.‖ It‘s like, ―Well, hey.‖  
 
Yet, Dorothy‘s mortgage payment was not $500/month. Due to a 2-1 buy-down financing 
structure, which backloads the mortgage payment onto the end of the loan term in 
exchange for a lower monthly payment on the front-end of the loan term, Dorothy‘s first-
year mortgage was $600/month. Complicated by her lack of housing finance literacy, 
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what Dorothy did not understand, and was not clearly explained to her, was an increase in 
her monthly mortgage payment to $1,000/month in the second year. This significantly 
higher payment reflected both the structure of the 2-1 buy-down and fully assessed tax 
and insurance. The combination of a 2-1 buy-down structure and fully assessed property 
taxes were reasons for the mortgage increase and, ethically, should have been explained 
to the borrower at the time of financing:  
When I went to closing, I was told that I was in a 2-1 buy-down. The first 
year I was in my house my mortgage payment was $600/month, which 
was manageable. The next year it jumped $400/month.  
 
Due to her limited knowledge of housing finance, Dorothy had to rely on the erroneous 
and incomplete information provided to her. She was disconnected from the knowledge 
that she would be unable to afford her home as soon as the second year of 
homeownership. Because Dorothy was not connected to basic housing finance literacy, 
she was exploited and set-up to fail from day one.  
Part of Dorothy‘s financing package included down-payment assistance (DPA) 
from the Nehemiah program. The Nehemiah program was used extensively in the late 
1990s and early 2000s to cover the traditional 20% down often required for a home 
mortgage. Due to issues of fidelity with the program, it was banned when the 2008 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) was passed. Dorothy was one of many 
people who did not experience the Nehemiah program as it was intended. Recipients of 
Nehemiah DPA funds were required to be connected to homeownership training:   
There was a class I was supposed to take, but I don‘t ever remember 
taking that class. I think they bogused it to say that I did, but I never took 
it.  
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Since her experience with foreclosure, Dorothy has empowered herself. She connected 
with a local, not-for-profit intermediary, the Indianapolis Neighborhood Housing 
Partnership, and enrolled in home buying courses. Ten years and many financial and 
emotional hardships later, Dorothy is resilient, knowledge-filled about housing finance, 
and ready for another homeownership experience. With the experience of foreclosure 
behind her, she has some critical knowledge she wants to share with other people who 
might find themselves where she was almost 15 years ago:  
What I would suggest for anyone, especially for a first-time homebuyer, is 
to gain the knowledge. Don‘t go into it blindly.  Don‘t go into it believing 
that anyone is going to look out for your best interests…Because the 
bottom line is every—everything is about money.  Everybody involved is 
out to make money.  Yeah.  They‘re gonna give you a surface protection.  
They‘re gonna look like they‘re lookin‘ out for your best interest, but you 
have to have some knowledge yourself to be able to question things that 
don‘t look right or feel right to you.   
 
Dorothy‘s point underscores how homebuyers can be taken advantage of if they are 
disconnected from the knowledge of the home buying process and nuances of housing 
finance. Dorothy asserts that one of the most important ways foreclosure can be 
prevented is to connect people to home buying and home finance education so they are 
not put into a position in which they outsource their financial agency to unscrupulous 
lenders.   
Like Dorothy, Jessica participated in a first-time homebuyer program but her 
home was financed through M/I Homes, which consists of both a real estate development 
and financing arm. One of the most striking aspects about Jessica‘s experience is that she 
purchased her home in 2011, which occurred five years following the 2006 housing crash 
and three years after the Great Recession began in 2008. Her situation provides one 
window through which we can see how lending institutions have—or have not—changed 
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since the global economic crisis. One thing that has not changed, at least in Jessica‘s case, 
is that the lender did not connect Jessica to any homebuyer education through its first-
time homebuyer program: ―I don‘t remember them handing me anything really saying—
it was almost like they were just telling me what you needed to know to get in.‖ The 
primary benefit of participating in M/I Homes first-time homebuyer program was 
receiving down-payment assistance (DPA). DPA is provided to cover the traditional 20% 
down-payment required when financing a mortgage loan. Jessica explains, ―We only paid 
a couple hundred dollars. Assistance was like $7,500. I think is what we got.‖ With astute 
hindsight and the knowledge she gained through the unfortunate experience of 
foreclosure, Jessica now thinks her family should have waited to pursue homeownership. 
Jessica appears to have learned a lesson lending institutions have yet to grasp or, 
prioritize:  
I think, too, that we should have—I think we should have waited to buy a 
house instead of rushing into it and having more money in the bank, 
instead of going in. The program is good, but at the same time—for the 
down-payment, it‘s like it‘s good to help people get into a house, but at the 
same time to help them get into the house, it doesn‘t help them keep it.  
 
Jessica now realizes that she would have benefitted from being connected to the home 
buying and housing finance system more thoroughly. She realizes how easily individuals 
with limited knowledge can be taken advantage of:  
I just think that I shouldn‘t have—that it wasn‘t a wise decision to move in 
in the first place. I feel like I shoulda been more financially stable, not that 
I wasn‘t bringing in the income, but I didn‘t have a big savings account. I 
didn‘t really understand what home ownership really was.  
 
Then you get the—you go and a bunch of people don‘t know and then it‘s 
like somebody comes in and might—they‘re gonna take advantage of that. 
You don‘t really know. They‘re just trying to get—they don‘t necessarily 
have your best interests in mind, they‘re just trying to get you in the house 
so that they can make their money.  
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Sadly, Jessica understands that her lack of knowledge about home buying and housing 
finance made her vulnerable to lender exploitation. Jessica also recognized that her 
disconnection from her own housing finance knowledge which resulted in reliance on 
lenders, who she did not necessarily believe had her best interests in mind, continued 
throughout the foreclosure process:  
When I was starting the paperwork, so I didn‘t really know anything about 
foreclosure. I didn‘t know anything about what programs were out there. 
I‘m basically relying solely on what the mortgage company‘s telling me. 
 
They were just so nit-picky with this application. I did it probably six 
times. It was like things there were correct the first time aren‘t the second 
time around. Then, I‘ll change the way I fill it out, and it‘s always wrong.  
 
Unlike Helen, Dorothy and Jessica, Heather had remained in her home for several 
years before encountering foreclosure. The Horton family started with a modest 
mortgage, with modest terms for a modest home. The pivotal life moment for Heather‘s 
family occurred about seven years into homeownership when they consolidated their debt 
into a refinanced mortgage. As explained previously, the lender-hired appraiser produced 
a bogus appraisal about double the actual value of the home, which put Heather upside-
down in the loan. Heather indicates that she did not fully understand the implications of 
the refinanced loan:   
You would think, yes. I did. I saw all the paperwork. I signed all the paper. I 
thought we could make it, doing that. I was fully aware of how much that 
payment was going to be. 
 
Heather notes the lender who refinanced the loan did not explain the long-term 
implications of consolidating her debt, which essentially means tying unsecured debt to 
secured debt:  
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No [laughter]. I think they were just looking at—I mean, of course, 
everything‘s in writing, but no, it was nothing verbally, ―Now, you realize 
your payment‘s gonna increase.‖ No, nothing like that.  
 
Throughout her interview, Heather accepted a significant amount of responsibility for the 
financial situation she and her family experienced. With so much time spent in self-
reflection, I asked Heather if she could go back to 1999, knowing what she knew now, 
what she would do:  
We would not have bought a house. We know that now. We definitely 
weren‘t—I don‘t wanna say mature enough. We didn‘t know what we 
were getting into. We really didn‘t.  
 
The disconnection of knowledge these homebuyers had with understanding the 
housing finance system appears to have created the conditions in which it was easy for 
them to be exploited by unscrupulous lenders and manipulated underwriting standards. 
Most participants seemed to be driven more by their emotional connection with the 
symbolic meaning, promise of homeownership and the American Dream than with the 
financial and economic ramifications of most likely the single largest purchase any of 
them would ever make.  
 Although the analysis here points to an underlying need for building consumer 
empowerment through connecting individuals with education and training on the home-
buying process and housing finance, it should not undermine or minimize the dimension 
of exploitation that not only occurred among the participants here but also to millions of 
Americans during the housing crash and Great Recession. For example, even though 
most of the participants articulated a lack of familiarity with the home-buying process or 
particular nuances of housing finance, this was not the case for Linda. Linda successfully 
held two mortgages before her third home ended in foreclosure. Further, Linda is a 
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financially savvy individual who held a position as a director of a community 
development corporation at the time she was diagnosed with cancer. Linda is more than 
competent in the areas of real estate development and housing finance. Linda knew what 
immediately needed to be done when she realized she would not be able to continue 
working. Because of the weak housing market, she knew she would not be able to sell the 
house quickly enough on the market. So, Linda went to work and lined up a prospective 
buyer for a potential short sale. Yet, with all her housing finance savvy and competence, 
Linda did not have the power or incentive to compel the lender to negotiate. Linda 
thought, ―If they can do that, again, to someone who knows the system, what are they 
doing to some of these people who have no idea?‖ Linda‘s comments underscore how the 
exploitation of the other participants may have occurred. This aspect of the lender-
borrower relationship should not be minimized and it serves as the basis for the next 
shared theme.   
Theme 3: Foreclosure reflects a disconnection in the relationship between a 
lending institution and a borrower. 
 A mortgage represents a contractual relationship between lender and borrower. 
Until relatively recently, lenders were located in the same community as their borrowers. 
This local connection often resulted in a mortgage contract extending beyond financial 
considerations. A lender had a vested interest in ensuring community stability and 
borrower well-being.  Beginning in the 1990s, it became a trend for larger financial 
institutions to purchase, consolidate and merge smaller, local banks. With each merger, 
the connection between lender and borrower grew more distant.  
152 
 
 In discussing their experience with foreclosure and financial institutions, a clear 
theme of disconnection emerged. Any semblance of a mutually beneficial social 
exchange between lender and borrower is extremely limited in all the interactions 
participants described. This break-down in relationship appears to have been worsened by 
a geographical disconnection between borrower and lender. Participants felt challenged 
in simply connecting with their lender. This situation seemed to be exacerbated by the 
physical distance between borrower and lender. Further challenging the relationship 
between borrower and lender was the growing practice of ―flipping loans.‖ Loan flipping 
describes the process when a lender sells a mortgage to another lender. Borrowers have 
no control in this decision. In fact, the standard practice is to inform a borrower after their 
mortgage loan has been sold. Disconnections in the lender-borrower relationship also 
resulted in ethical improprieties of underwriting standards, which benefitted the lender at 
significant expense to the borrower. All of these lender-borrower dynamics also created 
suspicion of the lender as trusted advisor. Lastly, there was a marked disconnection in 
how lender and borrower approached its respective sense of accountability to the other 
party in the social exchange of mortgage loan and mortgage payment.  
 The disconnections in the social exchange relationship between lender and 
borrower were articulated in the following sub-themes: a) geographical distance between 
lender and borrower; b) service disruption when lenders flips loans; c) ethical violations 
in lender underwriting standards; d) relationship break from lender as trusted advisor, and 
e) lack of accountability for shared responsibilities between lender and borrower.   
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 Sub-theme 3a: Geographical distance between lender and borrower. 
 Most participants experienced frustration with the geographic disconnection with 
their mortgage servicer. In some ways, this frustration seemed more pronounced among 
the older participants who grew up in a time where one had a closer, community-based 
relationship with financial institutions. At one time, mortgages were not only formally 
executed through a written contract but also informally with a handshake. Of the older 
participants, Dorothy seemed most resigned to accepting the fact that her mortgage 
servicer was located out-of-state. She simply noted the mortgage servicer was not local, 
―It was out of state.‖ Perhaps the resignation Dorothy felt about geographically distant 
servicers stemmed from the knowledge that she was no better served by the locally-
owned Irwin Mortgage, who she felt set her up for failed homeownership.  
 After several attempts to connect with her mortgage servicer, J.P. Morgan Chase, 
Linda grew ever more exasperated. Although J.P. Morgan Chase is essentially 
ubiquitous, mortgage services may be handled at off-site locations. Since no one would 
return her calls, Linda attempted to connect through a store-front branch:  
I couldn‘t even get to a mortgage lender person. I was trying—I went 
through the branch manager of the local branch, and said, ―I can‘t get 
anyone to talk to me.‖ He says, ―Call this number.‖ I did, and they would 
not talk with me.  
 
The geographic disconnection appears to have allowed lenders to ignore or minimize the 
concerns of borrowers.  
 In Jessica‘s case, the geographic disconnection between her and her mortgage 
servicer proved to be extremely costly. Similar to Linda, Jessica had a relationship with a 
lender that had store-front branches for deposit and basic bank services but the servicing 
of her mortgage was handled from some remote, disconnected location. At the time of her 
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impending foreclosure, Jessica‘s mortgage was being serviced by US Bank. Although she 
had consistent contact with one mortgage service representative, which was unusual until 
a few years following the Great Recession, she received inconsistent guidance in filling 
out forms requesting mortgage assistance:  
They were just so nit-picky with this application. I did it probably six 
times. It was like things that were correct the first time aren‘t the second 
time around. Then, I‘ll change the way I fill it out, and it‘s always 
something wrong.  
 
In addition to the lost time of this frustrating process, it was also draining limited 
financial resources from Jessica‘s family. Jessica was not able to drop-off forms at a 
store-front branch. Each time she submitted the packet of forms, she had to fax them to 
an off-site servicing location:  
…after about filling it out like six times, I already don‘t have any money 
and I have to fax—they want me to fax this stuff.  
 
Every time, and it‘s ten pages. I go to FedEx to fax it. It‘s $1.50 a page. I 
already don‘t have any income coming in and you want me to fax these 
papers [laughs] over, and over, and over, again. I gotta put food on the 
table first.  
 
Yeah, and so I kept missing the deadlines because I didn‘t have any 
money to fax it. Then, I would have to restart all over again. I did it about 
six times.  
 
 Helen‘s mortgage loan originated with an Indiana-based branch and was then sold 
to a mortgage servicer based out of Florida. Although Helen was frustrated about the 
geographic disconnection like other participants, in her case, the spatial difference 
appeared to completely undermine her sense of self-efficacy. She seem overwhelmed, or 
maybe, uncomfortable in even reaching out to an out-of-state servicer for help. She was 
also convinced the physical distance implied the person on the other end of the phone 
would have no concern to help. From her perspective, she felt that because the loan was 
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now being serviced in Florida, no one cared. It is unclear if Helen ever spoke to someone 
from Everhome Mortgage, the company servicing her loan from Florida.  
Helen‘s plan of primary intervention was set to occur at the sheriff‘s sale:  
When it went to the sheriff‘s sale, I did go to the sale, hoping that they 
would have it where you could try to purchase it. The loan originally 
started here in Vincennes, then it moved—they sold it to Florida. When I 
got ready for the foreclosure part of it, you have nobody to talk to, and if 
you—it would‘ve been a local bank, you could‘ve went and talked to them 
about your circumstances, and whatever, and they would‘ve worked with 
you. This is somebody down there that probably doesn‘t really care one 
way or the other. 
  
I‘m not sure if I actually talked to them, or if I did everything through 
correspondence type thing. 
 
Helen thought she might be able to purchase her home at the sheriff‘s sale. The sheriff‘s 
sale represents the last point of intervention to save a home—it seems more likely a 
successful resolution would have occurred much earlier in the process than at a sheriff‘s 
auction, where the point is to extract the highest possible bid from the public. Not having 
a local person for Helen to personally connect with and speak to presented a significant 
geographical barrier. She needed that local contact to feel comfortable speaking with 
someone about her financial situation:  
I mean there‘s nobody to really help you. Like I said, if they would‘ve 
been local where you could‘ve went and talked to somebody, but when 
you‘re trying to deal with people that‘s thousands of miles away.  
 
 Sub-theme 3b: Service disruption through loan flipping.  
 Related to the issues of geographic distance is the sub-theme of service 
disconnection perpetuated by lenders through loan flipping. Loan flipping is a term to 
describe the lending practice of originating or holding a borrower‘s loan for a period of 
time then selling it off, typically bundled with other mortgage loans as an investment 
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instrument. Once the mortgage is bundled and sold with other loans, another financial 
institution begins acting as the mortgage servicer. Essentially, this practice removes the 
foundational social exchange between lender and borrower. The originating lender 
quickly sells the loan, pockets the profit, and distances themselves from the 
accountability aspects of the mortgage contract.  
 All of the participants experienced the relatively recent practice of loan flipping, 
except Linda. Linda‘s loan was originated by J.P. Morgan Chase, who also held the loan 
at the time of her foreclosure. A local branch of Regents Bank originated Helen‘s loan. 
When she went through foreclosure, Helen‘s loan was being serviced by Everhome 
Mortgage in Florida. Dorothy‘s loan was originated by Irwin Mortgage. At the time of 
her foreclosure, it was being serviced by J.P. Morgan Chase. Heather‘s refinanced 
mortgage was processed by a local mortgage company. She does not recall who held their 
mortgage at the time of the foreclosure. Heather explains that the loan was flipped several 
times so she was challenged to keep track. After the bankruptcy, it was flipped two 
additional times:  
It was moved quite a few times, the mortgage was…several times, yes. 
Sometimes we would just get a letter, just stating our company‘s been 
bought by this other company. It‘ll take effect. Nothing will change, 
basically affect six months from now, three months from now, whatever it 
was.  
 
Jessica‘s original home loan was financed through the financial arm of M/I homes. Two 
years later, when her home went into foreclosure, the mortgage was being serviced by US 
Bank.  
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 Similar to the geographic disconnection, Helen seemed to be the participant who 
had the strongest reaction to the service disconnection caused when a lender flipped a 
borrower‘s loan:  
The loan originally started here in Indiana, then it moved—they sold it to 
Florida. 
 
This is somebody down there that probably doesn‘t really care one way or 
the other. 
 
Then, too, with selling mortgages off, I just think it needs to be with the 
people that you dealt with.  I think it needs to stay there.  Of course, 
they‘ve gotta keep going, they‘ve gotta do what they‘re doing, and keep 
their doors open too, but it‘s really hard on people.  Cause you don‘t know 
that it‘s even gonna happen until you get the letter in the mail that it‘s 
already done. 
 
Helen thinks homeowners should be informed prior to the selling of their mortgage. 
Helen discusses this issue from the perspective of a consumer protection issue—a right to 
know before the mortgage, which represents a contractual obligation between lender and 
borrower, is flipped:  
It doesn‘t seem right to me. Because you‘ve entrusted yourself to them to 
start this process, and then it‘s like they sell you down the river to the 
highest bidder kind of thing. 
 
The flipping of a mortgage loan is a breech in the social exchange relationship between 
lender and borrower. Helen‘s metaphor of ―selling you down the river to the highest 
bidder‖ is an incredibly accurate representation of the breech in the lender-borrower 
relationship during this period of time. The practice of high-stakes trading and investment 
bundling during this time has been considered a sophisticated form of Wall Street 
gambling. To the borrower, the mortgage loan continued to represent a service 
relationship with the lender. To the lender, the mortgage loan was now an investment 
instrument, bundled and packaged with other loans, to extract the highest return.  
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 Sub-theme 3c: Ethical violations in lender underwriting standards.  
 Another disconnection in the social exchange relationship between lender and 
borrower occurred during the loan underwriting process. As many people experienced in 
the lead-up to the 2006 housing crash, lenders working with most of the participants 
ignored or manipulated underwriting guidelines to approve loans. Lax or fraudulent 
underwriting practices appear related to the practice of loan flipping. Since financial 
institutions held mortgages for a short period of time until they could bundle and sell 
them to investors, lenders no longer had an obligation, personal or financial, to ensure 
ethical underwriting standards were being maintained. This practice represents another 
significant disconnection in contractual and ethical obligations between lender and 
borrower.  
 In Helen case, it appears lax, rather than manipulated, underwriting standards 
were used:   
They know you‘re only making so much money, I mean they are wise 
enough to know about what approximately utilities and stuff is gonna run.  
They‘ve got to see that you‘re not gonna be able to do that.  You‘ve got to 
always add the unforeseen in there, some kind of medical emergency 
coming up, or having to buy another car, or whatever.  Which, I‘ve had all 
those things.  The vehicle things, and just about time you think you‘re 
doing okay, something happens to the car. 
 
Helen‘s experience underscores the need for underwriting standards to be revisited. The 
public expects banks to be honest with the people they are trying to finance and to tell 
them when they cannot afford a home. Helen explains that the banks know what people 
are making and understand how thin the margin is:  
I think that the guidelines need to be different.  If you‘re honest with the 
people you‘re trying to finance through, and you tell them—and they 
know exactly what you‘re making, cause they check all that stuff out.  
They‘ve got to see that you can‘t live that way.  That you‘re biting off 
159 
 
more than you can chew.  I think they need to turn you down, instead of 
letting you get in such a financial shape that you‘ve got all that over you, 
all that expense over you to try to deal with, when they knew from the 
beginning that you couldn‘t do that. 
 
Helen thinks the banks need to take their gatekeeping role seriously and turn people down 
instead of setting them up for financial failure. She believes they know from the 
beginning when people will not be able to sustain a mortgage.  
 Dorothy shares Helen‘s perspective that lenders should act appropriately as 
gatekeepers to safeguard consumers from accepting a mortgage they cannot sustain; 
however, unlike Helen, she does hold financial institutions accountable for their 
unwillingness to adhere to traditional underwriting standards. Notably, Dorothy‘s loan 
appears to contain significant predatory features:  
Unfortunately, the downside of it was—and I knew goin‘ into it, but I 
thought I would be able to handle it.  I was involved in a new construction, 
so I was getting a new home.  Pretty much the whole way the thing was 
handled was backward, underhanded.  I was put into a home that I was 
really not qualified for.  The frustrating part about it was that they told me 
initially that I was not qualified.  Then when I pressed for, ―Well, if I‘m 
not qualified for it, give me my money back.‖  Then all of a sudden 
everything was a go.   
 
After Dorothy had her "fortunate" car accident, she was able to send documentation to the 
bank demonstrating she no longer had a car payment. At this time, it seems Dorothy also 
begins questioning the process and her ability to qualify for a loan. Yet, at the moment 
Dorothy seems to accept she will not be approved for a loan, the bank qualified her and 
set up a closing date. 
Dorothy later requested a loan modification when she was struggling to make the 
payment. At this time, the lender denied her request. The rationale for the decision was 
that Dorothy did not make enough money to maintain the house. Dorothy was at least 
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earning the same amount, even slightly more, when the lender approved her for the loan 
she was now struggling with. Somewhere in this process, there seemingly had to be a 
departure from ethical underwriting standards:  
When I got into trouble financially and couldn‘t make the payments, then I 
applied for modification, which I was denied because they said I didn‘t 
make enough money to keep the house.  I didn‘t make enough money to 
maintain the house.  My question to them was, ―If I don‘t make enough 
money now, and I‘m making more money now than I did when I bought 
the house, how did I qualify for the mortgage?‖ 
 
Dorothy believes unethical underwriting standards and other nefarious lending behavior 
led to her foreclosure. She charges that someone, somewhere, manipulated figures to get 
her loan through underwriting. In fact, Dorothy was told one of the ways the lender 
manipulated her income was to include her retirement. The lender included Dorothy's 
retirement savings as if she had access to that money at the time she was approved for the 
loan. Someone in the financial institution erroneously and unethically counted her 
retirement savings as income:  
Underwriting standards or the whole process just was not right.  It was not 
done above board.  Had they followed through procedures or the 
standards, then it never would have happened.  Someone somewhere was 
able to manipulate the figures to get it through underwriting. 
 
Part of what I was told was that they used my retirement as income. That‘s 
pretty much what HUD told me. It‘s not income.  It‘s not income.  Even 
though I have this—and what they were lookin‘ at was my annuity 
savings.  Even though I had this amount of money over here, I can‘t touch 
it until—when I either retire or I leave the company.  Then I can pull it 
out, but it‘s not anything I have access to now.  They knew this.  They 
knew this.   
 
Like Dorothy, Heather was put in a precarious financial situation with her home 
due to unethical underwriting procedures. As previously discussed, when the Horton‘s 
decided to refinance their mortgage to consolidate unsecured debt, the lender hired an 
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appraiser to determine the value of the home. Adhering to standard banking practices, the 
amount of the refinanced loan would be determined on the home value. Heather 
confirmed that she considered the appraisal to be double the true value of the home. The 
mortgage company processed a loan for the family based on this inflated number. 
Heather identifies this pivotal event as the start of their struggles to maintain the 
mortgage and other housing-related expenses. 
 Hindsight being 20/20, Jessica would have told herself not to buy the house, and 
to get something more affordable. She remembers considering two different housing 
configurations--a two-story and a ranch. Both homes were constructed to include three 
bedrooms. Jessica remembers how she felt rushed in the purchase process:  
I would have told myself not to buy that house, or to get something that is 
cheaper so that the mortgage would be less cause we had looked at two 
different style houses.  This one's a two story and then there was one that 
was a ranch.  They were both three bedroom.  I felt like it was just very 
rushed.   
 
The process was just very rushed. Had we got the ranch, our mortgage 
would be $150 cheaper and I wouldn't have to go upstairs.   
 
Jessica feels she was taken advantage of by her lender. When looking at her income-to-
debt ratio, Jessica now feels it is obvious she could not sustain the mortgage. She was 
unethically advised by the lender to enroll for a class, which would trigger a deferment on 
her student loans and allow her to artificially and temporarily meet underwriting 
standards. When Jessica acted on this advice, her loan was approved:  
I feel like when you look at my credit cause whenever I was—because of 
my student loans, my income-to-debt ratio was high.  The only way I 
could get that house was to sign up for a class to put my student loans in 
deferral.  That's what the advice of—that I got to do that so that way, my 
loan was approved. 
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To sign up for a class so that it would put my student loans in deferment 
so that it would not be counted against my income-to debt-ratio because 
my student loan debt was so high.  Looking back thinking they—I feel like 
they told me to do that so that they could just get the sale done.  I had 
good credit.  I had a high income (to-debt-ratio) because of my student 
loans.   
 
Although Jessica thinks the lenders do not technically have to take any responsibility for 
her situation, she does think they take advantage of people who are naïve to the home-
buying process. She thinks they could have been raising concerns about her situation but, 
instead, they were thinking of how to maximize their position. The focus on maximizing 
financial gain resulted in manipulating standard underwriting. I noted to Jessica that she 
appeared to take responsibility for her mortgage situation and I asked her if she thought 
the lender shared any accountability in the underwriting process:  
Technically none, being an adult making my own decisions.  At the same 
time, I feel like they were taking advantage of someone who was naive to 
the process.  I feel like they could have been red flagging, and no this is 
probably not a—looking at the best interest for the person and not 
necessarily their business.  Technically, that's not their job.   
 
Sub-theme 3d: Relationship break from lender as trusted advisor. 
Until relatively recently, financial institutions enjoyed a favorable status as a 
trusted advisor for borrowers. A mutually beneficial relationship existed in which a social 
exchange of a mortgage loan and mortgage payments enhanced both the lender and 
borrower. Once mortgages began being used primarily as investment instruments and 
lenders were no longer located in the same community as borrowers, features of the 
trusted advisor relationship disappeared. Linda sums up her thoughts concerning the 
relationship disconnection she experienced with her lender, ―The bank was the bank. 
There was no human side to it.‖ Linda is the only participant whose loan was not 
flipped—her loan originated with J.P. Morgan Chase and was still held by them at the 
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time or her foreclosure. In fact, Linda‘s other two prior mortgages were also held by 
Chase. Despite her long-term and once positive relationship with the bank, they were 
unresponsive to her. Linda now holds a very negative perception of her bank. When 
dealing with her terminal diagnosis, she had consistently encountered a lack of empathy, 
connection, and understanding of her situation. Linda was attempting to navigate health 
challenges while still trying to work out a solution with the bank:  
It made me angry because I realized I had just gone through seven straight 
weeks of radiation—five days a week for seven weeks, couple of it was 
chemo. It was at least two to three days a week plus I had some internal 
radiation therapy. I wasn‘t like I am today or like you are today where you 
can say, ―Oh, let‘s get in the car and just‖…I mean, I was having to 
schedule all of this stuff around health issues. At the same time trying to 
deal with these—I can even remember using the term, assholes. Just the 
simple fact that I could not get a company to have anyone who had people 
working for them, employees, to respond to simple requests. Simple 
requests.  
 
I wasn‘t asking them for a complicated, ―Oh, please consider this 
extraordinary circumstance.‖ I was bringing them a solution. They didn‘t 
even know it. I mean, they didn‘t recognize it. If they did, they didn‘t care. 
 
Through their lack of response and inaction, Linda‘s relationship with her financial 
institution was fractured. There was nothing in their behavior to demonstrate that they 
understood or cared about her situation. Further, they appeared either unaware or 
disinterested in the deal she had attempted to work-out with them to prevent a 
foreclosure.  
 Yet, the bank began contacting Linda after her home went into foreclosure and 
she had discharged her debt through bankruptcy. This late response was what frustrated 
Linda the most. After attempting to work-out a solution for many months prior to her 
foreclosure, and now that her home was in foreclosure, the bank began contacting her.  It 
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does appear this late response may have been prompted by government programs being 
implemented after the Great Recession:  
I think the thing that frustrated me most was the fact that once they—I determined 
that the bank was not gonna be working with me and that I was going to 
have to take a bankruptcy, put the house in foreclosure.  They didn‘t 
respond until about three months later, after I had filed for bankruptcy.  I 
started—that‘s when the program started kicking in that they were 
supposed to work with people—so I get all these form letters.  We‘d like 
to work with you.  Well, I was already in the bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
It was too late.  Even after the bankruptcy had cleared in—I think this 
March 2009, I was getting letters that the bank is indicating that you are 
not showing insurance coverage on this home.  You are required to do 
that.  I‘m thinking, ―Folks, I turned those keys over to you in December.  I 
gave you all this information.  This property is yours. Don‘t tell me I‘ve 
got to do insurance coverage on this house.  The bankruptcy is over. 
 
At every step of the process, the lender‘s response was inadequate and late. For several 
months, the institution‘s representatives ignored Linda‘s compromised health status and 
attempts to find a mutually agreeable alternative to foreclosure. They acted in ways that 
increased her stress-levels and possibly worsened her health status. They responded after 
the home was in foreclosure and the asset had been discharged back to their possession. 
Still then, when Linda reached out to them to explore what options they were presenting, 
she learned there was no substance to the form letters.  
Linda had some thoughts about what I might find through this study:  
I am just real eager to see how many like scenarios you get in talking with 
different individuals. How comparable are these experiences, and I think 
what we‘ll probably find is there‘s one common denominator, because of 
policy, (the financial institution) doesn‘t care about the individual, and 
until policy changes the institution—by policy, I mean some regulations.  
 
Bottom-line, Linda now holds the perception that, due to the current regulatory 
environment, financial institutions no longer care about the individuals with whom they 
do business. The idea that a lender is a trusted advisor is now a relic of the past for Linda.  
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 Like Linda, Dorothy no longer has any trust in lenders or financial institutions. 
Dorothy says she was very vocal about her situation with the foreclosure and trying to 
find a workable solution. She talked to anyone who would listen. She also noted it was 
not just she who found herself taken advantage of by unscrupulous lenders. There were a 
group of disaffected homeowners who came together from three Crossman communities 
who were going through the same situation. Home loans were approved and, within a 
matter of months, people were no longer able to sustain their payments. At the time 
Dorothy went through her foreclosure, at least 33% of homeowners in her community 
were experiencing the same fate:  
It wasn‘t just me.  It was a group of us because there were three different 
communities that Crossman had built where it was the same thing.  They 
got the people in there and within a matter of months or years, people 
were losin‘ their homes.  During the time that I was goin‘ through my 
foreclosure, I drove through my community and there were 33 (out of 100) 
homes. 
 
The homeowners in Dorothy‘s community were reaching out to their lenders hoping to 
secure some type of loan modification so that they could remain in the home they were 
just approved to build only a few months earlier:  
That was just it.  I kept askin‘ him to just lower the payment.  Do a 
modification where you put the back payments on the end or somethin‘ 
cause by then, it would have gone—the payments would have gone down 
enough where I could manage it, but they just out and out refused.  
 
There was no willingness on the part of the lender to work with Dorothy. Dorothy felt 
dismissed by the lender at this point. She did not receive an adequate response explaining 
why she originally qualified for the loan but was not being considered for a modification. 
Even with demonstrating access to more household income than she had when approved 
166 
 
for the original loan, the mortgage servicer refused to re-negotiate the loan terms so that 
Dorothy could remain in her home and prevent the foreclosure.  
 Unlike Linda and Dorothy, Jessica had early and frequent contact with one lender 
representative. This person was specifically assigned to assist borrowers in filing requests 
for loan modifications. Yet, even with the assigned point-person and consistent contact, 
Jessica was still unable to navigate a loan modification with her lender. Actually, it 
appears Jessica‘s efforts were at best, frustratingly impeded, and, at worst, maliciously 
stalled:  
It was just frustrating because it'd be like I would fill out, say, the budget 
form, fill it out one way, filling it out, like they want what it is that 
particular month.  Then when they‘re dragging it out for six weeks, now 
it's outdated.  Now I have to resend that.  I would fill it out and then it's 
like, ―Oh, you‘re not supposed to put—‖  I can‘t even remember.  ―You‘re 
not supposed to put that number.  You‘re supposed to put—‖  I think I put 
something in the wrong spot, or I split up the mortgage with the taxes and 
everything.  I put the mortgage—because mine had escrow.  Some of that 
stuff I didn‘t really know necessarily.  I think one time I split it up and that 
was wrong, so then I combine it, and then that was wrong.  It‘s like things 
like that was like, ―Now first it was right, now it‘s wrong, now which one 
is it so I—cause I‘m trying to fill it out exactly the way you‘re telling me 
to fill it out.‖ 
 
I asked Jessica if anyone from her lending institution ever offered to sit down with her 
and walk her through the correct way to fill out the forms—or if they even offered to 
schedule a phone conference to assist her with the forms. Jessica shared that the lender 
never offered to do either. Although assigned a dedicated contact person, the mortgage 
representative did not behave in any manner or take any meaningful action that resulted 
in reflecting the role of a trusted advisor.  
 Bottom-line, in contrast to the rushed process Jessica experienced at the time of 
home purchase, after almost eight months of attempting to seek a loan modification, 
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Jessica‘s forms were never processed. She never reached the point of even learning what 
type of modification she might qualify for:  
That was like I never really got the information on—cuz I guess they had 
several programs to offer.  Once they got all your information in the 
system, they could look and see what they could offer.  It could be 
anything from lowering the interest rate, lowering the payment, 
postponing the payment, even things like adding those payments to the 
end of the mortgage.  It could be any—but they had to get all the 
information in the system and then after you‘re approved, then they can 
tell you what they can offer.  They never told me what I (qualified for)… 
 
In all participant accounts, the service relationship and trusted advisor role of 
financial institutions was fundamentally non-existent.  
 Sub-theme 3e: Lack of accountability for shared responsibilities.  
In a social exchange, each party benefits and holds responsibility in the 
relationship. The goal of an effective social exchange is a mutually beneficial 
relationship; however, there can be unevenness in the level of benefits and 
responsibilities. Yet, in the lender-borrower relationship described by the participants, 
there is evidence of a heightened sense of responsibility among the borrowers and a 
minimal level of accountability on the part of the lender.  
 Helen did not understand why the lender who approved her for a mortgage would 
not put in any effort to help her remain in her home. She identified some ways that she 
may be able to stay in the home, continue to pay the mortgage, and prevent her home 
from going into foreclosure. It seems difficult for her to understand why the lender did 
not work harder to maintain the lending relationship:  
You had a person there that you dealt with, and they helped you get the 
loan to begin with. You would think that then they would be still 
concerned about you being able to keep that loan, and keep the payments 
coming. Whether that be maybe trying to refinance and get it at a lower 
rate. Although the rate I had it was, probably, at that period of time, just 
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probably as low as maybe it would‘ve gone. Maybe they could‘ve done 
something to help work with you to try to keep it going.  
 
For the first time, Helen brings up accountability and gatekeeping functions of 
financial institutions. Her demeanor and tone shift and, as much as seems possible for 
her, she seems angry. She feels that banks should, frankly, know better and prevent 
people from failing at homeownership when they know people do not meet standard 
underwriting criteria. She speaks of homes sitting empty and the disconnection from 
people who need shelter in this country:  
Like I say, I think I lay a lot of blame on the financial institution that let 
you get yourself into such a shape.  Where it‘s really kinda setting you up 
for failure.  Like I said, I just saw so many places, especially places that 
had modular homes on them, with the grass grown up in the yard, and 
stuff, and they‘re empty.  They‘re not that old, but you know it‘s been 
sitting empty for a while.  That home is wasted, when somebody could use 
a home. 
 
As is common in my discussion with Helen, she sometimes appears to contradict 
or back-off earlier statements. At first, she clearly identified that banks should take blame 
for foreclosures, she now takes a couple of steps back and claims she is not trying to 
blame them:   
I guess I‘m trying to lay—I‘m not laying blame on them, cause they didn‘t 
force me to sign that paper.  You want it.  It‘s what you want, or what you 
think you want at the time, but I think there should be some accountability 
there someplace. 
 
Yet, underscoring Helen‘s point is the acknowledgement that a shared 
accountability should exist between homebuyer, lender and/or mortgage servicer.  
Again, as opposed to Helen, Dorothy pulls no punches when discussing 
how she feels lenders failed in their shared responsibility. In the predatory 
arrangement initiated by her originating lender, Dorothy‘s payments increased 
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significantly from the first year of homeownership to the second. She was not 
informed or prepared to deal with the increased payment and knew immediately 
that she was in financial trouble. It took Dorothy one and a half paychecks each 
month to cover her increased mortgage. Dorothy worked very hard to maintain 
her mortgage and to also reach a mutual agreement with her lender to prevent 
foreclosure. Although Dorothy was ultimately not successful in saving her home 
and holding her lender accountable, she does see some ways in which lenders are 
beginning to share responsibility for the foreclosure crisis:  
Well, what they eventually did do.  The people that were writing these 
bogus loans and inflated loans and whatever, they called them on the 
carpet and made them responsible like Wells Fargo who just had to settle.  
This was 2008.  Four years after.  [Pause]  I think once it became such a 
widespread problem and people began to talk about it.  Because usually 
when you go through a foreclosure or somethin‘ like that, it‘s not 
somethin‘ you want everybody to know about.  Well, I wanted everybody 
to know.  I did TV interviews.  I did newspaper interviews.  I did whatever 
I could to say, ―Hey, this is goin‘ on.  This is not right.‖  I was also 
instrumental in getting the predatory lending law enacted here.   
 
Dorothy remains committed to empowering home buyers and holding lenders  
 
responsible.  
 
 Like the other participants, Heather demonstrated a heightened sense of 
responsibility in trying to make ends meet and maintain her mortgage. The Horton‘s 
demonstrated significant perseverance in trying to save their home:  
Because we kept on thinking, ―Okay, we‘re gonna get through this.  We‘re 
gonna pay these bills.  Whatever we have to do.‖  We‘re listening to 
finance, Dave Ramsey.  Whatever his advice is, we‘re trying to follow 
that.  It‘s not working.  There‘s too much month left, and not enough 
money.  We just kept on wanting to keep that house.  We have to keep the 
house.  We have to keep the house.  Things kept breaking still. 
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They were able to stave off the foreclosure a few years after the refinance tightened their 
budget and put them in an upside-down mortgage. Yet, eventually, the cost of home 
repairs and the inability to sell the home for an amount under the mortgage pay-off was 
too much for them to do.  
 Similar to other participants, their lender began contacting them with alternatives 
to foreclosure after the family had left the home and started the bankruptcy process:  
Whoever had the loan at the very last—cause it was done a few times—
they kept sending us stuff, even after the bankruptcy, even after we had 
filed.  Not harassing stuff, but letting us know, ―Hey, we understand your 
situation.  We‘re willing to work with you.‖  It was a little bit appealing at 
first, but we‘re like, ―We‘re in this apartment now.  We‘ve signed a year 
lease.‖  There was nothing that we could do. 
 
Then, that company got bought out just recently.  We got something from 
them, saying, ―Hey, we have your mortgage now.‖  It was almost like—
it‘s like a lack of communication.  I don't know.  We did contact our 
lawyer.  He said, ―Just ignore 'em.  I will contact them.‖  We scanned 
them and sent an email with what we had.  He said just to ignore it and he 
would take care of it.   
 
Communication and accountability on the part of the lending institutions always seemed 
to appear late and be inadequate. In some ways, it was just another bank-related 
frustration that the families had to deal with.  
 The Horton‘s present an interesting case in accountability of lessons learned and 
insight gained from the foreclosure and bankruptcy process that seemed to elude the 
financial sector. The amount of personal responsibility accepted by the family as 
juxtaposed against the lack of shared accountability on the part of the financial institution 
is notable. Heather responded with deep sincerity and earnestness when asked how her 
life would be different without the foreclosure:  
I think we would still be in debt.  I think we would still be fumbling with 
our money.  I know we would not be debt-free at all.  I don't know—I 
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don‘t think we would even be close.  I still think it would be the same 
wheel, just trying to make ends meet, and getting nowhere, really.  I do 
believe that we‘ve learned so much.  We know, now, what we did wrong.  
Not doing the refinancing.  That was silly.   
 
Without banks being held equally accountable or responsible, at least through 
Jessica‘s experience, we see that they continue to engage in the same practices that 
resulted in a global economic meltdown. After spending roughly eight months and 
submitting the required 10-page packet for mortgage relief six times, the emotional and 
financial desperation due to her lender‘s lack of response and shared responsibility was 
beginning to take its toll. Jessica felt like crying when she received the foreclosure filing 
notice from her lender. She was still hoping to find a solution but felt like no one was 
willing to work with her. Jessica projects desperation as she reflects on this experience. 
At that time, she was still pleading, wanting someone to hear that she was trying, that she 
tried to be proactive:  
I felt like crying.  [Laughs]  I felt sad, and I just felt—I almost felt—and I 
was still with the whole situation trying to work it out and felt like nobody 
was wanting to work with me.  I was trying.  I knew I had to try, so it‘s not 
like I was waiting till I was six months behind.  I already knew.  [Laughs] 
  
Theme 4: Foreclosure represents a disconnection between a homebuyer and 
the benefits of homeownership. 
Without question, the dominant paradigm about homeownership is positive in the 
United States. Both symbolically and materially, homeownership is associated with 
beneficial characteristics such as being part of the American Dream, wealth and asset 
accumulation, freedom, ownership, stability and connection. It is these attributes that 
often drive the desire for homeownership. Yet, if these are the benefits of homeownership 
then, by logical extension, foreclosure is the disconnection from these characteristics. 
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Certainly, participants described both emotional and material loss. Further, in some ways, 
it appears the participants never truly had a grasp on the perceived benefits of 
homeownership in the first place. In this section, sub-themes of disconnection of shelter, 
gathering place, freedom, and ownership and asset creation are articulated as they were 
experienced by participants.  
Sub-theme 4a: Disconnection from shelter.  
In its most fundamental sense and purpose, homeownership provides shelter. 
When the participants were facing foreclosure, their concerns turned to where they would 
live, in what conditions would they live, and would their damaged credit impact their 
ability to secure alternative shelter. In addition, the concepts of security and stability were 
closely connected to the idea of shelter. For example, when Linda was asked how 
homeownership is different from foreclosure, her response was immediate and clear:  
Oh, when you have a home in foreclosure, you have no sense of 
security…always before when I rented, I had a full-time job and the 
confidence that if I wanted to buy a home I could. When you‘re in 
foreclosure, you‘re not sure where you‘re gonna live because all of a 
sudden, if you‘re in foreclosure, you probably got a bankruptcy. Will you 
even be able to rent a place? If so, what kind of place?  It totally changes 
your perspective on how secure you are and how in control of your own 
life you are.  
 
Helen also spoke of her concern about securing shelter after the foreclosure. She had 
always envisioned what her retirement would look like and the stability of housing was 
central to this image:  
I think what is in your mind from the beginning is I‘m gonna have a place 
when I get older. I retire, I‘m gonna have a place that‘s paid for, and I‘m 
not gonna have to worry about that in my old age. A place where the kids 
can come back with grandkids and that kind of thing. It changes.  
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Foreclosure disconnected Helen not only from the future she had planned for herself but 
also for her children and grandchildren. Considering Helen had been isolated from her 
family most of her married life, the loss of this particular future was certainly deeply felt 
by Helen.  
 Helen also had experienced prior challenges in securing affordable shelter before 
she purchased the home that went into foreclosure. It was very difficult for her to find 
housing that was safe, affordable and of quality. These concerns were likely fresh in 
Helen‘s mind as she, once again, found she was searching for shelter:  
You don‘t know what—you‘re trying to find a place that you can afford.  
You don‘t know where to go.  Like I told you earlier with this community, 
there‘s no place over here that—I don‘t know, the place I got right now, 
my rent is $375.00 a month.  Which is reasonable, but she‘s a lady that 
goes to the church where I go.  That‘s probably the reason the rent is what 
it is.  Otherwise, we looked at a lot of other places.  I looked at a lot of 
other places and you‘re talking at least $500.00, usually, a month. 
 
The uncertainty and instability are apparent in Helen‘s consideration. Right now, she is 
relying on the kindness of one of her fellow church members, who is providing a rental 
for $375/month. The thought of having to pay $500/month for rent raises a lot of 
concerns for Helen.  She perceives this amount to be unaffordable to her.  
Despite the seeming stability with her current shelter, Helen admits the idea of 
homelessness is not a far-fetched thought:  
Well, it‘s (homelessness) a definite possibility, even today.  What if the 
place where I‘m renting, they decide that they‘re gonna do something else 
with that property, or whatever?  You don‘t have—you look in the paper, 
because I‘ve been looking for your kids.  You see all this—the cost that‘s 
there.  You just, like I said, with the retirement age coming up, I think 
that‘s a lot of it.  Because it‘s just a big expense. 
 
At age 65, Helen is still facing significant uncertainty and instability not only with 
maintaining her shelter but also employment and income.  
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 Dorothy also experienced significant concerns about shelter, security, and 
stability following her foreclosure. Between her financial and emotional stress, Dorothy 
eventually reached out to one of her daughters for help:  
I moved into an apartment and I stayed there about six months.  I just, I 
couldn‘t pull it together because I had filed for Chapter 13.  They were 
takin‘ about $400.00 a month from me to pay off the other bills and 
everything, which left me even less to try and live off of.  I was strugglin‘.  
I was just falling apart.  At that point, I knew I was falling apart.  I went to 
my oldest daughter and I asked to move in with her.  I moved in with her 
and stayed with her for a year and a half.  Then I moved into her—I 
moved into the apartment that I‘m in now.  I've been there for almost eight 
years now.   
 
Like Helen and Dorothy, Jessica held intense feelings about shelter, stability, and 
security. The Jones moved out in November 2012, when the mortgage servicer sent a 
foreclosure filing notice. Jessica admits she could have stayed longer but was concerned 
about her credit impacting her ability to secure rental housing. She was advised by an 
attorney to consider moving sooner rather than later. Having three children to consider, 
Jessica took the advice seriously. As much as she could, she took control over the 
situation and moved on her terms rather than waiting to be locked out of her own home:  
We ended up moving out in November because they sent me a foreclosure 
notice that they were filing.  I know I could've stayed longer, but I had 
spoke with a lawyer and she just kind of advised me, ―Right now, it hasn‘t 
hit your credit.  The foreclosure itself hasn‘t hit your credit.  You need to 
be out before that hits, or you‘re gonna have a hard time finding 
somewhere to live.‖  Me having three kids, I‘m thinking I just wanna—I 
don‘t wanna have that stress.  I don‘t wanna come home and find my 
house locked when all my kids stuff is inside.  I'd just rather just go now.  
We moved out in November into where we‘re at now.  We moved back 
into an apartment. 
 
Jessica felt the advice she was receiving from her attorney was helpful. She was 
experiencing significant uncertainty in the face of unknown shelter:  
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Yeah.  I mean, it helped with my ease of mind, too, because just that 
uncertainty is—that‘s one of the hardest things I think to deal with was the 
uncertainty of not knowing when it was gonna happen or when I‘d have to 
get out and how long I'd have.  Just with three kids, it‘s like I don‘t wanna 
end up in a rough apartment just because I had to take whatever I could 
get as fast as I could get it. 
 
Jessica‘s foreclosure unearthed a history of housing insecurity from her youth when she 
was forced to consider where she would move her children due to the impending 
foreclosure. She experienced instability and uncertainty related to shelter when she was 
growing up:  
My concerns were one of the main reasons why we got the house in the 
first place was just to have that stability, too, for the kids so they‘re not 
moving around all over.  Both my husband and I, when we were kids, we 
moved around a lot.  [Laughs]  Both of our families were all over the 
place.  It was just like, having that consistency for them as well as being in 
a safe neighborhood cuz we both lived in apartments.  Excuse me.  Some 
are good, some are pretty rough.  It was just trying to think about them and 
what‘s gonna be good for them cause we—we don‘t like our apartment 
we‘re in now, we don‘t wanna stay.  It‘s not a bad neighborhood.  I 
haven‘t had any problems there, but it‘s a very old building.  Ever since 
we moved in, my baby‘s been sick.   
 
Yeah, the building‘s so old, so it‘s like, is there mold in the walls that I 
don‘t know about or something?  It seems like someone‘s always sick and 
we…I don‘t get sick very often, and he‘s been sick pretty much the whole 
time we‘ve been living there.   
 
At the root of Jessica‘s concerns about shelter are her children:  
 
If it was just me by myself, I probably wouldn't care so much.  It's the fact 
that I have kids to think about.  I don't want them to not have the things 
that they need.  I don't want to have to—I don't want them to be moving 
from—having to live with family members or anything like that because I 
can't pay the rent.  Just things like that. 
 
Jessica worries about her children not having the things they need, having to move from 
place to place, and having to live with family members. She is concerned about getting 
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behind again and having a second bankruptcy. Worries about obtaining shelter, stability 
and certainty linger for Jessica.  
 Sub-theme 4b: Disconnection from gathering place. 
 Most participants identified their home as more than just a physical structure but 
also a significant gathering place to celebrate holidays, birthdays, and other important life 
events. Linda and Heather appeared to enjoy this benefit of homeownership the most—
equally, both felt a deep, emotional loss when they were disconnected from their 
gathering place due to foreclosure.  
 Part of the reason Heather had such a difficult time walking away was due to the 
emotional connections and memories she associated with the house. In particular, she 
connected these significant life memories to the gathering place her home provided for 
family and friends, during both happy and challenging times:  
I would think about Christmases, and the birthday parties that we had, and 
friends coming over and laughing, all the stupid silly things we did, and 
family being over there, family and friends who‘ve passed away.  
Thinking of things that we did there.  All those memories would just come 
back.  I know those memories are still—they're all in my mind.  They‘re 
not in that house.  When I would think of the house, I would think of all 
those things.  It would always come back to that. 
 
Like Heather, Linda had a strong emotional connection to her house as a 
gathering place. This function even became an integral part of her personal identity:   
Yeah. I was very fortunate, again, because of my circumstances. I can 
remember every Christmas Eve having 40, 50 people over for a dinner. 
Most of ‗em were folks from other countries or didn‘t have family here, 
and we just had a huge amount of fun. Same thing in the summer. We‘d 
have big picnics out in the side yard…and we just had—we called ‗em 
Christmas parties, but they—and we had Hindu and Sikh and Muslim and 
everything. It was because I had this home that, number one, I liked, and it 
was big enough, and we could have a huge international family—and then 
we‘d follow-up in the summer, and it was always, ―We‘ll go to Linda‘s 
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place.‖ It (home) was a source of fun, of enjoyment. It wasn‘t just a 
domicile for a place to live. It was part of the living.   
Yeah, I had also some people say, ―Oh, anytime anyone wanted to get 
together, well, let‘s do it at Linda‘s,‖ because they all liked the house. It 
was conducive to large groups.  
 
The joy Linda felt in hosting large celebrations with her diverse group of friends was 
apparent. Clearly, one of the benefits she received from homeownership was the ability to 
host these large and fun gatherings. ―Linda‘s place‖ ―was part of the living.‖ Foreclosure 
disconnected Linda from the community she loved.  
 On another joyous occasion at ―Linda‘s place,‖ her nephew was married. It 
seemed very difficult for Linda to be physically disconnected from the house that held so 
many special memories not only for her but also dear family members and friends:  
My nephew, when he got married, he says, ―We‘re just gonna have a small 
wedding. We‘re only gonna have about 50 people. Can we have it at the 
house? His bride came down the big stairwell into the living room, and 
they stood in front of the fireplace and had their wedding. It was fun.  
 
Lots of memories. Then, all of a sudden, within the course of a year, I am 
told—I‘m probably gonna die. I no longer have a job because I can‘t do 
it—and lose a home. The person I was no longer existed. It‘s tough.  
 
Linda communicates a deep sense of loss—all of sudden, one‘s life changes, one is 
separated from the gathering place that holds so many special memories and from the 
people one holds dear.   
 Sub-theme 4c: Disconnection from freedom and ownership. 
 The participants discussed an initial connection and then disconnection related to 
the perceived freedoms of ownership that are associated with the American Dream of 
homeownership. Without exception, all of the women spoke of the creative freedom that 
accompanied ownership of one‘s house. They viewed ownership as freedom through 
being able to paint the house as they wanted, remodel as they wanted, or experience 
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privacy. Yet, it appeared these elements of freedom and ownership were mostly 
perceptions and not grounded in reality. As participants began to explore their experience 
with homeownership and foreclosure, a pattern emerged in which most participants 
discussed being restricted by their financial challenges. Most of the participants 
experienced tight financial situations that left little margin to tend to cosmetic 
improvements or remodeling of the home.  
 Linda appeared to be the only homeowner who experienced enough financial 
stability and wealth to enjoy the creative freedom that may accompany homeownership. 
With great joy, she spoke of the aspects she enjoyed most about homeownership, ―Oh, 
having the old homes in the city and being able to knock down walls and refurbish and 
see all of the wonderful craftsmanship. It gave you a sense of pride and dignity.‖ 
Although the other participants envisioned this version of homeownership, their deeper 
and persistent financial struggles prevented them from fully realizing these perceived 
benefits of owning one‘s home. For example, Heather‘s meaning-making experience of 
foreclosure probably demonstrated the most significant redefinition of homeownership as 
freedom and ownership to viewing it as ―being stuck‖ and feeling like a prisoner:  
To feeling like you‘re a prisoner, almost. You‘re no longer free because 
you don‘t have the ability to sell it, because you can‘t sell it in the 
condition it is in.  
 
The reality of homeownership for Heather proved to be a significant departure from 
anything that resembled freedom or ownership. The imagery of prison denotes the 
complete opposite. Yet, in the beginning of her homeownership experience, Heather 
envisioned something much different:  
Just the fact that I could have my own design, my own—I could be 
creative in the house, if I wanted to.  I could paint it.  I could change the 
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carpet, if I wanted.  Hanging things on the wall, remodel it, if I wanted.  I 
could make a kitchen into a bedroom, if I want—just having that freedom 
to do that, and to not have someone over you, saying no.  I think it was 
freedom, to get to—and you thought, ―I‘m growing up.  I have my own 
place now.‖   
 
Heather embraced the idea of homeownership as freedom. Owning something meant you 
could do whatever you wanted to without having approval from someone else. She had 
dreams of remodeling and other creative projects. Then, other aspects of homeownership 
appeared:  
When things broke, we had to fix them.  We quickly found out that we 
didn‘t know a lot on how to fix things.  I promise you, everything that 
needs fixed—needed fixed in our house was at least $1,000.00.   
 
Yeah, so we had to—you know, and you wanted to trust someone.  You 
had to find somebody, make the call—because it was under—we had 
$1,000.00 deductible on our home, our insurance, because the payment 
down.  You‘d have to try and find somebody that was cheap, but good. 
 
The next day, you‘d be spending—you know, so things like that.  It was 
very stressful.   
 
As notes previously, the idyllic vision of homeownership Heather had in the beginning 
was quickly replaced with multiple home repair projects and significant home 
maintenance costs. Even though it was very difficult for Heather to lose her home, it was 
also a source of stress and endless repairs. The notions of freedom and ownership went 
out the window—or maybe through the holes in the roof caused by the relentless storms. 
The home that once represented freedom and ownership had turned into a prison. 
Heather and her family now live in an apartment. Once considered to be for 
―losers,‖ the Horton‘s have redefined what freedom means—and it does not include a 30-
year mortgage:  
Well, we live in an apartment now, and we absolutely love it.  
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I think, at first, our parents are telling us, my husband‘s parents are telling 
us, ―This is what you want.‖  I think that‘s what I thought.  Okay, this is 
freedom to do whatever I want—until all of these things start happening to 
the house.  It‘s taking a little less freedom because I have to worry about 
things that are happening to the home.  I don't know how much they‘re 
gonna be.  I know we can‘t fix it, whether electric, plumbing, whatever.  
We‘re gonna hafta call or talk to somebody else to fix it.   
 
It‘s taken a long time, still, for me to make this feel like home, but it 
finally does feel like that.   
 
Heather worries less in her rental than she did in the house. Heather reflects on the value 
they once placed on homeownership and how that perspective has evolved.  
 Although Heather has dramatically redefined the meanings she associates with 
homeownership, rental, freedom and ownership, she notes there are still drawbacks to 
renting; however, she also recognizes her old perceptions about rental living were based 
in the same distorted reality as her previous ideas about homeownership:  
It was just—that was nice, to be able to—and we have new windows 
there.  The carpet was new.  They make sure they changed—and the paint 
was new.  Of course, over time, it‘s gotten little dings and stuff, but it 
finally feels—all those smells are there, still.  We‘ve made memories there 
already.  Our dog and our cat are there.  My daughter did move out 
[laughter], so she‘s not there.  Yeah, I think—it sounds so cheesy, but 
home is where the heart is kinda thing.  It doesn‘t matter, as long as I have 
my husband, my family.  We‘ve already made tons of memories there. 
 
Looking back now, Heather affirms her family would not have bought a house. She does 
not think they understood what they were getting into. Further, all of those dreams they 
had tied up in homeownership—of creative projects and remodeling—never happened:  
We would not have bought a house.  We know that now.  We definitely 
weren‘t—I don‘t wanna say mature enough.  We didn‘t know what we 
were getting into.  We really didn‘t.  It was nice to paint a room whatever I 
wanted, and to do—but, all these things I wanted to do to the home, I 
didn‘t.  I didn‘t remodel it.  Yeah, I painted and we changed carpet, but all 
these remodeling things, I didn‘t do any of that.   
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 Although not as dramatic of a shift, Helen went on a similar redefining journey of 
her meaning-making experience about homeownership and foreclosure. Like Heather, 
Helen was excited to think about the creative projects and personal touches she would 
add to her home. She also initially embraced the concept of homeownership as freedom 
and ownership:  
Well, it starts out a little exciting, because you‘ve got your own place, you 
can fix it up the way you want to, as long as the money holds out.  
 
Helen does acknowledge there are limitations to freedom and ownership—one can ―fix it 
up the way you want to, as long as the money holds out.‖ Unfortunately for Helen, the 
money not only did not hold out but it was also short a good amount of the time. Helen 
acknowledges having to rely on food pantries and occasionally getting assistance from 
the Township Trustee.  
 In addition, since Helen was the primary breadwinner and responsible for most 
household duties, she was disconnected from the freedom of leisure and rest:  
Sometimes it was just the upkeep of trying to—we had a pretty big sized 
yard, going home and trying to push the mower and mow, after you‘ve 
worked all day. Come home to that, and not having the money that you 
needed to do the little things that you would‘ve liked to‘ve done, or 
purchased, or whatever. It was pretty well, you have enough to make the 
payment, to buy a few groceries. You make just maybe $100.00 too much 
to get any kind of assistance. It‘s just kinda hard.  
 
It took me about I‘d say an hour and a half to mow it. He had allergies, so 
he couldn‘t mow the grass. The kids didn‘t always—they were, at the end, 
they were old enough to help, but most of the time they didn‘t a whole lot.  
 
Contrary to living a life of freedom where she was in control, Helen admits, ―It was 
stressful all the time.‖ In fact, some might be surprised to learn that although the 
foreclosure caused Helen significant worry and concern, it also brought her some 
measure of relief:  
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Kind of a blessing in disguise. Well, it was kinda nice there for a while, 
cause I wasn‘t making any payments.  I was living there rent-free except 
for utilities.  That was nice, but it doesn‘t last.   
 
There exists a level of irony in that Helen, through foreclosure, at least temporarily, 
found the freedom she never experienced with homeownership.  
 When Dorothy was asked what she liked most about homeownership, she 
provided a simple reply, ―It was mine.‖ [Laughter] Yet, like most of the other 
participants, Dorothy never established her financial footing in homeownership to truly 
be able to enjoy any lasting aspects of freedom or ownership. One aspect that Dorothy 
did enjoy while living in the home was the ability to have an animal companion. Having 
a pet was a significant expression of freedom that Dorothy enjoyed in homeownership 
that she was disconnected from when she began renting following the foreclosure. When 
Dorothy left homeownership, she had to say goodbye to her dog. This loss was a 
tremendous one for Dorothy:  
One of the other things that I had to give up when I lost my home was my 
dog.  I had a Rottweiler.  Apartment complexes just don‘t take 
Rottweilers. 
 
Like every other participant, one of the things Jessica liked about homeownership was 
perceived creative freedom:  
Let‘s see.  What did I like best?  Probably the fact that if I wanted to do 
something, I didn‘t have to run it by anybody.  I could just kinda do what I 
wanted to do.  If I wanted to paint the wall, I could paint the wall; I mean, 
things like that, just having that freedom. 
 
But, when I asked Jessica about engaging in the freedoms she associated with 
homeownership, she acknowledged that she had not painted and, because of the tight 
margin on the mortgage, she could not afford upgraded design features on the home:  
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We had it painted before we moved in, but it wasn‘t white, it was tan. It 
was new when we moved in. We did (have option to pick features), but we 
also had—because of my credit, and my student loans, and stuff like that, I 
could only afford so much for the house, so we had to take that into 
consideration.  
 
Jessica‘s response again underscores the important distinction between what participants 
perceived their homeownership freedoms to be and what they consisted of in reality. Like 
many of the other participants, one reality of homeownership Jessica did not appreciate 
was home maintenance:  
I didn‘t like having to fix things myself. [Laughs] 
 
 For the youngest participant, Jessica demonstrates significant insight into the 
perceived concepts of freedom and ownership that are associated with homeownership:  
Probably in the beginning, it was very exciting, very wow, this is mine.  
Now, all of a sudden, it's not.  It's just, I guess, the frustration.  You think 
you have control in the beginning and then at the end, you realize how 
much control you don't have.   
 
You think it's your house, but it's not.  It's the mortgage company's house.  
It's almost like you're still paying rent.  Even though I could do what I 
want to the inside of the house—it still could be taken away.   
 
Jessica has unraveled the slick messaging about homeownership. Until a person pays off 
their mortgage, the home is technically not theirs. She is correct—―You think it‘s your 
house, but it‘s not. It‘s the mortgage company‘s house. It‘s almost like you‘re still paying 
rent.‖ Yes, perhaps, it is like paying the rent—except, in a homeownership situation, the 
mortgage holder is responsible for maintenance and other unexpected expenses. It does 
beg the questions—What is freedom? What is ownership?  
 Sub-theme 4d: Disconnection from asset creation. 
 Asset creation is often identified as one of the perceived benefits of 
homeownership. There is a perception that homeownership increases one‘s wealth 
184 
 
through the accrual of equity. Yet, for these participants, whether through predatory loans 
or manipulated financing schemes, major health issues, or divorce, they were 
disconnected from accumulating wealth. In fact, all participants filed for bankruptcy—
disconnecting them from their financial assets for at least several years.  
 Not only did Helen have no real chance of accumulating equity and wealth in her 
home, but she also relied on some social assistance to make ends meet:  
Well, the food pantries.  A lot of things, like I said, you're just 50 to 
$100.00 too much to actually qualify for things.   
 
Helen estimates she was $50 or $100 over eligibility guidelines from receiving public 
assistance benefits. One might question how Helen qualified for a mortgage if she was 
this close to the poverty level. In addition, given her financial position and value of her 
home ($55,000), it was unlikely she was going to increase her assets in any meaningful 
way. Certainly, experiencing foreclosure and declaring bankruptcy added to this 
challenge:  
…don‘t let a person get themself in such a situation that they‘re gonna 
lose everything.  Because they don‘t only lose the house, you lose—if you 
have to file bankruptcy, there‘s that involved, and then you‘ve got that 
stigma with you for seven, ten years, whatever that is.  You still can‘t—I 
went out to Wal-Mart to try to get one of their Wal-Mart cards, for 
$100.00 or $400.00 for Christmastime, or whatever.  You can‘t do that 
anymore because you filed a bankruptcy.  Things like that, you actually 
don‘t see that at the time, what all that entails.  How far down the road it 
goes with you. 
 
I mean they tell you, but you don‘t really realize, I don‘t think, how much 
it takes out of a person‘s life. 
 
Other people I think could be disastrous for them.  A young couple 
starting out, get them self in this mess, and then where do you go?  If you 
don‘t have family, or somebody who will come to help you along the way.  
It can be rough.  If you‘ve got little kids. 
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 Like Helen, Heather was also disconnected from any meaningful asset-building 
aspects of homeownership. Heather did believe the idea that homeownership is what 
responsible people are supposed to do and that is a part of achieving the American 
Dream:    
I think it was that‘s the American Dream.  That‘s what we‘re supposed 
to—people who live in apartments or people who rent, they‘re losers.  
What are they thinking?  Rent is a lot more than—you see it on 
commercials.  Why rent, when you can buy?  I loved that house.  I didn‘t 
wanna—I didn‘t wanna even think about losing it or it being empty.  My 
daughter basically grew up there.  It was a lotta sentimental value, too.   
 
Then, Heather‘s financial margin grew tight. The home fell into disrepair and the 
likelihood of the structure yielding any wealth began to diminish:  
Yeah.  You almost start resenting every time a bill would come in, or 
resenting the house because I still have to make a $700.00 payment, and 
here it is falling down around me, it felt like.  It wasn‘t, but it needed a ton 
of work.   
 
The Horton‘s became so disconnected from the asset-building features of homeownership 
that even their daughter felt the need to contribute to family expenses:  
I was ashamed that she felt like she needed to be responsible, to have to 
worry about where we‘re gonna get that money from.  Because all she‘s 
heard is, ―How are we gonna get the money?  What should we do?  What 
should we‖—‗cause, especially towards the end, we were not paying our 
electric bill one month, and then paying it the next month.   
 
Typically, when we think of home equity or the asset-building features of 
homeownership, it is used to help finance educational expenses for children—or, maybe, 
in Heather‘s daughter‘s case, extracurricular activities; however, the family‘s financial 
margin was too thin and their house too underwater to extract any monetary assets.  
 Linda sees asset-creation happening—but for financial institutions and not 
everyday individuals and families. Maybe as questions are being posed about the 
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concepts of freedom and ownership, additional inquires about how assets are created and 
who they are created for also need to be considered. Linda posits that if we continue with 
the current regulatory climate and economic practices, it will be the institutions that 
continue to build assets:  
The institutions will continue to make money, and we will continue to see 
a huge divide between the haves and the have-nots, and there are gonna be 
a lot of people who thought they were in the haves, but they‘re gonna be 
have-nots.  
  
Theme 5. Foreclosure is a consequence of a disconnection between 
participants’ social service-based, helping-based and/or low-wage employment and 
self-sufficiency. 
Another experience shared by the participants was an association with social-
service based, helping-based, and/or low-wage employment. Despite holding positions, 
or because of them, where participants help other people, they were unable to help 
themselves out of foreclosure. For example, at the time of her foreclosure, Linda was 
employed by an agency that provided affordable housing opportunities. Despite being 
intimately aware of real estate development and the housing finance system, she was still 
unable to navigate a successful resolution with her lender. Linda explains the 
disconnection in her professional position and the situation she was in:  
It was very conflicting because I felt like this is a nightmare.  This is what 
I try to counsel people on.  I try to explain to them, ―These are the steps 
you take so that you protect yourself and your investment.‖  Every step I 
was taking, the system was saying, ―No, we don‘t accept that.‖ 
   
It was a real eye-opener for me because, unlike the people I was 
counseling, I had a decent income.  It wasn‘t going to me, but—and I had 
more education.  I had been—I wasn‘t a young kid.  I was in my 50‘s.  
There was—it was like this is not what you read in the textbook.  This is 
not what you hear from the professionals.  This is not what I‘ve been 
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telling these people. I was finding that in theory, yes, it‘s supposed to 
work, but in practicality, it didn‘t. 
 
This anecdote underscores a critical lesson from Linda‘s experience. Very few people 
would have more knowledge about helping someone navigate through foreclosure than 
Linda. Further, up until the circumstances leading to foreclosure, Linda had a positive 
and long-term relationship with her lender. Yet, she could not successfully negotiate with 
her mortgage servicer. If Linda is unable to find a resolution, is it possible for others with 
more limited knowledge and resources?  
 At the time of her foreclosure, Helen was employed by a state agency that serves 
people with disabilities who have employment and financial challenges. Yet, to fully 
understand Helen‘s disconnection from her employment and self-sufficiency, one needs 
to first look into her past employment. Helen worked in a manufacturing plant for 22 
years. She says the company told her she was being downsized due to an economic 
downturn. Helen is convinced she ―waged out‖ because she was at the top of the wage-
scale and did not have a college degree. She feels like they let her go so they could pay 
someone else less income. When she left the manufacturing job, she was making 
$30,000—that was 20 years ago:  
I worked 22 years for a gasket manufacturing company. They said that—
they had a recession cutback, they said. I don‘t buy that, but I—they just 
knew somebody that they could not have to pay. I didn‘t have college 
experience, so they didn‘t wanna pay the kinda wages they were paying. 
They could fire me. 
 
One year, I made like $30,000. Then, when you go down to…I mean they 
had a bonus program that the company did, well you got a good bonus that 
year. I had 20 years in, so I was doing better than…Well, that was when I 
was married, I worked there. Because I actually started with that company 
in ‘68, and I think I actually purchased my house, the first house, in ‘78 I 
think it was.  
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For the last 20 years, she has worked for the state—at one of the prisons, at a juvenile 
detention center and now for vocational rehabilitation. In her helping-based position 
where Helen provides administrative support, her income is significantly lower than her 
manufacturing job was over 20 years ago:  
I worked for the State of Indiana. At that time, I guess I had already been 
transferred to vocational rehab... I had worked at the prison...I had worked 
at the juvenile detention center for several years before I came here. 
 
Most people don‘t have the—a very good paying job. I mean the state 
pays okay. The people believe the state pays you exorbitant amounts of 
money. That‘s not the truth. We looked at—so many homes we tried to 
even look about renting places and nothing was under five or six hundred 
dollars to rent. 
 
When asked what her annual income was at the time of the foreclosure, Helen responded:  
 
At that time? Probably back then, it would‘ve been $18,000 something a year.  
 
From Helen‘s perspective, an $18,000 annual salary was ―okay‖ pay. Yet, if one looks at 
the poverty guidelines in 2009, for a household of four, the income-level was $22,050. If 
Helen‘s estimates are correct, for her household size, she was earning a poverty-level 
wage. A review of recent state job postings of similar positions reveals Helen‘s estimates 
are in-line with current wages. A similar position to Helen‘s in another part of the state is 
paying around $19,000 annually. Helen‘s low-wage issue brings up a couple of 
considerations: 1) How was she able to qualify for a mortgage based on this household 
income? and 2) Is it ethically or fiscally acceptable for the state to pay poverty-level 
wages for a full-time job? Throughout her time in her current position, supervisors and 
co-workers have provided much needed and appreciated emotional and financial support 
to Helen:  
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They knew a lot of things that I was going through.  They were very 
supportive and very helpful to me in that period of time.  Financially they 
helped me a lot of times, when they could.  
 
In effect, Helen‘s supervisors and co-workers were subsidizing the poverty-level wages 
she was earning from the state. As Helen worked for a state agency that helps people with 
disabilities improve their self-sufficiency, Helen‘ poverty-level, state-based employment 
was an impediment to her own self-reliance.   
Helen thinks someone who works should not have to struggle as much as she does 
to make ends meets:  
…you think to yourself, if I‘m working, why isn‘t there enough to go 
around?   
 
Are you gonna be able to keep paying all this, plus the utilities, plus the 
medical bills, on a limited income?  You can‘t really think about retiring, 
even though you think you want to, because you don‘t see how in the 
world you were gonna make it. 
 
At the time of her foreclosure, Dorothy was employed as support staff for a 
university-based internship program within a professional school. She estimates her 
income:  
 At the time, I think I was making roughly $25,000/year.  
Dorothy enjoys her work and takes pride in continuing her involvement with the social 
work profession. Like other participants, she was employed in a helping-based, support 
position that paid a relatively low-wage. Although Dorothy was not in as dire of a 
situation as Helen was with her poverty-level wage, there does seem to be a 
disconnection of working in and around social work education at the same time she was 
financially and emotionally struggling. The profession of social work is concerned with 
empowering individuals and expanding opportunities for social and economic justice. If 
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the profession is unable to provide a living wage for the people it employs to assist with 
carrying out that mission, then how does it portend to adequately help the people it 
serves? 
 Heather was also employed in a helping-based position during her financial 
struggles and foreclosure. Heather experienced a disconnection in her financial situation 
and her perceived expectation that her employer expected her to tithe:  
I work at a community church.  
 
By this time, I‘m working in the church, too, so I feel like—I don‘t know. 
There‘s this status, working there. I feel like I should be tithing, as well, 
giving money to the church.  
 
Despite her financial difficulties and the impending reality of facing foreclosure, Heather 
felt she should still contribute to the well-being of others. This dichotomy of financial 
inability to help and desire to help is a common experience of the participants employed 
in social service-based and helping-based professions. Their financial well-being is put at 
risk due to their care, concern and wage sacrifice for others.  
 Jessica also depended on helping-based employment and low-wage work at the 
time she was facing foreclosure. Jessica had shifted to caretaking of other people‘s 
children to enable her to balance her responsibilities of maintaining a household and 
raising her children. However, when the people who employed her learned she was 
having another child, they became concerned about Jessica‘s ability to keep caring for 
their children and ended their employment relationship with her:  
Yeah, then we had it all caught up in 2013 for—at the tax season.  The 
problem there was I was pregnant with the third.  When my families found 
out that I was pregnant, they just kinda up and left me. 
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Unfortunately, the loss of this employment occurred at the precise time Jessica needed it 
the most. She was pregnant, due in about five months and, once again, facing financial 
insecurity and the possible loss of her home. Being the responsible person she is, Jessica 
immediately set-out to find alternative employment, which initially proved costly to her 
in terms of lost time and resources:  
Yeah, and so I had to—I wasn‘t planning on finding a job or figuring 
something out until after he was born.  This was, what, the 
January/February time-frame 2013; I was due in June.  I had to find a job 
fast.  That‘s how I got started driving the bus.  I did the training cuz I 
didn‘t have my CDLs at that time, and they provided training.  Their ad 
advertised that you got paid $11.50 an hour for training.  Then once you 
passed your tests and you were driving, then you'd get bumped up to a 
sub-position, which'd be $16.25 an hour.  Then once you‘re on contract, 
you‘re making $20 an hour and some change once you have your own 
route.  That‘s what was advertised and all the paperwork they gave me 
said that.  Then I‘m almost all the way through the training when they told 
us that the way that they do the payment you‘re self-employed.  They 
consider you self-employed.  You‘re not technically hired by them yet. 
 
Yeah.  You‘re not gonna get paid until they feel like you‘re halfway 
through the training: you‘re gonna get half of your payment, and then at 
the end of the training, once you‘ve passed your tests, you‘ll get the other 
half.  Then towards the end of my training a few weeks to go, I‘m getting 
worried because I‘m like, ―I got caught up on my mortgage.‖  
  
Jessica was counting on this amount because she was, once again, getting behind on her 
mortgage payment. She went in to find out exactly how she was being compensated.  
Jessica learned that they pay the trainees through a voucher:  
They do a voucher.  It doesn‘t matter how long you train, or anything, or 
how long it takes you to finish the training, you only get paid, what was it, 
like $800 for the whole training or something like that.  I'd already been 
training for two months. 
 
Jessica did not understand why they were dragging out the training so long. She had 
already been in training for two months and had received no compensation: 
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After all of that time.  I mean, if I would've known that, I woulda been 
like, ―Come on, let's get it done.  I'm not dragging it out for two—‖  I 
didn't know why they were dragging it out so long anyway, and I was 
getting a little frustrated because of that.  I'm a fast learner, so I'm like, 
―Come on, come on.‖  Yeah, they were like, they had changed it on their 
stuff.  They're like, ―Oh, we used to do it like that, but it just got changed.‖  
They didn't give us the updated paperwork. 
 
This change in the anticipated payment structure resulted in Jessica not making any 
income again, which put the family further behind:  
Then, I ended up not bringing in—bringing any money in, so then we 
were behind again. 
 
Oh, we did four hours—three hours a day, five days a week.  Then at the 
end, I started doing Saturdays, too. just to get—hurry up and finish 
because I‘m telling them here we are in March—at the end of March.  I 
was like, ―School‘s almost over.  I gotta get some work in before school‘s 
over, and I‘m getting ready to have a baby.‖  I‘m freaking out at this point.  
Then, I passed my test on April 3
rd,
 and I immediately start working at the 
$16.25.  I only got to work six weeks before I started having issues with 
my pregnancy.  The doctor took me off of work, so then I was off all 
summer.   
 
Then, we were just really—and that‘s when I started tryin‘ to do the 
paperwork to get assistance through the mortgage.  I was like, ―There was 
nothing I can do.‖ 
 
Facing the reality of their situation, Jessica started the paperwork to secure a loan 
modification. She felt resigned to the circumstances of their financial situation.  Despite 
Jessica initiating several attempts to remain self-sufficient, she was challenged by 
unexpected delays of securing employment and shifting expectations concerning wages 
and benefits.  For most of the participants, the hidden costs associated with low-wage 
and/or helping-based employment impeded their ability to achieve and maintain self-
sufficiency.   
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Chapter V.  Discussion 
Finding Meaning: Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
 The purpose of this study was to explore with depth and intentionality the lived 
experience of foreclosure. In particular, the thing itself to be uncovered was the meaning 
homeowners associated with the experience of foreclosure (Laverty, 2003; Smith et al., 
2012). Through interpretative phenomenological analysis, an essential pattern of 
disconnection was associated with the mean-making experience of foreclosure. Beyond 
being physically disconnected from the physical structure of one‘s home, the participants 
also felt separated from their personal identity, from their competency of housing finance, 
from the social exchange they engaged in with their lender, from the benefits of 
homeownership and from self-sufficiency due to their social service-based, helping-
based, and/or low-income wage employment. These areas of disconnection form the five 
primary themes related to the essential pattern of foreclosure as disconnection.  
 Eloquently, Van Manen (1990) articulates the critical importance themes provide 
when understanding and interpreting the commonality of participant experience, ―Themes 
are the stars that make up the universes of meaning we live through‖ (p. 90). The 
thematic patterns illuminated through IPA reflected a significant disconnection in many 
critical areas of the participants‘ lives. Now that these patterns have been brought out of 
the darkness, we can respond as social work researchers, educators, and practitioners. 
From disconnection, we can collectively work to establish connection between 
participants and self, competencies, relationships, assets, and self-sufficiency.  
 In attempting to understand and articulate the best ways to establish connection, it 
is helpful to consider Van Manen‘s (1990) conceptual framework of the four existentials. 
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Existentials are understood to be general, common lifeworld themes (Van Manen, 1990). 
Van Manen (1990) posits that all lifeworlds reflect, at some level, these core experiences. 
The existentials may help deepen our understanding of the participant‘s lifeworlds as they 
relate to the disconnection caused by foreclosure. Depth in understanding can clarify 
implications for theory, education, practice, policy and research. The four existentials are 
articulated in the following sub-sections as conceptualized by Van Manen (1990) and 
applied to the essential pattern of foreclosure as disconnection:  
Table 10  Van Manen‘s Four Existentials 
Van Manen’s  
Existential Concept 
Van Manen’s  
Existential Framework 
Application to Essential Pattern: 
Foreclosure as Disconnection 
Lived space Spatiality Home as space 
Lived body Corporeality Sense of self 
Lived time Temporality Individual and socio-economic context 
Live human relation Relationality Relationship with lender 
(Van Manen, 1990, pp. 101-106) 
  Lived Space: Home as Space. 
 Although Van Manen‘s (1990) conceptualization of spatiality broadly includes all 
mathematical and physical space, he notes the distinctiveness of home as place. ―Home is 
where we can be what we are‖ (Van Manen, 1990, p. 102). Commonly, home represents 
a place where we belong, where can be ourselves, where we can feel secure. Without 
exception, each participant noted the unique, special aspects of their lived space. For 
Linda, her home provided space for significant gatherings of family and friends. 
Although Helen‘s home was a space of social and familial isolation, it also provided her 
with a place of security. Even in spaces of discomfort, people sometimes find stability in 
the familiar. Dorothy‘s lived space represented a sense of ownership, ―It was mine.‖ In 
her home, Jessica‘s space meant providing stability for her children that she never 
experienced in her own childhood. Van Manen (1990) also acknowledges the importance 
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of home to childhood stability, ―In the home and its immediate environment the child is 
offered the opportunity to explore the world from a safe haven‖ (p. 106). And, Heather‘s 
home so embodied her family as space that it took on the fragrance of her daughter and 
husband,  
It would be either a candle that I lit, or my [laughter]—a perfume that my 
daughter wears, or a cologne that my husband wore.  You could smell that.  
The smell of my dog being in the room, or whatever.  It would just—you 
just walked in.  Those were the smells.  That‘s my family [laughter]. 
 
For all participants, home reflected a special space. In its most fundamental sense, 
foreclosure disconnected each participant from the physical space of their home. Yet, 
beyond the physical structure of their homes, foreclosure also separated participants from 
all of the specialness of their lived spaces---gatherings with friends, essence of family 
life, demonstration of self-efficacy, and stability and security. Foreclosure disrupted the 
lived space of each participant. It separated participants from ―the location of our shared 
lives, the home‖ (Van Manen,1990, p. 106).  
 Lived Body: Sense of Self. 
 Although Van Manen (1990) conceptualizes the lived body as primarily a 
physical incarnation, in its application to the findings of this study, it is broadened to 
include a holistic sense of self. At the core of an existential framework of the lived body 
is the notion that people simultaneously reveal and hide aspects of their being and life 
experiences (Van Manen, 1990).  It cannot be known what participants chose to hide, 
―consciously or deliberately,‖ about their selves and experience with homeownership and 
foreclosure; however, participants did reveal a disconnection from their lived identity due 
to foreclosure (Van Manen, 1990, p. 103).  
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Each participant reflected a significant questioning and redefinition of self due to 
the experience of foreclosure; however, two participants articulated the loss of lived body 
most profoundly. For Heather, undercurrents of shame and stigma permeated most of her 
interview. Her language, in more than one way, interchanged the physical structure of her 
home with bodily attributes of her family. She also conflated the loss of home as 
divorce—or a bodily and emotional separation from her place of shelter. Psychologically, 
she equated homeownership with the physical representation of responsibility, personal 
growth, and maturity. Likewise, when she lost the home through foreclosure, she 
internalized the embodiment of irresponsibility and immaturity. The loss of identity and 
self-perception fundamentally shifted for Heather.  
Like Heather, Linda also expressed a tremendous loss of personal identity. Linda 
experienced disconnection from her lived body both psychologically and physically.  A 
terminal cancer prognosis estimated six-months of remaining life for Linda. Impending 
death would obviously mean a complete disconnection from her lived body. Further, as 
Linda separated from her body, she was also separating from her house. Her medical-
related issues prevented Linda from continuing her employment. Without an income, 
Linda faced disconnection from her lived space. Since Linda‘s personal identity was 
intimately connected with the house, this situation caused a significant separation from 
the lived self:  
You lose your whole perspective of who you are.  I mean, one day you‘re 
a successful person. You have family.  You have friends.  You have a 
good job.  You don‘t worry about money.  You are the one that are the 
caregiver, the nurturer—and then all of a sudden, you don‘t have the job, 
the profession.  That‘s your identity.  You don‘t have the home.  You 
don‘t have the security.  You‘re being told you‘re less than what you 
oughta be. 
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You‘ve done something wrong, and it shatters what you had always 
perceived yourself as being of, like as I say, a confident, competent—
individual.  
 
 Lived Time: Individual and Socio-economic Context. 
 When considering the essential pattern of foreclosure as disconnection, lived time 
is a critical concept. The conceptual framework of lived time is not concerned with 
notions of time clocks but with contextual periods—dimensions of past memories, 
present realities, and future visions (Van Manen, 1990).  There are two critical ways in 
which context matters to how participants experienced homeownership and foreclosure: 
1) individual context and 2) socio-economic context.  
 In social work, we embrace the idea of person and environment. A person is not 
separate from the world around him/her and society, likewise, consists of individuals. 
From the perspective of a phenomenological lens, the focus is on identifying and 
analyzing the meaning of shared experience. Yes, there were common experiences 
among the participants. Yet, within the gaps of shared experiences lie distinct and unique 
pasts, presents and futures. To understand the whole, attention also must be given to the 
part. Linda‘s particular context reflects a stable past that was undermined by a critical 
health crisis. Unlike other research participants who were of modest means, Linda had a 
higher socio-economic standing. Yet, despite all of her advantages, including specialized 
knowledge of real estate and housing finance, she shared the lived experience of 
foreclosure. Dorothy experienced significant depression, lasting several years beyond her 
foreclosure. Refusing to allow her past to define her future, she has empowered herself 
through homeownership education and training and plans to be a homeowner again. In 
the past, Heather was devastated by foreclosure, considering it a personal failure of 
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responsibility and maturity. In her present, Heather has redefined what it means to be a 
renter and is enjoying her newfound financial and psychological freedom. Helen 
continues to work, even though she has reached the point in her life when most people 
retire. Her future is constrained by her past social isolation and present economic 
insecurity. Jessica is in the process of giving her husband one last chance to be a 
committed and responsible life partner. Even with their commonalities, participants live 
nuanced lives.  
Although participants experienced nuanced lives, another commonality they 
shared was socio-economic context. Participants purchased homes during a period of 
time when the regulatory environment governing financial institutions fundamentally 
shifted. The collective span of time between mortgage origination and foreclosure for 
participants was 1999-2012. At the end of the 1990s, a substantial shift occurred in 
financial deregulation. In 1999, President Clinton signed the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999, which repealed Glass-Steagall and again allowed 
commercial banks to engage in investment activities with their customers‘ money (Carow 
et al., 2011; MacDonald, 2005). Further, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act was 
passed in 2000, which allowed ―over-the-counter‖ investment derivatives, including 
credit default swaps (CDS), to be unregulated (Friedman & Friedman, 2010; Stout, 
2011). CDSs were the genesis of the securization of mortgages (residential mortgage 
backed securities) and a contributing factor to the economic crash of 2008 (Friedman & 
Friedman, 2010; Schwartz, 2010; Stout, 2011).  
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 Lived Human Relation: Relationship with Lenders. 
 From Van Manen‘s (1990) perspective, relationality, or relating to other people, is 
one way human beings search for a sense of purpose or meaningfulness in their lives. In 
the beginning of the lender-borrower relationship, participants found a shared sense of 
purpose with their lenders through the meaningfulness of homeownership. Lender and 
borrower joined together through a contractual obligation forged in a mortgage loan. 
Over the course of the lender-borrower relationship, there existed a common breakdown 
in the purpose and meaningfulness of the contractual union.  
Geographical distance posed significant strain on lender-borrower relationships. 
Participants placed phone calls, sent correspondence, or otherwise attempted to maintain 
some mutually beneficial relationship with a distant lender. All participants except one 
would eventually learn that their lender had sold their contractual obligation to the 
highest bidder.  Some participants learned that their meaningful and purpose-filled 
mortgage contract was sold multiple times—so many times, that one participant could not 
remember who held the loan last.  
Some participants would learn that their shared relationship never meant as much 
to the lender from the beginning. They had been manipulated and lied to from the 
beginning of the relationship as they learned their loan contained unethical and predatory 
features. Further, when they needed their mortgage partner more than ever to save their 
home, lenders were indifferent and callous to borrower need. Each lender-borrower 
relationship became so disconnected that the contractual bond was terminated and the 
realization of the one-sided relationship was sadly accepted.  
―The bank was the bank.  There was no human side to it.‖—Linda 
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From Disconnection to Connection 
 With deeper understanding developed from exploring participant common themes 
through the lens of Van Manen‘s (1990) four existentials, implications for theory, social 
work education, social work practice, housing policy, and foreclosure response will be 
discussed.  
Connecting Understanding: Implications for Theory 
 Prior to the study, four theoretical frameworks were analyzed for relevant 
explanatory features helpful in understanding the intersection of homeownership and 
foreclosure: 1) asset development theory, 2) functional theory of federalism, 3) Marxist 
theory, and 4) social exchange theory. In light of the study‘s findings, these theories will 
be reexamined to discover ways in which participant accounts affirmed and challenged 
these explanatory frameworks.  
 Asset Development Theory. 
 The findings of this study uncovered a few significant implications for asset 
development theory. Asset development theory contends that, if wealth-building 
opportunities are provided, then people of low socio-economic status can accumulate 
assets and enjoy the associated benefits (Sherraden, 1990). Homeownership, along with 
pursuing higher education or starting one‘s business, are considered to be foundational 
wealth-creating ventures. The theory‘s conceptual framework highlights 11 
complementary policy principles (see Chapter 2), including, complementing income-
based policy, encouraging ―gradual accumulation‖ and ―promoting economic information 
and training‖ (Sherraden, 1991, p. 199). Obviously, for the participants, homeownership 
did not result in asset accumulation. Not only did the participants lose their homes but 
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they also declared bankruptcy, which will limit their asset-creating activities for years to 
come. Their experience underscores the need for policy to adhere to the three principles 
outlined by Sherraden and noted above (1991).  
 Complementing income-based policy.  
 Three of the participants (Helen, Dorothy, and Jessica) were constrained by their 
helping-based, low-wage employment. The financial margin was so tenuous for them that 
when confounding life challenges appeared, they were not able to cover the unexpected 
expense and everyday bills. One crisis or multiple economic disruptions pushed the 
participants into a financial downward spiral toward foreclosure and bankruptcy. Part of 
the reason for their shaky financial standing was due to their low-wage, and, in some 
cases, poverty-level, employment. In order for people with low-incomes to build a solid 
foundation for asset-accumulation, they must be paid a sustainable wage. Otherwise, 
people with low-incomes will always be one unexpected life crisis or a few disruptions 
away from financial insecurity and instability.  
 Gradual accumulation.  
 In considering the ―gradual accumulation‖ of assets, at least one participant, 
Jessica, discussed in some detail how she felt rushed through the home-buying process.  
Jessica also noted how she thought it would beneficial to require evidence of a savings 
account, equivalent to a down-payment standard, at the time of home purchase. From her 
perspective, if she had a savings account, she could have staved off life‘s confounding 
challenges and retained her home as an asset. 
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 Promoting economic information and training.  
 Without question, the importance of this policy principle was affirmed by the 
participants. Many of the participants noted the lack of literacy they possessed about the 
home buying process. Further, this lack of home-buying literacy created the conditions 
for participants to be exploited and disempowered through the home-buying process. 
Although there exists an overall gap in financial literacy in the U.S., it is important to 
note the particular peculiarities and nuances regarding home finance. Front-end, back-
end, and loan-to-value ratios are not topics Americans discuss in everyday conversations. 
Further, these are not concepts typically covered in the standard curriculum of most 
schools. Empowering home-buyers, and people of low-incomes in general by offering 
user-friendly training on housing finance should promote sound financial decisions and 
minimize consumer exploitation.  
 Participant findings also raise another important conceptual consideration relevant 
to asset development theory. Embracing a capitalistic perspective, this theory privileges 
wealth-accumulation and ownership (Sherraden, 1990). Yet, through their 
homeownership high-points and foreclosure low-points, participant experiences challenge 
traditional concepts of assets and ownership. Perhaps, it is not logically or intellectually 
honest to challenge the theory on these conceptualizations given its foundational 
connection to wealth-accumulation; however, there needs to be some space to explore the 
depth and breadth of conceptual attributes of assets and ownership. For some participants, 
psychological and financial assets were gained through the stability and freedom acquired 
through renting—not owning. And, as Jessica so eloquently and dishearteningly noted,  
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You think it's your house, but it's not.  It's the mortgage company's house.  
It's almost like you're still paying rent.  Even though I could do what I 
want to the inside of the house—it still could be taken away.  
 
 Functional Theory of Federalism.  
 The most relevant finding related to the functional theory of federalism concerns 
financial regulation. Most participants spoke indirectly about policy-related issues; 
however, Linda was very direct in her criticisms concerning financial deregulation. She 
attributed the lax regulatory environment as the reason for homebuyer exploitation and 
market failure. From her perspective, unless Dodd-Frank is fully implemented, abuses of 
homebuyers will continue and future market disruptions will occur. Indirectly, other 
participants noted the consequences stemming from financial deregulation and lax 
enforcement of existing laws.   
 Typically, federalism relegates redistributive policies to the federal-level and 
developmental policies to the state-level (Peterson, 1995). Although there are 
considerations for housing policy and foreclosure response that were not addressed in this 
study‘s findings, the regulation issue prompts immediate consideration. The housing 
crash occurred over eight years ago in 2006 and the Great Recession began six years ago 
in 2008. The comprehensive financial regulation to address the economic crisis, Dodd-
Frank, was not drafted until 2010—two years post-global economic crash. Further, it was 
not passed until 2012 and parts of the legislation remain unimplemented. Due to the 
widespread disruption caused by nefarious lending practices and financial institution 
behavior, financial regulations must be strengthened at the federal-level to ensure equal 
protection for all consumers and timely resolutions of loan modifications.  
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 Marxist Theory.  
 An entire book could be dedicated to articulating how participants‘ experiences 
are informed by Marxist theory. In fact, one might argue Picketty‘s recent contribution, 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, does just that. Marxist theory is deeply relevant to 
understanding and explaining participants‘ experiences with homeownership and 
foreclosure; however, there is an important distinction and implication for its conceptual 
framework. At its core, Marxist theory is concerned with the means of production and 
who controls the benefits of that labor (Marx, 1964). Obviously, as evidenced by Helen, 
Dorothy and Jessica, ―wage-slaves‖ still exist (Marx, 1964). Yet, a fundamental shift has 
occurred within the ruling class, which in the case of this study, are represented by 
financial institutions. In the financial environment, capitalism has become so perverted 
that there is no longer anything produced. Financial institutions have effectively 
accumulated wealth, hoarded it, and continued to insatiably exploit the working class for 
more capital. The separation of people from the outcome of their labor continues. 
 Cumulatively, each participant was exploited in fundamental ways. Most notably, 
participants bought into the marketing scheme of the ―American Dream.‖ The slick 
marketing message convinced them they would, through homeownership, find freedom—
creative freedom, personal freedom, and financial freedom. Instead of finding freedom, 
participants found despair, insecurity, and bankruptcy. A few years after their 
foreclosures, some of the participants are beginning to find their financial footing again 
while others continue to struggle. At the same time, ―too big to fail‖ financial institutions 
continued to merge and consolidate power and influence, compensation packages grew 
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larger and exploitative lending practices, although reigned in, continue. Exploitation 
endures.  
 Social Exchange Theory.  
 Findings from this study challenge essential elements of social exchange theory. 
The theory contends while individuals attempt to maximize personal gains, they are also 
mediated by conforming to socially desirable characteristics thought to prevent acting in 
selfish ways that result in detriment to others (Longres, 1995). All evidence indicates 
lenders were not only significantly focused on maximizing personal gain but that they 
also were particularly immune from any social controls. In some cases, the damage they 
callously and with willful disregard, inflicted upon the participants was extremely 
detrimental. From the participants‘ experiences, the social exchange relationship between 
borrower and lender is fundamentally broken.  
Social exchange also posits that individuals have available to them a range of 
choices (Robbins et al., 2006). For example, based on a list of favorable or unfavorable 
criteria, participants may choose one lender over another. The fundamental flaw in this 
proposition is the assumption that consumer choice and empowerment exists. During the 
1990s and early 2000s, it was common practice to disregard standard underwriting 
protocol. The power and resource imbalance in the lender-borrower social exchange 
relationship are critical factors for consideration. As the findings from this study suggest 
significant flaws and considerations for revision, additional research should be conducted 
to test the conceptual and empirical validity of this theoretical framework.   
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Connecting Competency: Implications for Social Work Education 
The NASW Code of Ethics (2008) outlines social work‘s commitment to vulnerable 
populations and the responsibility to pursue economic and social justice. Findings from 
this study have highlighted the economic impact of homeownership and foreclosure. In 
order to serve and advocate for vulnerable populations, social workers must not only be 
comfortable with financial information but also have some level of literacy with the 
topics. The Code of Ethics (2008) instructs social workers to practice only in the areas in 
which they are competent. Given that many of the micro and macro issues impacting 
clients have economic ties, it is essential for social workers to develop financial literacy 
(Birkenmaier & Curley, 2009; Sherraden et al., 2007).  
Currently, there are two meaningful attempts to increase social work competency 
with financial issues: 1) Center for Financial Social Work, and 2) University of 
Maryland, School of Social Work, Financial Social Work Initiative. The Center for 
Financial Social Work provides a Financial Social Work Certification, which is approved 
by the NASW for continuing education credits (Center for Financial Social Work, n.d.). 
The purpose of the certification is to prepare social work practitioners to work with 
clients on behavioral change and obtaining financial security (Center for Financial Social 
Work, n.d.). In addition, the Center has prepared a support group kit for financial 
education. In its current form, the Center has existed since 2003.  
The University of Maryland‘s School of Social Work introduced its comprehensive 
Financial Social Work Initiative in 2008 (University of Maryland, School of Social 
Work, n.d.). The scope of the effort includes instructional education, practice 
interventions, research initiatives, policy advocacy, theory development and community-
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based partnerships (University of Maryland, School of Social Work, n.d.). In addition, the 
Initiative also encourages and supports networking among social work educators, 
practitioners, and researchers.   
These two efforts are an important step forward in ensuring financial literacy 
among social work practitioners; however, a larger commitment to expand professional-
wide competency in this area is needed. In addition, it is critical that social workers are 
also competent in the area of policy practice and advocacy. Solely focusing on individual 
financial literacy ignores and minimizes the structural forces that keep people in poverty.  
Connecting Empowerment: Implications for Social Work Practice 
 Social workers are called to ―enhance human well-being and help meet the basic 
human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of 
people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty‖ (NASW, 2008, p. 1). This 
study illustrated how easily it was for unscrupulous lenders to exploit low-information 
home buyers. Social workers should work to ensure borrowers, of all ages and socio-
economic backgrounds, are empowered through homebuyer education. Further, beyond 
traditional number-centric homebuyer education and counseling services, social workers 
should explore the utility and evidence for offering ―grief counseling‖ or support group 
programming for people who have endured significant financial challenges or losses 
associated with shelter. Issues of personal efficacy, depression, and insecurity were 
pervasive among participants. In addition to these general considerations, specific 
practice and philosophical implications are discussed in the following sub-sections.  
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Practical Implications. 
 According to the World Bank (2001), a general framework for attacking poverty 
should include the following three components: ―1) promoting opportunity, 2) facilitating 
empowerment, and 3) enhancing security‖ (p. 33). Social workers should consider this 
framework in considering how to address the intersection of homeownership and 
foreclosure—particularly as it relates to individuals facing affordable housing 
availability, financial difficulties, or being constrained by low-wage employment.   
 Promoting opportunity.  
The World Bank (2001) defines the promotion of opportunity as ―expanding 
economic opportunity for poor people by stimulating overall growth and by building up 
their assets and increasing the returns on these assets, through a combination of market 
and nonmarket actions‖ (p. 33).  Homeownership has the potential to provide this type of 
opportunity for people in poverty; however, stronger financial regulations must govern 
lending in a way that does not increase profits for financial institutions at the expense of 
stripped equity from borrowers.  Research has demonstrated the costs of foreclosure. The 
next step is to evaluate and strengthen the policies and governing institutions that protect 
homeowners and communities from foreclosure. Social work practitioners need to 
reaffirm their commitment to fight oppression where it exists and work for increased 
social and economic justice.   
 Facilitating empowerment. 
The World Bank (2001) states that empowerment is facilitated by ―making state 
institutions more accountable and responsive to poor people, strengthening the 
participation of poor people in political processes and local decision-making, and 
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removing the social barriers that result from distinctions of gender, ethnicity, race, and 
social status‖ (p. 33).  Governmental institutions need to play a larger and more visible 
role in the protection of homeowners against foreclosure.  Financial institutions are 
chartered through government institutions.  Such charters should be conditioned on 
providing appropriate loan products to consumers.  Research documents that minority 
borrowers are targeted to receive higher-interest loans not based on individual credit 
worthiness, but by racial identity (Williams et al., 2005). Social work researchers should 
explore factors contributing to these unscrupulous practices and recommend solutions 
that strengthen protections to consumers most vulnerable to foreclosure.  
The growth of fringe financial services, including subprime loans, payday 
lending, and rent-to-own options threaten the economic stability and opportunities in all 
communities (Lord, 2005).  These services also have the potential to further weaken 
protective community and economic policy like the Community Reinvestment Act and 
Dodd-Frank.  As mentioned previously, social workers interested in community practice 
should develop additional skill and competency in this emerging practice area.  Weil and 
Gamble (2002) suggest that social workers can act in the role of negotiators, planners, 
promoters and/or educators to assist marginalized groups to initiate change by connecting 
with or targeting financial institutions.  
 Enhancing security.  
The World Bank (2001) says security can be enhanced by ―reducing poor 
people‘s vulnerability to ill health, economic shocks, policy-induced dislocations, natural 
disasters, and violence, as well as helping them cope with adverse shocks when they 
occur‖ (p. 33). For the participants in this study, foreclosure unearthed real and perceived 
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fears concerning security.  Public policy and regulations must be developed to guard 
against the cumulative disruptions that foreclosures bring to bear.  Social workers should 
be on the forefront advocating for expanded consumer protections.  
Philosophical Implications. 
 According to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, housing 
is a human right that may be used to further human development (United Nations 
Development Programme [UNDP], 2000).  Providing basic shelter helps individuals 
achieve the human right of having a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2000).  Further, 
homeownership may be used as a human development tool to enrich the lives and 
freedoms of individuals.  As an asset development tool, homeownership has been 
demonstrated to increase political participation/civic involvement, psychological well-
being, stability in relationships, wealth, and intergenerational transfers for some segments 
of the general population (Miller-Adams, 2002).  In addition, a home may be leveraged to 
start a business or further one‘s education.  Due to confounding life challenges, 
unscrupulous lenders, and low-wage employment, asset-creation associated with 
homeownership alluded the participants in this study.  
 On the flipside of homeownership is the American nightmare of failed 
homeownership or foreclosure that not only strips the human development tools from a 
home, but may also leave an individual, family, or community in crisis.  In the U.S., there 
is no guarantee to shelter.  Housing is not viewed as a right, but as an economic 
commodity.  This fact is illustrated by the operation of homeless shelters that is primarily 
provided by private not-for-profit, charitable organizations. The government may provide 
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funding to such entities, but there are no guarantees a bed will be available to someone 
seeking shelter. 
 Professor Amartya Sen provides the following definition of the human 
development approach,  
Human development, as an approach, is concerned with what I take to be 
the basic development idea: namely, advancing the richness of human life, 
rather than the richness of the economy in which human beings live, 
which is only a part of it. (UNDP, n.d., n.p.) 
 
Philosophically, the evidence provided from this study presents an initial argument for 
designing public policy that embraces a human development approach and protects 
homeowners from foreclosure.  Homeownership is not only a wealth-building asset; for 
those properly prepared for and desire it, it can be a mechanism that enriches human life.   
Connecting Relationship: Implications for Housing Policy and Foreclosure 
Response 
 Findings from this study provide relevant considerations in reestablishing a 
mutually beneficial relationship between lender and borrower.  The deregulation of 
financial markets beginning in the 1980s and continuing throughout the 1990s created the 
conditions and incentives for a disconnection to occur, which profited lenders at the 
expense of borrowers. In order to reintroduce some functional equilibrium in the lender-
borrower relationship, key consumer protections should be implemented and enforced: 1) 
Institute consumer-authorized mortgage flipping, and 2) Recommit to standard 
underwriting guidelines and consider reevaluating to reflect true cost of homeownership. 
In addition to these consumer protections, issues of housing options and affordability 
should be incentivized and subsidized across the housing continuum. Each of these topics 
is discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections.  
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 Mortgage flipping.  
 As illustrated through the experience of the research participants, loan flipping 
incentivizes lenders to participate in risky investment schemes at the expense of 
consumer protection. Because a lender immediately benefits from the sale of a 
borrower‘s mortgage and has no lasting commitment to service the loan, little regard is 
given to the borrower‘s situation and ability to repay the loan. Further, even though the 
mortgage contract is between lender and borrower, the borrower is not informed his/her 
mortgage has been sold to another servicer until after the transfer. Sometimes, the first 
notification a borrower receives of the sale is through receipt of a new mortgage loan 
payment book. The lender holds all of the benefit in this exchange—and the borrower is 
subject to all of the risk.  
 In order to refocus a lender‘s attention on its service relationship with a borrower, 
rather than on solely maximizing profit from bundling mortgages as risky investment 
instruments, a borrower should have to be informed and agree to his/her loan being sold 
prior to the transaction. In a notification of prospective sale, the terms, conditions and 
implications should be provided to the borrower in accessible language. This process will 
introduce an element of relational, shared power (Loomer, 1976) back into the lender-
borrower relationship. It will also remove negative incentives on the part of lenders. 
Since lenders will potentially hold mortgage service responsibilities longer, they should 
be more likely to perform their due diligence when underwriting loans.  
 Reevaluating true cost of home. 
 Most participants identified unethical underwriting practices as a central 
component of their inability to sustain a mortgage. Unethical practices ranged from lax 
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adherence to nefarious manipulation of the underwriting process. Jessica was encouraged 
to sign-up for a college course, temporarily placing her student loans into deferment so 
that she could meet underwriting ratios. Dorothy‘s retirement savings were included in 
her income. These exploitative practices set these homeowners up for foreclosure.  
 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), created through Dodd-Frank, 
has implemented new rules to curb questionable and potentially predatory practices. In 
January 2014, the CFPB began requiring lenders to engage in a ―good-faith effort‖ to 
determine a borrower‘s ―ability-to-repay‖ a mortgage loan (CFPB, 2013). Lenders are 
now expressly prohibited from determining a borrower‘s ability to repay based on the 
first few months of a loan when an artificially low ―teaser rate‖ may be in effect (CFPB, 
2013). According to ―ability-to-repay‖ rules, lenders must take into account the 
borrower‘s ability to repay for many years and consider a ―borrower‘s income, assets, 
employment, credit history and monthly expenses‖ (CFPB, 2013).  
Further, lenders may offer and borrowers may choose a qualified mortgage (QM), a new 
category of mortgage designed by CFPB, which meets the ability-to-repay standards and 
precludes risky features, and limits points and fees that banks can charge (CFPB, 2013). 
These new products and rules address many of the unethical underwriting issues 
encountered by participants; however, they also mimic standard lending practices, which 
were ignored during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Consequently, it will be important 
for social workers and other consumer advocates to monitor implementation and 
enforcement of these standards to ensure other borrowers are not exploited.  
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Incentives and subsidies across the housing continuum.  
When facing impending foreclosure, all participants spoke about the uncertainty 
and insecurity they experienced. This uncertainty stemmed from concerns about securing 
affordable and quality housing. Helen experienced challenges in finding affordable rental 
housing before she purchased her home. Most likely, her current rental housing is only 
affordable now because a fellow church member is charging her an unusually low rate. 
Helen worries what will happen if this housing option goes away. Like Helen, Jessica 
was extremely concerned about finding an affordable and quality rental. Although the 
current rent is affordable for Jessica and her children, she worries about their continued 
and recent respiratory issues. After leaving her foreclosed home, Dorothy stayed with her 
daughter for a period of time. Participant experiences affirm that equal attention should 
be given to homeownership and rental opportunities.  
Most affordable housing advocates note the need for options across the housing 
continuum (see Figure 9). The focus on creating an ―ownership society‖ resulted in 
funding being diverted to homeownership opportunities at the expense of expanding 
rental options. As we learned from the participants, homeownership does not always 
equal assets, freedom, and ownership. People will experience various confounding life 
challenges and may need different types of housing options across their lifetime. A 
reassessment of national housing priorities and funding is past due.  
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Figure 9  Housing Continuum 
 
  
 
 
Limitations of Study 
 A common critique of qualitative research is that one cannot generalize the 
findings.  Unquestionably, the findings from this research reflect the unique and 
collective experiences of the five participants; however, to critique the study as lacking 
generalizability is to fundamentally misunderstand the utility of qualitative inquiry. The 
purpose of qualitative studies, in general, is to seek a thick, rich, and deep understanding 
of a particular topic. Specifically, for this interpretative phenomenological study, the 
intention was to illicit how homeowners experience foreclosure. Although I reject the 
notion of a lack of generalizability as a limitation, it is reasonable that some will 
approach this study from a strictly positivist perspective and claim this omission; 
consequently, I have chosen to address this likely critique in this section. 
Options Across The Housing Continuum 
Emergency & 
Transitional, 
Subsidized 
Affordable 
Rental & 
Homeownership, 
Subsidized  
Rental & 
Homeownership, 
Market-rate 
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 Having opened this section from a seemingly defensive stance, I certainly 
acknowledge the existence of limitations in the study. Although others may identify 
additional challenges and concerns related to the study, there are three substantial 
limitations that immediately deserve critical reflection and discussion: 1) challenges 
identifying a sample; 2) revisions of inclusion criteria; and 3) time with data analysis.  
 Challenges identifying a sample.  
 Having worked in the field of affordable housing and community economic 
development for several years, I have developed an extensive network of contacts. In 
particular, many of my organizational contacts are not-for-profits who specifically 
provide not only homeownership education training and counseling services but also 
foreclosure prevention and intervention programs. Relying on this network, I developed 
an outreach strategy to identify potential research participants. To paraphrase the great 
poet Burns, the best laid plans of mice and men often go awry. Not only did I encounter 
significant challenges in identifying a viable sample, but I also did not secure one 
participant from this outreach strategy—my primary strategy.  
 Certainly, I anticipated and respectfully understood that potential participants may 
avoid the study due to feelings of shame or stigma and, simply, wanting to move forward 
from the experience and declining to reflect on a potentially traumatic life event. I, 
however, significantly underestimated these, or other likely, concerns (i.e., time, 
availability for interview, etc.) on the part of potential participants. Identifying 
participants represented one of the most intense and persistent efforts of the entire study. 
After receiving IRB-approval in August 2013, I immediately contacted my networks and 
they distributed the research invitation to their respective contacts. I conducted my first 
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interview in September 2013. In late September and October 2013, I expanded my 
outreach strategy and attempted to reach participants directly. After broadening my 
outreach strategy, the next three interviews occurred in late February and early March. 
The remaining participants were identified through referrals from individuals who were 
aware of my research and shared the research invitation and study information sheet with 
friends, family members, and colleagues. I conducted my last interview in June. In total, 
it took nine months to identify and interview five participants.  
 Initially, in reflecting common practices of IPA, I planned to interview between 
six and 10 participants. Although I am assured that I achieved a level of depth required 
for IPA analysis, some may question whether five participants is an adequate sample. 
Difference of opinion continues to exist among phenomenologists regarding sample size; 
however, due to its qualitative approach, IPA privileges quality, and not quantity of, 
interviews (Smith et al., 2012).  
 Revision of inclusion criteria. 
 Due to the significant challenges identifying research participants, I also had to 
substantially revise my inclusion criteria. In the planning stages of my study, I identified 
the following attributes among my inclusion criteria: experienced foreclosure within last 
seven years (since 2006); was a first-time homebuyer/homeowner of home that was 
foreclosed; have an income no more than 80% of area median income; an Indiana 
resident at time of foreclosure; and the willingness and ability to be open and expressive 
about the experience of moving from homeownership to foreclosure. After experiencing 
numerous challenges in identifying participants for the study, I made the decision to 
reduce the inclusion criteria to two attributes: Individual had/was facing foreclosure and 
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demonstrated a willingness and ability to be open and expressive about the experience of 
moving from homeownership to foreclosure. 
 Some scholars may question this decision. It is reasonable to assume another 
essential pattern and supporting themes may have been uncovered if I adhered to the 
original inclusion criteria. Practically, it is also reasonable to assume the study may still 
be incomplete.  
 Time with data analysis.  
 As discussed in the methods section, by its very nature, IPA is concerned with 
deep exploration of a particular phenomenon. Consequently, it is expected that 
researchers will demonstrate rigor through prolonged immersion in data analysis. 
Although there are not general standards, it is estimated that rigorous, prolonged 
engagement requires essentially a months-worth of analysis for each case (Smith et al., 
2012).  
 Due to an externally imposed deadline, I chose not to extend my data analysis 
period over an equivalent timeframe (i.e., 5 months for 5 cases/participants).  I contend 
that I did engage in rigorous engagement with the data; however, some scholars may 
raise legitimate concerns about the lack of time I had to process in between analyzing 
each interview.  Essential insights and interpretations may reveal themselves in this 
critical-time-in-between each participant analysis. From my perspective, this limitation is 
among the most significant.  
Directions for Future Research  
 Beyond people experiencing foreclosure, a much broader implication highlighted 
by this study is the need to seek out and give voice to marginalized and stigmatized 
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populations. It is reasonable to assume that other segments of the population experience 
stigma, shame, and trauma equivalent to, if not more so, than people who have 
experienced foreclosure. These voices are traditionally silenced or marginalized by more 
powerful interests but, as demonstrated in this study, the people behind these voices have 
critical knowledge and insight that may benefit individual empowerment and societal 
well-being.  
 This interpretative phenomenological analysis concerning the meanings 
homeowners associated with the lived experience of foreclosure and the extent that those 
accounts may inform homeownership-as-asset theory provides a foundation on which to 
explore these topics through a fully-developed research agenda. My plan is to use my 
findings from this initial, qualitative study to develop a quantitative research design that 
will test asset development and wealth-building theories upon which most U.S. housing 
policy is predicated. Concepts of asset, ownership, and freedom need to be more fully 
explored and understood from the perspective of people characterized by low socio-
economic standing.  
 In addition to engaging in research to advance theory progression of asset-
development theory, study findings also suggest the need to further explore the lender-
borrower relationship. It seems natural to ground future analysis from a social exchange 
perspective, to examine more deeply distributive justice principles and power dynamics. 
Further, this study presents the borrower perspective. Additional insights and knowledge 
from the lending perspective are also critical to this body of inquiry. In particular, it may 
be useful to begin by engaging individuals employed in the community reinvestment 
department of lending institutions. Although the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 
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was not implicated as a factor in the housing crash and economic crisis, such lending 
representatives are typically more attuned to issues that are relevant to this line of 
inquiry. Once relationships are established within those departments, subsequent studies 
may be conducted with other lending representatives.  
 Over the last few years, new consumer protections have been implemented to 
discourage the nefarious lending behaviors participants spoke about in this study. For 
example, the Volcker Rule was implemented in January 2014 as part of Dodd-Frank. 
Although the Volcker Rule does not go as far as restoring the protective wall provided in 
Glass-Steagall, it does limit financial institutions‘ use of consumer deposits for risky 
investments. Social workers should not abdicate the responsibility of monitoring and 
researching these consumer issues to economists. As a profession, we need to make sure 
these protections are working as intended so that other individuals do not find themselves 
in crisis situations. In addition, social workers should also monitor and study the qualified 
mortgage and ability-to-repay guidelines.  
 Although this analysis initially included four explanatory theories, through data 
collection and analysis, it is now clear this discussion would also benefit from 
considering the relevance and implications of social contract theory. Further, findings 
from this study suggest the potential for testing and development of social contract theory 
in relationship to mortgage contracts and financial regulations governing the lender-
borrower relationship. Theoretical implications may be derived from the variations of 
social contract theory constructed by Thomas Hobbes (1997), John Locke (1997) and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1997). The foundation of Hobbes‘ social contract framework 
rests on the premise that humans seek to escape from the ―solitary, poore, nasty, brutish 
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and short‖ state of nature by entering into agreements with social institutions (Hobbes, 
1997, p. 113). By entering into a social contract with government, people expect to 
experience ―social cooperation‖ and ―mutual reciprocity‖ (Meslin, Carroll, Schwartz, & 
Kennedy, 2014, p. 9). Yet, the findings from this study suggest that the state or, federal 
regulations governing financial institutions, left research participants in circumstances 
one could arguably describe as ―solitary, poore, nasty, brutish…‖ (Hobbes, 1997, p. 113). 
It appears the social contract between the government and its citizens is broken or, at 
least, extremely fractured. Further relevant to this area of inquiry is Locke‘s 
conceptualization of the social contract. Locke is particularly concerned with individual 
property rights and notions of ownership (1997). Although Locke is frequently 
interpreted as being an advocate of limited government intervention, part of this concern 
stems from his critique of the state when it fails to advance the interests of the public 
(Cahn, 1997). This particular nuance of Locke‘s social contract theory seems particularly 
relevant to the experience of foreclosure—where research demonstrates a lack of federal 
oversight of financial institutions was a precipitating factor in the housing crash. Lastly, 
and, perhaps, most relevantly is Rousseau‘s contribution to social contract theory. 
Rousseau suggests there is a ―general will‖ that arises from a collective understanding of 
the common good and commitment to citizen well-being (Cahn, 1997; Rousseau, 1997). 
Rousseau contends that inequality exists in society and social contracts may be 
established to mitigate negative consequences that arise when people with power oppress 
individuals with less means (Meslin, Carroll, Schwartz, & Kennedy, 2014). This 
particular feature of social contract theory should be tested and further developed in 
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relationship to the intersection of homeownership, foreclosure, mortgage contracts and 
financial regulations.  
 One of the reasons participants were vulnerable to foreclosure and financial 
exploitation concerned low-wage and poverty-wage employment. Although there is a 
body of existing research in the areas of living wage and affordable housing, in the wake 
of enduring economic challenges and a growing service economy, additional knowledge 
is needed. Further, a thorough comparative analysis of benefits, resource allocation, and 
outcomes should be conducted of homeownership and rental housing in low-to-moderate-
income communities. This type of study should explore the benefits that both types of 
housing provide to target populations, how financial resources are allocated, and the 
outcomes of both housing types. In addition, an examination of whether homeownership 
is always the appropriate type of housing for low- and moderate-income communities 
needs to be given further critical consideration.  
Conclusion 
 
 This discussion began with a historical review and contextual analysis of housing 
policy from the Great Depression to the Great Recession. A salient theme emanating 
from that analysis revealed that housing policy and foreclosure response was traditionally 
driven by three special interest groups—financial services, real estate, and construction 
industries. The voices, concerns, and interests of everyday people were marginalized and, 
in some cases, silenced. Following the 2006 housing crash and subsequent Great 
Recession, mirroring socio-economic conditions similar to the Great Depression, this 
study sought to give voice to people whose voices have historically been minimized. 
Through this interpretative phenomenological study, five individuals articulated the 
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meanings they associated with being a homeowner who experienced foreclosure. The 
essential pattern emerging from their collective experience was interpreted as foreclosure 
being disconnection.  Through data analysis, it was discovered that foreclosure 
represented disconnection in many areas of the participants‘ lives: disconnection from 
self; disconnection between a homebuyer and housing finance literacy; disconnection 
between lender and borrower; disconnection between a homebuyer and homeownership 
benefits; and, disconnection between participants‘ social service-based, helping-based 
and/or low-wage employment and self-sufficiency.  
Research findings both affirm and challenge traditionally held concepts about 
homeownership.  Symbolically, it was affirmed that homeownership held a sacred 
position for participants. Participants equated themselves, families, friends, positive 
attributes, and human qualities to homeownership. Yet, through a fractured relationship 
between lender and borrower, the most fundamental symbolic and financial benefits of 
homeownership were challenged. Instead of being empowered by homeownership, 
participants were exploited. Most significantly, some participants redefined 
homeownership as a liability and not as an asset. Although participants initially embraced 
the perceived freedoms of homeownership, most admitted they never had an opportunity 
to enjoy those liberties. Homeownership, coupled with low-wage employment, 
constrained them. These findings raise critical questions about the conceptual 
frameworks of assets, ownership, and freedom that are intimately intertwined with 
homeownership. Most significantly, the findings underscore the importance of listening 
to the voices of the marginalized and silenced.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Interview Schedule 
Researcher: Over the last several years, many people living in the United States have 
experienced the satisfaction of becoming a homeowner only to lose their home in 
foreclosure. In the wake of this national crisis, policies and programs have been 
established to address foreclosures. Yet, in establishing these programs and policies, 
minimal attention has been given to the people who have experienced foreclosure. The 
purpose of my study is to listen to and learn from people who have all experienced the 
transition from homeownership to foreclosure. In particular, I am interested in learning 
about you and what the experience was like for you to move from homeownership to 
foreclosure. The information you provide will be used to inform future policies and 
programs. 
 
I will first ask you a series of open-ended questions about how you came to be a 
homeowner. I will then begin asking you a series of open-ended questions about how you 
transitioned from homeownership to foreclosure. All of your responses will be kept 
confidential and there is no right or wrong answer. This interview is about a significant 
life event that happened to you, it is your story, and I respect your time and willingness to 
share it with me. Consequently, if at any time you become uncomfortable, please let me 
know and we will stop the interview to discuss your concerns. Or, if you wish to end the 
interview, please let me know and we will stop the interview immediately. Do you have 
any questions before we begin?  
 
Opening question: Can you tell me how you came to be a homeowner? (narrative) 
 
Type of question Question 
Descriptive How old were you when you purchased your home? 
Descriptive How many years or months did you live in your home?  
Descriptive Where was your home located in Indiana: Northern, central, 
southern? 
Descriptive Were you employed when you purchased your home? If yes, 
what type of job did you have?  
Evaluative Tell me about what it was like to become a homeowner?  
Evaluative What did you like best about being a homeowner? 
Evaluative  What did you like least about being a homeowner? 
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Narrative Can you tell me how your home came to be in foreclosure?  
Evaluative Tell me about what it was like to move from homeownership to 
foreclosure? 
Descriptive/Structural Can you tell me about all the stages involved in the foreclosure 
process?  
Contrast What are the main differences between being a homeowner and 
having your home in foreclosure?  
Circular What do you think people think about your home going into 
foreclosure? 
Comparative How do you think your life would be if your home had not gone 
into foreclosure?  
 
Ending question: Is there anything else about being a homeowner and/or going through 
the foreclosure process that you would like to share with me?  
 
Prompts & Probes 
 Can you tell me more about ______?  
 What do you mean by ______? 
 Why?  How? 
 Tell me what you were thinking about ______? 
 Tell me what you were feeling about ______? 
(Smith et al., 2012; Van Manen, 1990) 
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Appendix B 
Research Invitation 
 Have you or someone you know experienced foreclosure?  
Would you like to share your story?  
Invitation to Participate in Research Study  
A study exploring how homeowners have experienced foreclosure is being conducted by 
Amy Murphy-Nugen, a Ph.D. candidate at the Indiana University School of Social Work.  
 
Over the last several years, many people living in the United States have experienced the 
satisfaction of becoming a homeowner only to lose their home in foreclosure. In the wake 
of this national crisis, policies and programs have been established to address 
foreclosures. Yet, in establishing these programs and policies, minimal attention has been 
given to the people who have experienced foreclosure. The purpose of the study is to 
listen to and learn from people who have experienced the transition from homeownership 
to foreclosure. In particular, I am interested in learning about you and what the 
experience was like for you to move from homeownership to foreclosure. The 
information you provide will be used to inform future housing policies and programs.  
 
If you (or someone you know) is interested in sharing about the experience of 
homeownership and foreclosure, you will be asked to participate in a confidential 
interview. The interview will be scheduled at the participant‘s convenience and 
conducted in a location mutually agreed upon by you and the researcher. The in-person 
interview will take about 60-90 minutes to complete. Participation is completely 
voluntary. At the conclusion of the interview, each research participant will receive a 
$20.00 grocery debit card.  
 
I welcome your questions. Please contact me for more information or to schedule an 
interview at 812.237.3328 or abmurphy@iupui.edu.  
 
Sincerely,  
 
Amy Murphy-Nugen  
 
Amy Murphy-Nugen, MSW  
Ph.D. Candidate  
School of Social Work  
Indiana University  
902 West New York Street  
Education/Social Work Bldg.  
Indianapolis, IN 46202 
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Appendix C 
Study Information Sheet 
IRB STUDY #1308067968 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY STUDY INFORMATION SHEET FOR 
 
From Homeownership to Foreclosure:  
Exploring the Meanings Homeowners Associate with the Lived Experience of Foreclosure 
 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study about homeownership and foreclosure.  You 
were selected as a possible participant because you have the experience of both being a 
homeowner and going through foreclosure.  We ask that you read this form and ask any questions 
you may have before agreeing to be in the study.  
 
The study is being conducted by Amy Murphy-Nugen, a Ph.D. candidate and researcher on this 
project. Ms. Murphy-Nugen is affiliated with the Indiana University School of Social Work.   
 
STUDY PURPOSE 
 
The purpose of this study is for you to talk about your experiences with homeownership and 
foreclosure. The information you provide may be used to help other people having similar 
experiences.  
 
PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY:  
 
If you agree to be in the study, you will do the following things:  
 
 Take part in one in-person interview that will last approximately 60-90 minutes. 
 Identify a location that you feel comfortable meeting to talk about your experiences with 
homeownership and foreclosure. 
 Engage in a series of open-ended questions that ask you to speak openly and in detail 
about your experiences with homeownership and foreclosure. 
 After the in-person interview, possibly participate in one brief, follow-up phone call to 
clarify information from the in-person interview. 
 
It is possible that you will be contacted by phone following the interview for clarification or 
review of the interview. If so, you will receive no more than one additional call. If it is acceptable 
to be re-contacted, please indicate by placing your initials here_____________. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Efforts will be made to keep your personal information confidential.  We cannot guarantee 
absolute confidentiality.  Your personal information may be disclosed if required by law.  Your 
identity will be held in confidence in reports in which the study may be published and databases 
in which results will be stored.   
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The audio-recorded interviews will be transcribed by a professional transcriptionist, stored on a 
secure-server and then destroyed. To protect your confidentiality, any identifying information 
from the interview will be removed and your name will be changed to a pseudonym (fictitious 
name) on the written text. The transcripts may be shared with a research team consisting of the 
principal investigator, faculty members on the dissertation committee, and possibly one or two 
doctoral students. Transcripts will be identified with numbered codes to maintain confidentiality. 
No personal identities will be detectable in any reports or publications from this study. 
 
Organizations that may inspect and/or copy your research records for quality assurance and data 
analysis include groups such as the study investigator and his/her research associates, and the 
Indiana University Institutional Review Board or its designees. 
 
PAYMENT 
 
At the conclusion of the in-person interview, each research participant will receive a $20.00 
grocery debit card.  
 
CONTACTS FOR QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
For questions about the study, contact the researcher, Amy Murphy-Nugen, at (812) 237-3328 or 
at abmurphy@iupui.edu. 
 
For questions about your rights as a research participant or to discuss problems, complaints or 
concerns about a research study, or to obtain information, or offer input, contact the IU Human 
Subjects Office at (317) 278-3458 or (800) 696-2949. 
 
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF STUDY 
 
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  You may choose not to take part or may leave the study at 
any time.  Leaving the study will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
entitled.  There is no penalty to you if you choose to withdraw from the study at any time.  
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S101:  Introduction to Social Work; Spring 2010; enrollment 21 
S352:  Social Welfare Delivery Systems; Spring 2011; enrollment 25 
    
 
S433:  Community Behavior and Practice within a Generalist Perspective; Spring 
2011; enrollment 25 
S516:  Social Work Practice: Organizations, Communities, and Societies; Spring 
2011; enrollment 20 
S251:  History and Analysis of Social Welfare Policy; Fall 2011; enrollment 24 
S433:  Community Behavior and Practice within a Generalist Perspective; Fall 
2011; Two sections: online enrollment 30; face-to-face enrollment 19 
S503:  Human Behavior and the Social Environment I; Fall 2011; enrollment 19 
S352:  Social Welfare Policy and Practice; Spring 2012; enrollment 32 (online) 
S504:  Professional Practice Skills I; Spring 2012; Two sections: enrollment 18, 
13 
S555:  Practicum I; Spring 2012; enrollment 12 
S555:  Practicum I; Summer I & II 2012; enrollment 10 
S661:  Executive Leadership Practice; Summer II 2012, enrollment 22 
S251:  History and Analysis of Social Welfare Policy; Fall 2012; enrollment 20 
S423:  Organizational Theory and Practice, Fall 2012; enrollment 25 
S503:  Human Behavior and the Social Environment 1; Fall 2012; enrollment 20 
S505:  Social Policy Analysis and Practice; Fall 2012; enrollment 17 (IUS cohort) 
S352:  Social Welfare Policy and Practice; Spring 2013; enrollment 30 (online) 
S433:  Community Behavior and Practice within a Generalist Perspective; Spring 
2013; enrollment 27 (online) 
S504:  Professional Practice Skills I; Spring 2013; Two sections: enrollment 12 
S555:  Practicum I; Spring 2013; enrollment 11 
S460:  Scholarly Writing Seminar; Summer I & II 2013; enrollment 12 
S661:  Executive Leadership Practice, Summer II 2013; enrollment 22 
SOWK400:  Social Work Practice in Indiana Child Services, Fall 2013; 
enrollment 3 
SOWK502:  Social Welfare Policy, Fall 2013; enrollment 8 
SOWK504:  Culturally Competent Practice, Spring 2014; enrollment 6 
SOWK507:  Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice, Spring 2014; 
enrollment 6 
SOWK601:  Rural Social Work Practice, Summer 2014; enrollment 6 
 
Guest Lectures 
 
S513:  Human Behavior and the Social Environment II. (2013, April). Topic: 
―Empowerment Perspective, Critical and Radical Social Theories.‖  
S433:  Community Behavior and Practice within a Generalist Perspective. (2013, 
March). Topic: ―Social Planning and Policy.‖  
S516:  Social Work Practice II: Organizations, Communities And Societies.  
(2011, September). Topic: ―Appreciative Inquiry.‖ 
S433:  Community Behavior and Practice within a Generalist Perspective. (2010, 
November). Topic: ―Appreciative Inquiry.‖ 
S433:  Community Behavior and Practice within a Generalist Perspective. (2009, 
October; 2008, September). Topic: ―Community Economic 
Development.‖ 
    
 
S501:  Professional Social Work at the Masters Level: An Immersion. (2010; 
2008, 2007, 2006; September). Topic: ―MACRO Leadership Career 
Opportunities and Experiences.‖ 
 
 
Professional Service 
 
Indiana State University, Department of Social Work, Bachelor of Social Work 
Program, Curricular and Academic Affairs Sub-Committee, January 2014-present 
 
Indiana State University, Department of Social Work, Master of Social Work 
Program, Curricular and Academic Affairs Sub-Committee, January 2014-present 
 
Indiana State University, Department of Social Work, Curricular and Academic 
Affairs Committee, January-2014 present 
 
Indiana State University, Department of Social Work, Master of Social Work 
Program, Field Sub-Committee, January 2014-present 
 
Indiana State University, Department of Social Work, Field Committee, January 
2014-present 
 
Indiana State University, Department of Social Work, Search Committee for 
Instructor Position, January 2014-May 2014 
 
United Way of Wabash Valley, Community Impact Review Team Six, January-
February 2014 
 
Indiana State University, University Graduate Council, Curricular Affairs Sub-
committee, September 2013-present 
 
Indiana State University, First Generation Faculty Mentor Program, Faculty 
Mentor, September 2013-May 2014 
 
Indianapolis Neighborhood Resource Center, Board of Directors, 2006-2012; 
Finance Committee, September 2006-January 2010; Strategic Plan Task Force, 
October 2008- January 2010; Executive Committee, October 2009-October 2010, 
Secretary, October 2009- October 2010; Board Development and Governance 
Committee, Chair, December 2009-2012; Nominating Committee, Chair, May 
2010-October 2010, May 2011-October 2011; May 2012—October 2012 
 
Great Indy Neighborhoods Steering Committee, ICND Representative, January 
2006-June 2007 
 
 
 
    
 
National Association of Social Workers, PACE Committee Chair, 2005-2007 
 
Indiana Rural Development Council, Indiana Housing Assistance Review Team, 
March 2001- January 2008 
 
State of Indiana Consolidated Plan, Plan Coordinating Committee Member, 
December 2001- August 2005 
 
Legislation, Education, and Advocacy Day for Social Workers (LEAD), Planning 
Committee, August 2001-2007; Chair, August 2005-June 2007 
 
 
Professional Activities 
 
Conference Presentations  
 
Murphy-Nugen, A. (2008, April 23). Executive director succession planning in 
rural Indiana community-based development organizations. Poster 
presentation at the Indiana University School of Social Work Ph.D. Spring 
Symposium. Indianapolis, IN. 
 
Murphy-Nugen, A., & Richardson, R. (2009, April 8). Professional socialization 
of MSW leadership students. Poster presentation at the Indiana University 
School of Social Work Ph.D. Spring Symposium. Indianapolis, IN. 
 
Murphy-Nugen, A. (2009, July 18). Financial and developmental impacts of 
foreclosures on low- income and minority communities. Presented at the 
Building the Unsettling Force: A National Conference to End Poverty 
jointly hosted by the Poor People‘s Economic Human Rights Campaign 
(PPERHC) and the Social Welfare Action Alliance (SWAA), Louisville, 
KY. 
 
Murphy-Nugen, A. (2010, March 19). Red herring policy analysis model: A 
teaching tool for policy practice. Presented at the 27th annual conference 
of the Association of Baccalaureate Social Work Program Directors 
(BPD), Atlanta, GA. 
 
Barton, W. H., Murphy-Nugen, A., & Bloomquist, K. (2011, November). Indiana 
High-Risk Youth Reentry Program: Preliminary evaluation findings. Paper 
presented at the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology, 
Washington, DC. 
 
Murphy-Nugen, A. (2012, July). Strategy change cycle: A ten-step process to 
build capacity and nurture sustainability. Presented at the 37th annual 
national conference of the National Institute for Social Work and Human 
Services in Rural Areas, Nashville, IN.  
    
 
 
Murphy-Nugen, A. (2012, July). Strengths-based planning: Using appreciative 
inquiry to build capacity and nurture sustainability. Presented at the 37th 
annual national conference of the National Institute for Social Work and 
Human Services in Rural Areas, Nashville, IN. 
  
Murphy-Nugen, A. (2014, May). Housing Policy and Foreclosure Response at 
the Federal, State and Grassroots Levels: Implications for Social Work 
Advocacy and Practice. Presented at the 2014 Policy Conference 2.0: 
Energizing for Activism: Recommitting to Policy Change, Austin, TX.  
 
Murphy-Nugen, A. (2014, July). Hope Now? A Call for Social Work Leadership 
on Housing Policy and Foreclosure Response. Presented at the National 
Association of Social Workers 2014 National Conference, Social Work: 
Courage, Hope and Leadership, Washington, DC.  
 
 
Technical Reports 
 
Barton, W.H., & Murphy-Nugen, A. (2009). Indiana Juvenile Justice Task Force 
High Risk Youth Reentry Evaluation: Annual Progress Report, 2008. 
Indiana University School of Social Work, Indianapolis, IN. 
 
Barton, W.H., & Murphy-Nugen, A. (2010). Indiana Juvenile Justice Task Force 
High Risk Youth Reentry Evaluation: Annual Progress Report, 2009. 
Indiana University School of Social Work, Indianapolis, IN. 
 
Barton, W.H., Murphy-Nugen, A., & Bloomquist, K. (2012). Indiana Juvenile 
Justice Task Force High Risk Youth Reentry Evaluation: Final Report, 
2012. Indiana University School of Social Work, Indianapolis, IN. 
 
 
Publication 
 
McGuire, L., Howes, P., Murphy-Nugen, A., & George, K. (2011). Leadership as 
advocacy: The impact of Title IV-E supported MSW education on a public 
child welfare agency. Journal of Public Child Welfare, 5(2), 213-233. doi: 
10.1080/15548732.2011.566761 
 
 
Professional Development 
 
―Institute for Heideggerian Hermeneutical Methodologies.‖ Indianapolis, IN. 
(2009, June). Sponsored by the Institute for Heideggerian Hermeneutical 
Methodologies. Hosted by the Indiana University School of Nursing. 
 
    
 
―Discussing Research and Volunteer Topics.‖ Cologne, Germany. (2009, 
Sept./Oct.). Sponsored by Catholic Charities Archdiocese of Cologne, Germany. 
 
―Building rights, culture, and justice: Social work as a change agent.‖ San, 
Antonio, TX. (2009, November). Hosted by the Council on Social Work 
Education. 
 
―Promoting a culture of social justice: Social work and social change.‖ Atlanta, 
GA. (2010, March). Hosted by the Association of Baccalaureate Social Work 
Program Directors (BPD). 
 
―Enhancing online course series, sessions 1-5: Online course showcase and online 
teaching guidelines, web content delivery, planning an evaluation for your 
blended learning or online course, managing online interactions, assessing student 
learning in online courses.‖ Indianapolis, IN. (2011, June). Hosted by The Center 
for Teaching and Learning, Indiana University Purdue University.  
 
―Teaching today‘s students.‖ Indianapolis, IN. (2011, July). Hosted by The Center 
for Teaching and Learning, Indiana University Purdue University. 
 
―Integrating the new IUPUI common theme: Sharing ideas.‖ Indianapolis, IN. 
(2011, August). Hosted by The Center for Teaching and Learning, Indiana 
University Purdue University. 
 
―Teaching at IUPUI: Navigating IUPUI.‖ Indianapolis, IN. (2011, August). 
Hosted by The Center for Teaching and Learning, Indiana University Purdue 
University. 
 
―Oncourse: Preparing your course site.‖ Indianapolis, IN. (2011, August). Hosted 
by The Center for Teaching and Learning, Indiana University Purdue University. 
 
―Teaching at IUPUI: Syllabus and first day of class.‖ Indianapolis, IN. (2011, 
August). Hosted by The Center for Teaching and Learning, Indiana University 
Purdue University. 
 
―Oncourse advanced features.‖ Indianapolis, IN. (2011, August). Hosted by The 
Center for Teaching and Learning, Indiana University Purdue University. 
 
―2012 national conference: Strategies for strengthening communities.‖ New 
Orleans, LA. (2012, April). Hosted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Office of University Partnerships.  
 
―Moving out: How future demand will impact housing opportunity.‖ Washington, 
D.C. (2012, June). Hosted by the Urban Land Institute, Terwillinger Center for 
Housing.  
 
    
 
―Annual policy symposium: Coming home, framing the housing challenges, 
veterans‘ housing issues and broader policy solutions.‖ Washington, D.C. (2012, 
June). Hosted by the National Housing Conference and Center for Housing 
Policy.  
 
―Structural equation modeling.‖ Indianapolis, IN. (2012, August). Hosted by The 
School of Social Work, Indiana University.  
 
―Shaping the learning experience: What the best college teachers and the best 
college students do.‖ Bloomington, IN. (2013, April). Hosted by the Indiana 
University Bloomington FACET program, the Bloomington Scholarship of 
Teaching and Learning Program and the Center for Innovative Teaching and 
Learning.  
 
―Democratic engagement in a technocratic world.‖ Indianapolis, IN. (2013, 
April). Hosted by Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis, Center for 
Service and Learning.  
 
―New faculty orientation.‖ Terre Haute, IN. (2013, August-December). Hosted by 
Indiana State University, Academic Affairs.  
 
―Social and learning luncheon.‖ Terre Haute, IN. (2013, August). Hosted by the 
National Association of Social Workers, Indiana Chapter, Region 9.  
 
―Provocative ideas brownbag lunch series: Can grit be taught?‖ Terre Haute, IN. 
(2013, September). Hosted by Indiana State University, University College.  
 
―Teaching Triangles.‖ Terre Haute, IN. (2014, April-May). Hosted by Indiana 
State University, Faculty Center for Teaching Excellence.  
